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l)THE DARK SIDE OF LEADERSHIP
EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADER SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR
Leaders often have considerable control over the distribution of scarce resources within
their organizations or groups. In the quintessentially interdependent organizational
context these resources are typically needed to reach collective goals, and yet some
leaders choose to enrich themselves at the expense of the group. In academic circles as
well as in the forum of public opinion, leader self-serving behaviors have been proposed
to be particularly destructive, because they carry the specter of negative consequences for
the organization at large, as well as for individual followers’ motivation and performance.
In contrast, leader group-serving behaviors have consistently been depicted as a positive
force, linked to increased leader effectiveness. Despite the considerable dysfunctional
downstream consequences associated with leader self-serving behaviors, our under -
standing of when and why leaders choose to serve their own interests or to benefit their
groups has been limited. This dissertation aimed to uncover factors that influence leader
self versus group-serving behaviors by pointing to the value of (1) a self-concept-based
analysis, as well as (2) a power-based analysis of leader actions.
In a series of experimental and field studies, across four empirical chapters (1) I have
outlined how self-definition processes intimately tied to the leader role, as well as power-
related processes influence leaders’ framing of allocation situations and their subsequent
behaviors, and (2) I have identified potential ways to mitigate some of the negative
effects associated with elevated leader power. First, I found that self-definition as a leader
and power influence the type of information used by leaders in resource allocation
contexts. Contingent on the content of this information, more or less self-serving behaviors
ensued. Importantly, power did not necessarily lead to increased leader self-servingness.
Second, I identified systemic procedural justice, accountability, and perspective-taking as
potential mitigators of some of the more negative tendencies associated with elevated
leader power that could result in relatively self-serving leader behaviors.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Leaders are central causal agents within organizational contexts (Katz & Kahn, 
1966), and given the discretion afforded to them by virtue of their role (e.g., Mumford 
& Connelly, 1991; Williamson, 1963), their actions can be relatively self or group-
serving. While leadership has typically been a key issue in organizational behavior 
research, the core of leadership research has primarily addressed factors affecting 
leadership effectiveness, that is, what makes leaders able to influence and motivate 
followers (e.g., Bass, 1990; Chemers, 2001; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De 
Cremer, & Hogg, 2004; Yukl, 2002). One of the findings consistently emerging from 
this research has been that leaders are more effective when they display group-serving 
behaviors, that is, engage in acts that show the leader’s commitment to the collective 
and that are (perceived to be) in the interest of the group (Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999; De 
Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; van 
Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005; Yorges, Weiss, & Strickland, 1999) as opposed 
to engaging in behaviors that appear to be self-serving. Similarly, it has been pointed out 
that excessively high executive compensation, even if apparently justified, can have 
negative repercussions by weakening follower loyalty and increasing dysfunctional 
behaviors (Bok, 1993). Moreover, increased wage dispersion in organizations has been 
linked to lowered productivity, decreased cooperation, and increased turnover (e.g., 
Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993) and it has been argued that the 
ensuing inequality detrimentally impacts the collective interest (Aquino & Reed, 1998).  
Whereas empirical research has consistently attested to the value of leader group-
serving behaviors as well as to the detrimental impact of leader self-serving behaviors in 
achieving leadership effectiveness, over the last few years, public reactions have been 
particularly vehement to the staggering reports of top executives pursuing personal gain 
at the expense of their organizations (Herszhenhorn, 2008). The business press has 
become replete with headlines decrying top executives’ lofty bonuses and lavish 
spending of company money at a time when rank and file employees were losing their 
livelihoods and their companies were on the brink of bankruptcy (Dash, 2007; Hagan, 
2009; Jones, 2009). Accounts of leaders’ enjoyment of lavish perquisites, such as the 
personal use of company jets, gargantuan severance and pay packages, as well as 
extravagant company sponsored retreats – to name just a few – have come to permeate 
the major media outlets, whereas names such as Ken Lay, John Rigas, Bernie Ebbers, 
and Dennis Kozlowski have become almost synonymous to executive profligate 
behavior. More recently, executives of corporations at the root of the subprime 
mortgage crisis have met with scathing criticism for their buoyant compensation 
10
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packages after their companies lost billions in the US housing market, and John Thain, 
the ousted CEO of Merrill Lynch was publicly chastised for spending $ 1.2 Million on 
redecorating his downtown Manhattan office while his company was firing employees. 
Whereas accounts of leader self-serving behaviors have consistently drawn the ire of the 
general public and the body politic, the popular media has also extolled the behaviors of 
those leaders who prioritized their group’s interests over their own and, who, for 
example, forfeited pay increases or bonuses at times when their companies were 
floundering (e.g., Fabrikant, 2006; Glater, 2008).  
Clearly, there seems to be ample empirical evidence as well as a more general 
popular belief that, in the ubiquitously interdependent organizational context, where 
leaders are expected to use their position in the service of the collective interest, group-
serving leaders are effective because they are better able to motivate subordinates to 
exert themselves in the pursuit of organizational goals. In contrast, self-serving leader 
behaviors appear to have detrimental consequences for the organization at large, for 
subordinates’ motivation and performance as well as for leaders’ reputation and status. 
Given the specter of negative consequences carried by leader self-serving behaviors, the 
question begging for an answer is: what causes leaders to act self-servingly rather than 
group-servingly? Unfortunately, the leadership literature remains largely mute on 
determinants of leader self versus group-serving behaviors. Accordingly, there may be 
value in furthering our understanding of potential antecedents of leader self versus 
group-serving behaviors, especially given the host of potential downstream 
consequences in terms of leader effectiveness and subordinate performance. Therefore, 
the broad research question serving as the red thread for the empirical work in this 
dissertation is: 
 
Why do some leaders act self-servingly while others act to benefit their groups? 
 
To date, only a dearth of empirical research has investigated determinants of leader 
behaviors as compared to the voluminous body of work on leadership effectiveness. 
Moreover, the scant work considering determinants of leader behaviors has largely 
focused on individual difference factors (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2004; Chan & Drasgow, 
2001; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002) as well as on factors affecting leadership 
development (Day, 2001; Dvir & Shamir, 2003), rather than on social-psychological 
factors. Additionally, this previous work has not specifically zoomed in on factors 
influencing relatively group or self-serving leader behaviors.  
In contrast, the present research aims to introduce a social-psychological perspective 
in the study of leader behaviors and to identify specific psychological processes that may 
11
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affect leader self versus group-serving behaviors. In short, the ongoing theme in this 
dissertation represents a quest to uncover social-psychological factors that may play a 
role in influencing leaders to engage in relatively self or group-serving actions. 
Specifically, I took a two-pronged approach: In chapters two and three, I investigated 
the effects of self-definition and power on information processing and subsequent 
leader resource allocations, whereas in chapters four and five, I focused on how some of 
the potential negative effects associated with high leader power could be mitigated via 
organizational procedural justice systems, leader perspective-taking and leader 
accountability.  
 
Leader Self-serving Behaviors 
 
“The salary of the chief executive of the large corporation is not a market award for achievement. 
It is frequently in the nature of a warm personal gesture by the individual to himself.”  
(John Kenneth Galbraith) 
 
So far I have discussed leader self versus group-serving behaviors without delving 
into definitions of these concepts. Given that these terms tend to be relatively value-
laden and that different people will assign different meanings to them, below I will 
shortly expand on how self versus group-serving leader behaviors have been 
conceptualized in this dissertation. 
Whereas one could argue that the previously presented examples of leaders 
hubristically plundering company coffers are simply the result of untamed greed or 
power, in this dissertation I take a slightly more nuanced view of such leader allocations 
and argue, for reasons to be set forth below, that leader allocation decisions are often 
ambiguous in nature. Although undoubtedly, there will be cases where leaders pursue 
their own interests out of greed, I argue that, greed set aside, the ambiguity often 
accompanying such decisions can lead to relatively self versus group-serving behaviors.  
Typically, leaders do not only expend time and energy towards ensuring their group’s 
success, but also face the more mundane task of allocating scarce resources. These 
allocations may pertain to monetary assets such as promotions, pay increases, bonuses, 
and stock options, but they may also pertain to other types of assets such as office 
space, parking lots or company cars. In the quintessentially interdependent 
organizational context, these resources are limited, and the more of the shared resource 
(e.g., bonus budget) the leader claims for the self, the less will be available for 
subordinates’ enjoyment. Thus, leader self and group-serving behaviors are defined 
relative to each other : the more of the resource the leader self-allocates the more self-
12
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serving he/she acts, whereas the less of the resource the leader self-allocates the more 
group-serving he/she acts.  
The central argument regarding how leaders come to engage in relatively self versus 
group-serving behaviors rests on the assumption that resource allocation situations, 
where the leader distributes resources between the self and members of the group, are 
often ambiguous in nature. For example, equity considerations would imply that leaders 
are entitled to higher outcomes than subordinates (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; 
Samuelson & Allison, 1994). However, given the often ambiguous nature of leader and 
employee performance, the question as to how much higher these outcomes can be 
while still remaining justifiable, remains open to interpretation, leaving, for example, 
room for salient self-definitions to determine the type of information incorporated into 
the decision-making process. Contingent on how leaders make sense of such ambiguous 
situations, relatively self or group-serving behaviors ensue (i.e., the more of the resource 
leaders claim, the more self-servingly they act, because less is left for subordinates). 
Moreover, even when performance information is available and relatively clear-cut, the 
psychological experience of power could, for instance, influence whether the leader 
integrates such information in the decision-making process or not. Additionally, the 
psychological experience of power could color the framing of the decision by focusing 
leaders’ attention on specific types of information, at the expense of others. In short, I 
argue that the inherent ambiguity of such allocation decisions allows for psychological 
processes such as salient self-definitions or the psychological experience of power to 
significantly color the framing of the situation and to predictably influence the decision 
outcomes.  
 
Leader Self-definition Processes and the Psychology of Leader Power 
 
While several factors could influence how leaders frame ambiguous resource 
allocation situations, in this dissertation, I argue that two factors intimately tied to the 
leader role – self-definition as a leader and the psychological experience of power – fundamentally 
influence leaders’ framing of allocation situations and their subsequent allocation 
behaviors.  
Leader Self-definition. The self-concept provides a powerful sense-making frame 
(Leary & Tangney, 2003), and the notion that self-relevant cognitions serve as action 
guides has been a staple of social-cognitive research for decades. Leadership researchers 
have, however, only recently begun to direct their attention to the self-concept (Kramer, 
2003; Lord, Brown & Freiberg, 1999; Lord & Emrich, 2001; Lord & Hall, 2003, 2005; 
Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & 
13
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Hogg, 2004). Moreover, with a few exceptions (see Engle & Lord, 1997; Kramer, 2003; 
Lord & Hall, 2005), leadership scholars dealing with the self-concept have focused on 
the effects of leadership on followers’ self-concepts, thus neglecting leaders’ self-
concept and the role it might play in guiding leader decisions and behaviors. For reasons 
to be set forth below, in this dissertation, I argue that self-definition processes uniquely 
tied to the leadership role are germane in explaining leader behaviors.  
Previous research has shown that, the self-concept - all the knowledge, ideas, beliefs 
and views of the self (Banaji & Prentice, 1994) – links the individual to the environment 
and proximally influences behaviors (Leary & Tangney, 2003; Lord et al., 1999; Markus 
& Wurf, 1987). In short, what we do is to a large extent a function of who we think we 
are (Csikszentmihaliy & Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Shamir, 1991; Shamir et al., 1993). The 
self-concept is however a dynamic, flexible construct consisting of an aggregate of 
different self-schemas tied to specific social contexts and situations (Lord et al., 1999; 
van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Once a specific self-schema is activated by the social 
context, it will directly regulate and guide behavior (Brown & Smart, 1991) by 
moderating the use of social information (Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006). Whereas 
one’s self-concept can include various role-related selves which can differ in their 
centrality and importance (Markus & Wurf, 1987), I argue that the “self as leader” will 
be an important behavioral guide in work-related contexts, especially for those 
individuals for whom the “self as leader” has become a central, important defining part 
of their self-concept.  
Self-defining as a leader implies self-categorizing as a leader, seeing oneself as similar 
to the category prototype (Lord et al., 1999), incorporating the leader role into the self-
concept and developing a core self-view as a leader. Building on Kramer’s (2003) and 
Lord and Hall’s (2005) argument that self-definition as a leader serves as a meta-
structure guiding information processing, I argue that self-definition as a leader 
influences self-serving acts via its impact on the social information used to make sense 
of ambiguous resource allocations. Specifically, I argue that the more leaders self-define 
as leaders the more likely they are to rely on information about what other leaders do or 
did as well as on their beliefs about what an effective leader should do. Contingent on 
whether this information suggests acting in favor of the self or in favor of the group, 
relatively self or group-serving behaviors will ensue.  
The Psychology of Leader Power. Whereas there is an almost natural association 
between power and the leader role, the two are not synonymous (Goodwin, 2003). 
Unfortunately, despite the historical and functional link between power and leadership 
(French & Snyder, 1959), to date, their study has not been very well integrated 
(Hollander & Offerman, 1990). Power has often been considered to be a primal force 
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governing social relationships and has usually been defined as asymmetric control over 
valued resources (Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 
2003; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959). Moreover, it has been argued that this structural 
difference in the control over critical resources directly translates into psychological 
experience. The notion that power has metamorphic effects on the individual has 
already been noted by Kipnis (1972, 1976) and has been substantiated in more recent 
work on power (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; 
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007) deriving from the power-approach theory 
(Keltner et al., 2003). It has been further argued that power and its effects can become a 
psychological property of the individual independent of the context where power was 
originally activated (e.g., Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, & 
Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Magee et al., 2007).  
The leader role effectively places individuals in a position where, next to motivating, 
coordinating and directing group members’ efforts (e.g., De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; Farmer & Aquinis, 2005; Hollander, 1980; Yukl & van Fleet, 1992; 
Yukl, Wall, & Lepsinger, 1990), they have the authority to make decisions that affect 
individual and group-level outcomes. The leader role thus entails control over valuable 
resources, and consequently, it entails the possession of power. However, there will 
inevitably be some variation in the structural amount of power available within the 
leader role, and I argue that these structural differences translate directly into different 
psychological experiences of power. From an approach-theory of power perspective 
(Keltner et al., 2003) I propose that the foundation of the relationship between power 
and the leader role resides within these psychological effects of power (see also 
Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008). Because I posit that the amount of power 
psychologically experienced by individuals in leadership positions is a proximal 
motivator of their actions, in this dissertation, I examine the effects of varying amounts 
of power within the leader role on resource distributions.  
Contrary to the often-held notion that power is the root cause of leader corruption 
and derailment, in this dissertation, I will show that the effects of power on leader self 
versus group-serving behaviors are contingent on both features of the individual (i.e., 
internal belief systems) as well as on features of the situation (i.e., procedural justice 
systems and accountability constraints). I base my analysis of the effects of power on the 
power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003) as well as on more recent research directly 
deriving from it. In short, the theory suggests that power has wide-ranging psychological 
and behavioral consequences by fundamentally altering the way individuals perceive the 
world, others and themselves. According to this theory, the experience of power tips the 
balance of activation between the behavioral approach and inhibition systems, which in 
15
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turn drive behavior and cognition. Power triggers the behavioral approach system, 
which is posited to regulate behavior associated with rewards. That is, power triggers a 
general approach tendency, increases attention to rewards, frees the individual from the 
shackles of normative constraints and facilitates disinhibited behavior. In contrast, 
powerlessness activates the behavioral inhibition system, which is analogous to an alarm 
system triggering avoidance and response inhibition. That is, low power is associated 
with an avoidance tendency, an increased focus on threats and punishments and 
inhibited behaviors. Whereas a deluge of recent research based on the power-approach 
theory has documented a number of both functional as well as dysfunctional effects 
associated with elevated power (for reviews see Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008; 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008), at this point, I will merely mention three broad effects of 
power that will receive their due attention in the upcoming chapters of this dissertation: 
(1) power reveals the person (Chen et al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008; Lammers & 
Galinsky, 2009; Keltner et al., 2003); (2) power increases action-tendencies and a focus 
on rewards (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), and (3) power reduces social 
attention (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & 
Galinsky, 2008; Overbeck & Park, 2006).  
In short, in the upcoming empirical chapters of this dissertation, I will show that 
elevated leader power can lead to either self or group-serving behaviors contingent on 
leaders’ belief systems regarding effective leadership as well as contingent on features of 
the organizational environment, such as the existence of procedural justice systems or 
accountability systems.  
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 
In addition to the current introductory chapter, this dissertation consists of four 
empirical chapters as well as a final chapter where I present the findings and general 
conclusions of the present research. Whereas all four empirical chapters address the 
more general question of identifying antecedents and moderators of leader self versus 
group-serving behaviors, they are in essence stand-alone research articles and, as such, 
can be read independent of each other. As a result, there will be some overlap across 
chapters in terms of the theoretical development of my ideas. Moreover, because the 
empirical chapters have been developed in collaboration with my dissertation 
supervisors, I will use “we” instead of “I” from this point on, whenever I refer to the 
author(s).  
In chapter two, we took a self-definition perspective (Johnson et al., 2006; Lord & 
Brown, 2004; Lord et al., 1999) to understand leader self-serving behaviors. Specifically, 
16
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we considered the interactive effect of self-definition as a leader and social information 
processing (i.e., the reliance on descriptive and injunctive information) on leader self-
serving actions. Building on the notion that self-definition as a leader provides a sense-
making frame (Kramer, 2003; Lord & Hall, 2005) we predicted that the more leaders 
self-define as leaders, the more likely they are to rely on information about what other 
leaders do (i.e., descriptive information) or on beliefs about what an ideal leader should 
do (i.e., injunctive information) when allocating resources to the self. We expected that 
leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders would rely more on information about 
other leaders’ self-allocations and on their effective leadership beliefs when self-
allocating resources than those self-defining less strongly as leaders. These hypotheses 
were tested in a series of six studies - two laboratory experiments, two scenario 
experiments, and two cross-sectional surveys. In short, in this chapter, we argued that 
leaders are more likely to use social reference information when their self-definition is 
deeply embedded in those references. The main aim of this chapter was three-fold: (1) 
to put the study of the determinants of leader self and group-serving behaviors on the 
research agenda; (2) to introduce self-definition as a leader as a concept to be reckoned 
with when studying leader behaviors; (3) to show that self-definition as a leader interacts 
with both descriptive and injunctive information in determining leader self-serving 
behaviors. 
In chapter three we investigated the effects of power on leader self-serving 
behaviors. Following recent insights from the approach-theory of power (Keltner et al., 
2003) suggesting that power has wide-ranging psychological and behavioral 
consequences, we posited that leader power would influence the type of information 
(i.e., situational, context-specific versus internal, context-free information) leaders rely 
on in their resource distributions. Specifically, we predicted that high power leaders’ 
resource allocations would be impacted less by contextual cues such as performance 
information than low power leaders’ allocations. In contrast, we posited that high power 
leaders’ allocations would be more a reflection of their internal role-related schemas 
concerning effective leadership than low power leaders’ allocations. In short, we argued 
that higher leader power would not inevitably result in higher leader self-servingness. 
Rather, we purported that the more power a leader holds, the more the leader’s actions 
become contingent on internal belief states and the less they become contingent on 
situational, contextual cues. Whether this results in more or less self-serving behaviors 
depends on the nature of these belief states and contextual cues. We tested these 
hypotheses in a series of five studies – two laboratory experiments, two scenario 
experiments and one cross-sectional organizational survey. Our aim in this chapter was 
three-fold: 1) to contribute to an understanding of how power informs leader decisions 
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by integrating research on power and leadership; 2) to show that power diminishes the 
strength of the situation and increases the relevance of leaders’ beliefs about effective 
leadership; 3) to outline and demonstrate that this offers a viable perspective to 
understand variations in leader self versus group-serving behaviors.  
In chapter four we changed the focus of our attention from the influence of self-
definition processes and power on the processing of social information to potential 
ways of mitigating leader self-serving behaviors. Because some leader self-interested 
allocations appear to stem from a power-induced myopia that narrows the focus of 
attention to one’s own vantage point, one way to mitigate the occurrence of such 
behaviors would be to increase the extent to which powerful individuals consider others’ 
perspectives and interests. To this end, we argued that (1) perspective-taking can serve 
to broaden powerful individuals’ attention to incorporate consideration of others’ 
interests, and that (2) procedural justice systems can lead to increased perspective-taking 
on the part of powerful leaders. Our take on how procedural justice systems and 
perspective-taking can counteract a power-induced egocentric focus can be broken 
down into two interrelated positions that we developed and tested in the three studies 
(one laboratory experiment, one scenario experiment, and one cross-sectional 
organizational survey) reported in this chapter. First, in Study 1 we argued that the 
presence of procedural justice systems (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; 
Leventhal, 1980) should lead to increased perspective-taking on the part of powerful 
leaders. This in turn, should facilitate powerful leaders’ active consideration of 
subordinate interests, resulting in lower self-allocations in contrast to conditions where 
procedural justice systems are absent. Second, in Study 2 and 3, we proposed that the 
effect of procedural justice systems on leader resource self-allocations would be stronger 
for high than for low power leaders, but only under conditions of no perspective-taking. 
When perspective-taking is high, the effect of procedural justice systems on leader 
resource self-allocations should be weaker. Specifically, we hypothesized that under 
conditions of no perspective-taking, high power leaders should self-allocate less 
resources when procedural justice systems are present than when they are absent. 
However, high power leaders in the high perspective-taking conditions should self-
allocate about the same (low) amount of resources regardless of the presence or absence 
of procedural justice systems. The aim of this chapter was two-fold: 1) to identify two 
important factors influencing powerful leaders’ resource allocations: procedural justice 
systems and leader perspective-taking; (2) to outline both the theoretical and practical 
relevance of procedural justice systems and perspective-taking in mitigating the negative 
effects of power in the service of leadership. 
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In chapter five we focused on accountability as a potential moderator of the effects 
of power on leader self-serving behaviors. Specifically, we posited that subjecting leaders 
to accountability constraints should serve to mitigate some of the potentially negative 
effects associated with high power. We expected that accountable high power leaders 
should act less self-servingly than non-accountable high power leaders, whereas low 
power leaders should act less self-servingly than high power-leaders regardless of 
whether they are held accountable or not. This hypothesis was tested in one laboratory 
experiment as well as in one cross-sectional survey. The primary aim of this chapter was 
to provide first empirical evidence of the moderating role of accountability in the 
relationship between leader power and leader resource allocations.  
In chapter six, we summarized the findings of the empirical chapters and attempted 
to discuss the more general implications – both theoretical and practical – of these 
findings for leadership research in general, as well as for the study of leader self-serving 
behaviors in particular.  
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Chapter 2:Leader Self-definition and Leader Self-serving 
Behavior 
 
The present research investigated the relationship between leader self-definition processes and leader 
self-serving behaviors. We hypothesized that self-definition as a leader interacts with social reference 
information (descriptive and injunctive) in predicting leader self-serving actions. Six studies (i.e., two 
laboratory experiments, two scenario experiments, and two cross-sectional surveys) showed that self-
definition as a leader affected the extent to which leader resource self-allocations were informed by 
descriptive information (i.e., other leaders’ self-allocations) and injunctive information (i.e., effective 
leadership beliefs). Leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders relied more on other leaders’ self-
allocations and on effective leadership beliefs when allocating resources to the self than those self-defining 
less strongly as leaders. The data suggest that leaders are more likely to use social reference information 
when their self-definition is deeply embedded in those references.  
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Introduction 
 
Leaders can wield the discretion afforded to them by virtue of their role (Mumford 
& Connelly, 1991) to engage in relatively group or self-serving actions. While a lot of 
leaders1 use their position admirably and pursue group interests, others do not. 
Accounts of leader enjoyment of lavish perquisites, such as the personal use of company 
jets and gargantuan severance and pay packages (e.g., Dash, 2007) have come to 
permeate the business press. Public reactions have been particularly vehement to reports 
of leaders pursuing personal gain while their companies were on the brink of collapse 
(Herszhenhorn, 2008). Thus, the Dutch media scathingly covered the case of a local IT 
company facing bankruptcy, where the managers had raised their own salaries while the 
employees had agreed to a 20% salary cut. Next to the popular outcry against leader 
corruption and the blatant misallocation of resources, it has been argued that leaders 
who distribute resources to their own advantage harm group interests (Aquino & Reed, 
1998). Empirical research has consistently shown a positive relationship between leader 
group-serving (vs. self-serving) behaviors and leader effectiveness (e.g., Choi & Mai-
Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & van 
Knippenberg, 2005; Yorges, Weiss, & Strickland, 1999). Moreover, excessively high 
executive compensation has been linked to weakened follower loyalty and increased 
dysfunctional behaviors (Bok, 1993), whereas increased wage dispersion in organizations 
has been associated with lowered productivity, decreased cooperation and increased 
turnover (e.g., Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1992; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Given that leader 
self-serving actions carry the specter of negative consequences for the organization, as 
well as for subordinates’ motivation and performance, the question begging for an 
answer is: What causes leaders to act self-servingly? Surprisingly, the leadership literature 
remains largely mute on determinants of leader self-serving behaviors. Accordingly, 
especially given the host of negative consequences associated with leader self-serving 
acts, there may be value in investigating antecedents of leader self-serving behaviors.  
In this research we investigate determinants of leader self-serving allocations. 
Leaders do not only expend time and energy towards ensuring their group’s success, but 
also face the more mundane task of allocating scarce resources (e.g., stock options, 
bonuses, office space). However, the more of the shared resource (e.g., bonus budget) 
the leader claims for the self, the less will be available for subordinates. Leaders making 
such resource allocations may face an ambiguous situation that requires them to engage 
in a sense-making process. Equity considerations imply that leaders are entitled to higher 
outcomes than followers (e.g., De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison, 
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1994). But given the ambiguous nature of leader and follower performance how much 
higher can these outcomes be while still remaining justifiable? In addition to equity 
concerns, temptations to use the opportunity to ensure good outcomes for the self on 
the one hand, and feelings of responsibility to prioritize the group’s interests on the 
other hand, may further add to leaders’ uncertainty about what behavior would be 
appropriate. Contingent on how leaders make sense of such ambiguous decisions, 
relatively self or group-serving behaviors ensue (i.e., the more of the resource leaders 
claim, the more self-servingly they act, because less is left for followers).  
In this research we take a self-definition perspective (Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 
2006; Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999) to understand leader self-
serving behaviors. Specifically, we consider the interactive effect of self-definition as a 
leader and social information processing (i.e., the reliance on descriptive and injunctive 
information) on leader resource allocations. Building on the notion that self-definition 
as a leader provides a sense-making frame (Kramer, 2003; Lord & Hall, 2005) we predict 
that the more leaders self-define as leaders, the more likely they are to rely on 
information about what other leaders do or on beliefs about what an ideal leader should 
do when making resource self-allocations. Our aim is thus three-fold: (1) to put the 
study of the determinants of leader self and group-serving behaviors on the research 
agenda; (2) to introduce self-definition as a leader as a concept to be reckoned with 
when studying leader behaviors; (3) to show that self-definition as a leader interacts with 
both descriptive and injunctive information in determining leader self-serving behaviors. 
In doing so, we provide a conceptual and empirical basis for the study of this important 
but largely neglected issue in leadership research.  
 
Self-definition as a Leader 
 
The self-concept provides a powerful sense-making frame (Leary & Tangney, 2003), 
and yet, the leader’s self-concept has been largely ignored in the study of leadership 
processes (for some exceptions see Engle & Lord, 1997; Lord & Hall, 2005). In this 
research, we argue that self-definition processes uniquely tied to the leadership role are 
germane in explaining leader behaviors. 
The self-concept is a knowledge structure that helps individuals organize and make 
sense of their memory and behavior (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2004; Markus & Wurf, 1987), 
and it has been shown to proximally influence behaviors (Leary & Tangney, 2003). It is 
however also a dynamic, flexible construct consisting of an aggregate of different self-
schemas tied to specific social contexts and situations (Lord et al., 1999; van 
Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). Once a specific self-
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schema is activated by the social context, it will directly regulate and guide behavior 
(Brown & Smart, 1991) by moderating the use of social information (Johnson et al., 
2006). Thus, one’s self-concept can include various role-related selves such as being a 
parent or a leader. The ‘self as leader’ is however more likely to be a relevant behavioral 
guide in a work-related context than at home, while the ‘self as parent’ is more likely to 
inform behavior at home. These various self-conceptions can also differ in terms of 
their centrality and importance, that is, they can be core or peripheral self-conceptions. 
Central self-conceptions are more elaborate and predict information processing and 
behavior more strongly than peripheral self-conceptions (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Thus, 
‘the self as leader’ will be a central, important defining part of their self-concept for 
some individuals in leadership positions, but not for others. Individuals holding 
leadership roles will differ in the extent to which they self-define as leaders and 
incorporate the leader role into their self-concept.  
Support for the argument that leaders vary in the degree to which they self-define as 
leaders comes from two different areas of leadership research: the leader development 
literature (Lord & Hall, 2005) and a social-identity inspired analysis of leadership 
(Kramer, 2003). Lord and Hall (2005) postulate that across time and with mounting 
experience leaders incorporate the leader role into their self-identity and develop a self-
concept as leaders. Key to developing a leader identity is self-categorizing as a leader and 
developing a self-view as a leader. Moreover, this categorization as a leader can be 
independent of how the leader construes the actual role (i.e., the scripts that would 
directly guide role-behavior). More importantly, Lord and Hall contend that, once 
activated, this leader self-definition serves as a meta-structure guiding information 
processing, goal setting, and behavior. Similarly, Kramer (2003) ascertains in a qualitative 
study that leader identities, i.e., the self-categorizations they use to define who they are 
as leaders and the way in which they construe their leadership role, are intimately linked 
to their decisions. Self-definition as a leader is proposed to influence how the decision 
situation is framed and made sense of by providing a framework against which the 
consequences of actions are evaluated (Kramer, 2003). 
In sum, self-defining as a leader implies self-categorizing as a leader, seeing oneself 
as similar to the category prototype (Lord et al., 1999), incorporating the leader role into 
the self-concept and developing a core self-view as a leader. Building on Kramer’s 
(2003) and Lord and Hall’s (2005) argument that self-definition as a leader serves as a 
meta-structure guiding information processing, we argue that self-definition as a leader 
influences self-serving acts via its impact on the social information used to make sense 
of ambiguous resource allocations.  
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Social Information Processing 
 
In novel or ambiguous decision making situations that require sense-making, 
individuals often look at similar others or search their beliefs about ideal others for 
information about an appropriate course of action (Parks, Sanna, & Berel, 2001; Wood, 
1996). That is, when uncertain about how to act, individuals rely on some sort of 
normative information. This can be information of the descriptive variety (i.e., what 
others do) as well as of the injunctive variety (i.e., what should be done) (Kallgren, Reno, 
& Cialdini, 2000). Accordingly, leaders making sense of ambiguous resource allocations 
may base their decisions on information about what other leaders do or did as well as on 
their beliefs about what an effective leader should do.  
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) predicts that, to reduce uncertainty, 
people compare themselves to similar others (e.g., Greenberg, Ashton-James, & 
Ashkanasy, 2007; Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). The comparison source can refer to 
actual people as well as to generalized standards or self-standards (Greenberg et al., 
2007). The choice of the reference target is determined by its availability and relevance 
(Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). Thus, information about the comparison target has to be 
both available and relevant to solving the focal person’s current conundrum. More 
importantly, others (concrete persons or abstractions of ideal types) with whom one 
shares some type of category membership are particularly salient and important sources 
of comparison information (Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1988). Consequently, we 
propose that leaders making sense of resource self-allocations choose other leaders’ 
behaviors (i.e., comparison to concrete persons sharing membership in the leader 
category) or their beliefs about effective ideal leaders (i.e., comparison to a generalized 
standard of an effective ideal leader) as the referent standard for their own behavior.  
Leader Social Comparisons 
The workplace is a social comparison arena par excellence, and yet, only a dearth of 
organizational behavior research has taken a social comparison perspective (Brown, 
Ferris, Heller, & Keeping, 2007). The few undertaken studies, have, however, 
demonstrated the ubiquity of social comparison processes pertaining to resource 
entitlement perceptions. Wage comparisons with similar others on dimensions such as 
job-level and gender have been shown to influence wage entitlement beliefs (e.g., 
Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996; Major & Forcey, 1985). Social comparison processes 
have also been shown to affect leader compensation decisions. O’Reilly, Main, and 
Crystal (1988) found, in a field study of 105 firms, a strong positive relationship between 
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CEO compensation and compensation committee members’ remuneration. Specifically, 
they showed that CEOs whose compensation committee chair earned more than the 
focal CEO (i.e., the CEO whose salary had to be determined) on average received more 
pay, even after controlling for economic determinants. The authors argued that 
committee members (CEOs of similar companies) faced with an ambiguous decision 
(i.e., how much to pay the CEO) used their own pay as a standard for setting the focal 
CEO’s compensation.  
In sum, social comparisons seem to have cognitive and behavioral consequences 
(Wood, 1996). One such behavioral consequence could be the use of the comparison 
target’s behavior as a standard for determining one’s own behavior. Leaders deciding on 
the size of their own outcomes are likely to see others holding similar structural 
positions in organizations as the relevant comparison other (i.e., other leaders) (e.g., 
Shah, 1998), and use these other leaders’ outcomes as the diagnostic comparison 
standard. However, not all leaders will rely on information about other leaders’ benefits 
equally strongly. The more leaders self-define as leaders, the more likely they are to see 
information pertaining to the leader category as relevant and diagnostic. Therefore, 
leaders who self-define more strongly as leaders are more likely to use descriptions of 
other leaders’ actions or outcomes as the relevant standard informing their own 
decisions.  
Effective Leadership Beliefs 
Information about other leaders’ compensation (i.e., descriptive normative 
information) cannot always be expected to be available. As already stated, the 
comparison target can be a similar ‘other’ as well as a generalized standard or belief about 
an ideal ‘other’ (i.e., injunctive normative information). Thus, we argue that a qualitatively 
different type of information, namely one’s beliefs about the behaviors of an ideal other 
can also serve as a behavioral standard. 
While some progress in leadership research has been made in understanding 
followers’ (perceivers’) schemas of leaders, relatively little attention has been devoted to 
leaders’ own role-related schemas. The published record offers, however, some clues 
suggesting that they influence leader actions. Leaders’ behavioral schemas pertaining 
directly to the leader role (i.e., implicit leadership theories) have been posited to 
represent a foundation for the generation of behaviors (Lord & Maher, 1993; Meindl & 
Ehrlich, 1987). These schemas contain the attributes, features, images, and ideas that 
define the schema category (Wofford & Goodwin, 1994). 
One such specific type of leader behavioral schema is an effective leadership 
schema. Previous studies on implicit leadership theories have shown that perceivers hold 
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different schemas for effective and ineffective leaders (e.g., Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 
1984; Phillips & Lord, 1982). Although we are not aware of any research examining 
leaders’ own effective leadership schemas, it seems safe to assume that most leaders 
strive toward being effective. Whereas there is no universally accepted definition of 
leadership effectiveness, leaders undoubtedly hold beliefs about how an effective leader 
ought to behave and these beliefs can serve as behavioral standards. Thus, we posit that 
leaders hold a schema of an effective leader that “provides a self-standard about how 
the leader should behave in a given situation” (Lord & Maher, 1993, p. 132). We also 
propose that the content of leaders’ effective leadership schemas can vary along the self 
vs. group-serving dimension. Some leaders may think that effective leaders should fully 
take advantage of their status by enjoying the perks associated with the position, while 
others may think that they should renounce their status symbols by forfeiting perks. We 
therefore argue that the content of effective leadership beliefs (ELBs) (self vs. group-
serving) determines the self or group-orientation of leader resource allocations. 
However, not all leaders will rely equally strongly on ELBs. The extent to which leaders 
rely on ELBs is contingent on their self-definition as leaders. The more they self-define 
as leaders, the more they see beliefs about effective leadership as applicable to 
themselves and the more likely they are to use them in guiding their allocation decisions.  
 
Overview of the Present Research 
 
In sum, we predict that self-definition as a leader interacts with both descriptive and 
injunctive information in determining leader resource self-allocations. Contingent on the 
content of the information used, these allocations will be more or less self-serving. That 
is, we do not propose that high leader self-definition will unequivocally lead to leader 
self-serving behaviors. Rather, we expect leaders who self-define more strongly as 
leaders to act more self-servingly when descriptive information suggests that other 
leaders’ outcomes are high or when they endorse self-serving effective leadership beliefs. 
In contrast, we expect leaders who self-define more strongly as leaders to act less self-
servingly when descriptive information suggests that other leaders’ outcomes are low or 
when they endorse group-serving effective leadership beliefs.  
To test our hypothesized relationships between leader self-definition, descriptive and 
injunctive information and leader self-serving behaviors, we opted for a multiple-study, 
multiple-method approach. The first set of three studies (Study 1a, 1b, and 1c) focused 
on the interactive effect of leader self-definition and descriptive information about 
leader behavior. The second set of studies (Study 2a, 2b, and 2c) focused on the 
interaction between leader self-definition and injunctive information about effective 
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leadership. By thus testing essentially the same hypothesis for descriptive and injunctive 
information, we aimed to provide convergent evidence for the more general hypothesis 
that self-definition as a leader renders leader self-serving behavior contingent on social 
comparisons with standards informative about leader appropriate behaviors. Each set of 
three studies applied three different methodologies: a laboratory experiment, a scenario 
experiment, and a cross-sectional survey. The laboratory experiments (Study 1a and 2a) 
allowed us to establish causality in a situation in which participants were immersed in 
the leadership role. While these studies are high in experimental realism (Ilgen, 1986; 
Mook, 1983), they could potentially be criticized for their artificiality. To alleviate this 
potential criticism, we tested the same hypotheses in two scenario experiments (Study 
1b and 2b). The scenarios described hypothetical organizational situations, thus 
increasing the mundane realism of the studies, while maintaining the experimental 
nature of the test (van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). To determine whether 
the predicted relationships may also be observed in organizational settings, we 
conducted two cross-sectional surveys (Study 1c and 2c) in two heterogeneous samples 
of British organizational leaders. 
To further establish the robustness of the predicted interactions, each set of three 
studies used different conceptualizations and thus different manipulations and 
measurements of the social information concept. Whereas at a higher level of 
abstraction other leaders’ self-allocations and ELBs fall under the category of normative 
social information, at a lower level of abstraction these two types of information are 
conceptually different. Other leaders’ self-allocations/outcomes provide descriptive 
information (i.e., what other leaders commonly do) without any claims as to the 
appropriateness of these actions, and thus without any intrinsic implications for 
leadership effectiveness. Effective leadership beliefs provide injunctive information (i.e., 
what an ideal leader should do) and thus inherently carry implications for ‘good’ 
leadership by sanctioning actions that are approved or disapproved of. Hence, Studies 
2a, 2b, and 2c extend the findings of Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c by showing that self-
definition as a leader does not only moderate reliance on information about others’ 
actions, but also reliance on beliefs associated with ‘good’ leadership.  
Self-definition as a leader implies self-categorizing as a member of the leader 
category as well as seeing the self as similar to the category prototype. Consequently, we 
operationalized self-definition as a leader by experimentally manipulating (1) the 
perceived similarity to typical leaders (Study 1a and 2a) and (2) self-categorization in 
terms of the leader category (Study 1b and 2b). In the two surveys (Study 1c and 2c) we 
measured self-definition as a leader via the self-definition manipulation checks used in 
our experiments. By manipulating the self-definition as a leader construct in two 
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different ways and by measuring it with the same items in the surveys, the confidence in 
our findings is bolstered.  
Our dependent variable across our experimental studies is the amount of resources 
(e.g., points in Study 1a and 2a or money in Study 1b and 2b) leaders self-allocated out 
of a shared group resource. In the two surveys (Study 1c and 2c) we extended our 
dependent measure by tapping into leader behaviors, above and beyond simple 
monetary allocations. To this end, leaders reported how often they had engaged in 
certain behaviors during the past year (e.g., used their position to secure benefits for the 
self, claimed undue credit, did not invest time in a group project).  
 
Study 1a, 1b, and 1c 
 
Study 1a, 1b, and 1c tested the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The effects of other leaders’ self-allocations on leader self-allocations are stronger for 
leaders who self-define more strongly as leaders than for leaders who self-define less 
strongly as leaders.  
 
In Study 1a participants were led to believe that they were the leader of a four-
person group engaged in computer-mediated task performance. In reality, the group 
interaction was simulated via the experimental set-up. In Study 1b participants were 
presented with a hypothetical organizational scenario where they had to imagine being a 
leader and had to make a resource allocation decision. In Study 1c we measured self-
definition as a leader, perceptions of other leaders’ outcomes, and leader self-serving 
behaviors in a cross-sectional sample of organizational leaders.  
 
Study 1a 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty Dutch business administration students (32 
females, 48 males) with a mean age of 20.53 years (SD = 2.45) participated voluntarily in 
the study in exchange for 10 euro (approximately 12 US dollars). Participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Self-definition as a leader: high vs. low) X 2 
(Other leaders’ self-allocations: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants were invited in groups of four to participate in a computer-
mediated study on “virtual group decision making” and were seated in individual 
cubicles, each equipped with a computer. All instructions and stimuli were presented on 
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the computer screens and all dependent measures were recorded by the program 
software. 
After being informed about random assignment to a four-person team, participants 
completed a purported cognitive style test. Cognitive styles were presented as individual 
differences and all styles were described as being equally desirable. Participants then 
learned that their team, similar to real-world teams, had a hierarchical team structure 
(i.e., a leader and three subordinates) and that the team members were to be rewarded 
for their work. The instructions also prompted participants to imagine that their team 
was an advertising firm trying to secure the campaign of at least one of three potential 
clients eager to introduce new products on the Dutch market. Their “firm” had to 
generate marketing names for three products (i.e., a perfume, a bicycle, and a cell-
phone). 
To ensure the credibility of the computer-mediated virtual group interaction space, 
we made participants wait for 2 minutes for the alleged establishment of a network 
connection between themselves and their teammates. After confirmation of the bogus 
connection, all participants were assigned the leader role ostensibly by comparing their 
test scores to those of other leaders in our study. The reasoning leading to participants’ 
leader role assignment differed across conditions, and represented our self-definition as 
a leader manipulation. In the high self-definition condition, participants read that they had 
been chosen to be the leader because they were very similar to and representative of 
other leaders. Moreover, they had a lot in common with and exhibited qualities typical 
of these leaders. In the low self-definition condition, participants read that they were not 
very similar to and not representative of other leaders. They also had very little in 
common with and did not exhibit qualities typical of these leaders2 . 
The instructions stressed that, as leaders, they had to distribute tasks, motivate 
subordinates to perform well (via email), and synthesize the results of subordinates’ 
idea-generation efforts. Leaders did not generate any ideas (under the pretext that they 
had to complete other tasks). All leaders took the opportunity to send emails to their 
‘subordinates’. They spent an average of 6 minutes composing the emails and wrote an 
average of 112 words. There were no significant differences among conditions in the 
amount of time spent writing emails or in the number of words used suggesting that all 
participants took the leader role seriously and believed to be working in a real team.  
The team could earn a 450-point total for task-performance. Each subordinate 
earned a 60-point minimum with the possibility of accruing performance-contingent 
bonus points. The final number of points each subordinate earned was thus kept 
ambiguous. Participants read that, as leaders, they could self-award points out of the 
450-point total (i.e., our main dependent measure). The more the leader self-allocated, 
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the less was left in the “team pool” for subordinates’ bonuses. Participants were then 
presented with our other leaders’ self-allocations manipulation. Participants in the high 
(vs. low) other leaders’ self-allocations conditions read that other leaders had self-allocated on 
average 180 points (i.e., high self-allocations) or 90 points (i.e., low self-allocations).  
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the number of 
points leaders self-awarded. To ensure that participants had a real incentive to self-
allocate points, we informed them that at the end of the study everyone would enter a 
few 50 euro individual lotteries. The winners were to be determined by random drawing. 
Each compensation point counted as one lottery entry. Thus, the more points 
participants self-awarded, the higher were their chances of winning one of the 50 euro 
prizes. Finally, after answering our dependent measures, including some demographic 
indicators such as age, gender, and study major, participants were thanked for their 
participation, paid, and debriefed. At the end of the experiment we also randomly 
probed participants for suspicion regarding the reality of the virtual team. None of them 
indicated any suspicion. All dependent measures, unless otherwise stated, were measured 
on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  
Manipulation checks. As a check of our self-definition manipulation participants 
answered a 7-item scale (adapted from van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005) 
(e.g., “I see myself as a leader.”; “Being a leader is a central part of who I am.”; “I am a 
typical leader.”; “Being a leader is important to who I am.”). All items were combined 
into an average self-definition score (Cronbach’s ơ = .88). As a check of our other 
leaders’ self-allocations manipulation, participants answered the following question: 
“Other leaders in this study have self-allocated on average (1) 90 points; (2) 180 points; 
(3) I did not receive any information on that”.  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) self-definition as a leader (high/low) and 
other leaders’ self-allocations (high/low) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. A two-way ANOVA on the average self-definition score 
revealed only a significant main effect of self-definition, F (1, 76) = 39.14, p < .001, Ƨ²p 
= .343 , indicating that leaders in the high self-definition condition (M = 4.73, SD = .93) 
self-defined more as leaders than those in the low self-definition condition (M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.08). As a testament to our other leaders’ self-allocations manipulation, 78 out of 
80 participants answered the multiple-choice question correctly. The two individuals 
answering incorrectly chose the “I did not receive any information on that” option, and 
they were distributed across two different conditions4 . Thus, we may conclude that our 
manipulations were successful5 .  
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Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders self-
awarded revealed a main effect of other leaders’ self-allocations, F (1, 76) = 33.58, p < 
.001, Ƨ²p = .30. Participants presented with high other leaders’ self-allocations self-
awarded more points (M = 137.85, SD = 37.00) than those presented with low other 
leaders’ self-allocations (M = 97.07, SD = 26.76). This main effect was however 
qualified by a Self-definition X Other leaders’ self-allocations interaction, F (1, 76) = 
5.11, p = .02, Ƨ²p = .06 (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 450 points) in Study 1a 
Low High
Self-definition as a leader
N
um
be
r o
f p
oi
nt
s 
le
ad
er
s 
se
lf-
al
lo
ca
te
d High other leaders’ self-allocations
Low other leaders’ self-allocations
60
20
40
120
80
100
0
140
160
  
 
We had predicted that leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders would rely more 
on information about other leaders’ self-allocations than leaders self-defining less 
strongly as leaders. A simple main effects analysis indicated that leaders in the high self-
definition condition self-awarded more points when other leaders’ self-allocations were 
high (M = 150.65, SD = 38.25) than when they were low (M = 94.52, SD = 18.96), F (1, 
76) = 33.29, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .30, CI (diff) = between 36.75 and 75.50. Leaders in the low 
self-definition condition also self-awarded more points when other leaders’ self-
allocations were high (M = 124.37, SD = 31.16) than when they were low (M = 99.75, 
SD = 33.38), F (1, 76) = 6.09, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .07, CI (diff) = between 4.75 and 44.48. 
However, as the effect sizes indicate, this effect was weaker than the one found for 
leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders. Also in line with our hypothesis, we found 
that when other leaders’ self-allocations were high, leaders in the high self-definition 
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condition self-allocated more points (M = 150.65, SD = 38.25) than those in the low 
self-definition condition (M = 124.37, SD = 31.16), F (1, 76) = 6.94, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .08, 
CI (diff) = between 6.41 and 46.14. Thus, leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders 
included high other leaders’ self-allocations more readily into their decision than leaders 
self-defining less strongly as leaders. No such differences between the high and low self-
definition conditions were found when other leaders’ self-allocations were low. 
 
Study 1b 
 
Study 1a provides important first evidence for our hypothesis. However, replications 
generally bolster confidence in conclusions – especially replications with different 
manipulations of key independent variables. As already stated, two related factors feed 
into self-definition as a leader: (1) similarity to the category prototype and, (2) the actual 
self-categorization and incorporation of the category into the self-concept. In Study 1a 
our self-definition manipulation tapped primarily into the typicality/similarity 
dimension. In Study 1b we therefore manipulated self-definition as a leader more 
directly as self-categorization in terms of the leader category. 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Seventy-four Dutch economics students (29 females, 45 
males) participated voluntarily in a series of unrelated studies in exchange for 10 euro 
(approximately 12 US dollars). Participants’ mean age was 21.14 years (SD = 2.06) and 
they were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Self-definition as a leader: high vs. 
low) X 2 (Other leaders’ self-allocations: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants were invited individually to the laboratory and were seated 
in separate cubicles equipped with a computer. All instructions, manipulations and the 
recording of the dependent measures were administered via the computer. Participants 
were informed that they would read the description of an organizational situation and 
that they had to answer a few questions pertaining to it. The scenario text prompted 
participants to imagine that they were the R&D director of a pharmaceutical company 
directly leading a department of 31 employees.  
Then we introduced our self-definition as a leader manipulation. In the high self-
definition condition participants read that: “You are sitting at your desk thinking about 
your job. You realize that being a leader has become an important part of who you are. 
Only yesterday you were playing golf with a new member at your golf-club, and when he 
asked about your job, your answer was surprisingly simple: I lead other people!!! I am a 
leader.” In the low self-definition condition participants read that: “You are sitting at your 
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desk thinking about your job. You realize that being a leader has not become an 
important part of who you are. Only yesterday you were playing golf with a new 
member at your golf-club, and when he asked about your job, your answer was 
surprisingly simple: I do not lead other people!!! I am not a leader.” 
The scenario text continued by having the director’s secretary interrupt him/her by 
bringing an urgent matter to his/her attention: the department’s salary budget for the 
year. The departmental salary budget was 2,450,000 euro. Based on company policy, 
each of the 31 employees earned, on average, a fixed salary of 57,200 euro, with the 
possibility of earning a bonus. Company policy did not dictate the directors’ salaries and 
they could decide on how much they would earn out of the 2,450,000 euro allocated to 
the department. The remainder of the 2,450,000 (after subtracting the leader’s self-
assigned salary and the employees’ fixed salaries) was to be used for employees’ bonuses. 
The text stressed that leaders were not eligible for a bonus and that they would need to 
factor that into their salary self-allocation. Then we introduced our other leaders’ self-
allocations manipulation. Participants either read that other directors had self-allocated 
an average salary of 224,000 euro (i.e., high self-allocations) or 112,000 euro (i.e., low self-
allocations). 
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the amount of 
money participants self-awarded. After answering our dependent measures, participants 
were thanked, paid, and debriefed. All dependent measures, unless otherwise stated, 
were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).  
Manipulation checks. As a check of our self-definition manipulation participants 
answered the same 7-item scale as in Study 1a (Cronbach’s ơ = .97). As a check of our 
other leaders’ self-allocations manipulation, participants answered the following 
question: “Other leaders have self-allocated on average (1) 112,000 euro; (2) 224,000 
euro; (3) I did not receive any information.” 
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) self-definition as a leader (high/low) and 
other leaders’ self-allocations (high/low) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. As expected, a two-way ANOVA on the average self-
definition score revealed only a significant main effect of self-definition, F (1, 70) = 
143.55, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .67, with participants in the high self-definition condition (M = 
6.21, SD = .79) self-defining to a greater extent as leaders than participants in the low 
self-definition condition (M = 2.65, SD = 1.59). All participants answered our other 
leaders’ self-allocations manipulation check question correctly, leading us to conclude 
that our manipulations were successful. 
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Leader allocation decision. Not surprisingly, a two-way ANOVA on the amount 
of money leaders self-awarded revealed a main effect of other leaders’ self-allocations, F 
(1, 70) = 123.02, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .64. When other leaders’ self-allocations were high 
participants self-allocated more money (M = 208,905.60, SD = 57,242.46) than when 
other leaders’ self-allocations were low (M = 110,627.80, SD = 18,266.97). However, 
this main effect was qualified by our predicted Self-definition X Other leaders’ self-
allocations interaction, F (1, 70) = 10.20, p = .002, Ƨ²p = .13 (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders (out of 2,445,000 euro) in Study 1b 
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In line with Study 1a, a simple main effects analysis indicated that leaders in the high 
self-definition condition self-awarded more money when other leaders’ self-allocations 
were high (M = 231,866.67, SD = 44,617.20) than when they were low (M = 105,281.82, 
SD = 13,238.81), F (1, 70) = 100.25, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .59, CI (diff) = between 101,370.87 
and 151,798.82. Leaders in the low self-definition condition also self-awarded more 
money when other leaders’ self-allocations were high (M = 185,944.44, SD = 59,275.25) 
than when they were low (M = 115,973.68, SD = 21,732.25), F (1, 70) = 31.74, p < .001, 
Ƨ²p = .31, CI (diff) = between 45,203.08 and 94,738.43. However, as the effect sizes 
indicate, this effect was weaker than the one found for leaders self-defining more 
strongly as leaders. Similar to Study 1a, when other leaders’ self-allocations were high, 
leaders in the high self-definition condition (M = 231,866.67, SD = 44,617.20) self-
awarded more money than those in the low self-definition condition (M = 185,944.44, 
SD = 59,275.25), F (1, 70) = 12.10, p =.001, Ƨ²p = .15, CI (diff) = between 19,596.97 
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and 72,247.47. No such differential information use between the high and low self-
definition conditions was found when other leaders’ self-allocations were low.  
 
Study 1c 
 
While Studies 1a and 1b yield consistent causal evidence in support of our 
hypothesis, they could be criticized for their reliance on student samples in tightly 
controlled, potentially artificial lab settings. Study 1c sought to bring the test of our 
hypothesis closer to real organizational settings and see whether leader self-definition 
moderates the effect of social reference information on self-serving behaviors in a 
sample of British leaders. Furthermore, the dependent measures in Study 1a and 1b tap 
exclusively into the allocation of monetary resources, whereas leader self-serving 
behaviors may extend to other domains. In Study 1c we expanded the scope of our 
dependent variable by scrutinizing a greater variety of leader self-serving behaviors 
which go beyond and above simple monetary allocations (e.g., time investment, credit 
allocated for jobs performed). Study 1c is thus not only an extension of our earlier 
findings to a field setting in a different country, but it also taps into a greater variety of 
leader self-serving acts.  
 
Method 
Procedure. The study was conducted online as a leadership survey. Respondents 
were recruited via a panel firm located in the United Kingdom. Emails with personalized 
survey links were sent to a panel of individuals in managerial or supervisory positions 
who had a minimum of 3 direct subordinates and a minimum of 3 years of work 
experience. 
Importantly, the survey was conducted in line with recommendations given in the 
field (Birnbaum, 2004; Dillmann, 2007). By utilizing server-sided survey programming 
we avoided common technical selection biases, which generally exclude people who do 
not meet special browser requirements (e.g., Java Script). Moreover, prior to going live 
with the survey we pre-tested the layout on a number of different computers varying the 
browsers used as well as the screen resolutions to ensure that the survey would look the 
same on different systems. We also assigned each potential respondent a unique session 
ID, resulting in individualized survey links that made it impossible for any single 
respondent to participate in the survey more than once. To increase response rate 
respondents received a monetary incentive for their participation. On the first page of 
the survey we guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of individual surveys and 
emphasized that participation was voluntary. Respondents interested in our results were 
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given the opportunity to provide their email addresses in a different database so that 
names and email addresses could not be linked to individual responses. These measures 
taken to prevent common pitfalls of online research lead us to be at least as confident 
about the quality of our data as we would have been had we conducted a traditional 
paper and pencil survey.  
Sample. One hundred and forty respondents meeting the study’s requirements 
completed the survey out of a total of 209 emails sent out to potential respondents 
(66.9% response rate). The sample’s age ranged from 25 to 62 years (Mage = 40.54, SD = 
10.24) and women made up 41.4 % of the sample. Respondents’ average fulltime work 
experience was 20.76 years (SD = 11.36), their average tenure in a managerial or 
supervisory position was 10.99 years (SD = 8.61), and their average tenure on the 
current job was 6.15 years (SD = 5.19). All respondents worked in private organizations 
and had on average 11.8 subordinates (SD = 15.36). Respondents with a higher 
education degree (i.e., Bachelor degree or higher) made up 56.4% of the sample. The 
majority of respondents (87.15 %) held management or senior management positions.  
Measures. Self-definition as a leader was measured with a 7-item, 5-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) identical to the manipulation checks used in Study 1a 
and 1b. All items were combined into one average leader self-definition score. Whereas 
in Study 1a and 1b we had manipulated information about other leaders’ actions by varying the 
height of their self-allocations, in the survey we measured this reference information via 
a 3-item, 5-point scale (1 = significantly less than I, 5 = significantly more than I) designed to 
closely resemble our experimental manipulations (“Other leaders holding similar 
positions earn on a yearly basis”; “Other leaders holding similar positions have access to 
certain privileges (e.g. stock-options, company car, preferential parking space)”; “Other 
leaders holding similar positions make use of certain privileges (e.g. stock-options, 
company car, preferential parking space)”) The items were combined into one average 
other leaders’ outcomes score.  
A 9-item scale, inspired by work by Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998, 1999) and van 
Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) on self-sacrificial behavior comprised our 
measure of leader self-serving behavior. Arguably, leaders can act self-servingly by securing 
higher monetary benefits for themselves, but they can also act self-servingly by making 
self-serving causal attributions such as taking unwarranted credit for group 
accomplishments or by denying responsibility for failure on group projects (cf. Weary 
Bradley, 1978). While in Study 1a and 1b, our dependent measure tapped into the 
allocation of monetary resources, in the survey we also measured the allocation of other 
resources, such as time investment and credit allocated for jobs performed. Our self-
serving behaviors measure in the survey is thus more encompassing than our measure in 
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Study 1a and 1b. For each of the 9 items of the scale, respondents had to indicate the 
number of times they had performed the described behavior during the past year (1 = 
never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = usually; 5 = always). The 9 items of our scale were the 
following: “ I have negotiated a bonus for myself that was substantially higher than the 
bonus my subordinates received.”; “I have used my leadership position to obtain 
benefits for myself.”; “I have pursued my personal interests, even if those interests were 
not serving my group’s interests.”; “I did not put my own position at risk, even when I 
thought that this could have helped promote my group’s goals.”; “Instead of giving 
credit to my subordinates for jobs requiring a lot of time and effort, I took the credit 
myself.”; “Although I was partly to be blamed, I did not take personal responsibility for 
my group’s failure to meet a goal.”; “I have shifted the blame for a mistake of mine onto 
one of my subordinates.”; “I have left the office early although this meant that my 
subordinates had to finish some of my work.”; “I did not work overtime, although this 
would have helped my group meet its goals.” 
 
Results 
We first performed a principal component analysis with OBLIMIN rotation of our 
predictor variable items (i.e., self-definition as a leader and other leaders’ outcomes). 
This analysis yielded a two-factor solution with all items loading .65 or higher on the 
intended scale and all cross-loadings below |.18|. Then we performed a principal 
component analysis of the items comprising our dependent variable (i.e., leader self-
serving behaviors). This analysis yielded a one-factor solution with item loadings of .65 
or higher. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study variables are 
displayed in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 1c 
(1) Leader self-definition
(2) Other leaders’ outcomes
(3) Leader self-serving behaviors
M SD (1) (2) (3)
3.50 .67 (.87)
3.22 .62 -.20* (.84)
2.28 .47 -.12 .02 (.87)
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. N = 140 (listwise). 
* p < .05.  
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To test our hypothesis we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis in which 
leader self-serving behaviors were predicted by main effect terms (self-definition as a 
leader and other leaders’ outcomes) at Step 1 and the interaction term at Step 2 (see 
Table 2.2)6 .  
 
Table 2.2 Summary of Regression Analysis for Leader Self-definition and Other Leaders’ Outcomes 
Predicting Leader Self-serving Behaviors in Study 1c 
Step 1
Leader self-definition
Other leaders’ outcomes
b SE b ß t p
-.09 .06 -.13 -1.48 .14
-.00 .06 -.00 -.05 .95
Note. The explained variance of Step 1 was R2 = .01. Step 2 explained an 
additional variance of R2 change = .06.  N = 140 (listwise). 
Step 2
Leader self-definition
Other leaders’ outcomes
-.06 .06 -.08 -.99 .32
.11 .07 .15 1.53 .12
Leader self-definition x 
Other leaders’ outcomes
.21 .07 .29 3.01 .003
Variable
 
 
Following Aiken and West (1991), self-definition as a leader and other leaders’ 
outcomes were centered by subtracting the mean from each score, and the interaction 
term as well as the main effects were based on the centered scores. Table 2.2 shows the 
regression results: Step 1 did not explain a significant proportion of variance in leader 
self-serving behaviors. However, Step 2 did and it revealed our predicted Self-definition 
as a leader X Other leaders’ outcomes interaction. To further analyze the interaction, we 
conducted simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). As predicted, other leaders’ 
outcomes yielded a positive relationship to leader self-serving behaviors when leaders 
self-defined more strongly as leaders (1 SD above the mean; Ƣ = .33, p = .01), but it did 
not when they self-defined less strongly as leaders (1 SD below the mean; Ƣ = -.03, p = 
.67) (see Figure 2.3). Thus, in line with the findings of Study 1a and 1b, we found that 
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other leaders’ outcomes are more strongly related to leader self-serving behaviors, the 
more strongly leaders self-define as leaders.  
 
Figure 2.3 Leader self-ratings of self-serving actions in Study 1c 
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Discussion Study 1a, 1b, and 1c 
 
In line with our hypothesis, the present data suggest that self-definition as a leader 
influences the extent to which leaders rely on their peers’ behaviors when making 
allocation decisions. That is, self-definition as a leader moderates the relationship 
between descriptive normative information and self-serving behaviors. Leaders self-
defining more strongly as leaders acted more self-servingly when other leaders’ 
outcomes were high than when they were low, while those self-defining less strongly as 
leaders were less influenced by this type of information. Also, in Study 1a and 1b leaders 
who self-defined more strongly as leaders and had perceived other leaders to have self-
allocated a large amount of resources acted more self-servingly than leaders who self-
defined less strongly as leaders (and were privy to the same information about other 
leaders’ self-allocations). 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c used the same conceptualization of social information, that is, 
information about what similar others did. Hence, they remain mute as to whether self-
definition as a leader also moderates the relationship between other types of information 
(e.g., beliefs about what one should do) and leader self-allocations. To investigate 
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whether self-definition as a leader also influences reliance on injunctive normative 
information, in Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c we tested our more general hypothesis by using a 
different conceptualization of social information, namely effective leadership beliefs.  
 
Study 2a, 2b, and 2c 
 
In ambiguous resource allocation contexts, leaders are posited to not only use 
information about what other (real) leaders do, but to also use their beliefs about what 
ideal leaders should do. Therefore, in Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c we tested the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The effects of effective leadership beliefs on leader resource allocations are stronger for 
leaders who self-define more strongly as leaders than for leaders who self-define less 
strongly as leaders.  
 
Study 2a 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Sixty-nine Dutch undergraduates (24 females, 45 males) 
with a mean age of 21.75 years (SD = 2.06) were invited to participate in a study on 
virtual groups and were paid 10 euro (approximately 12 US dollars) for their time. They 
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Self-definition as a leader: high vs. low) 
X 2 (ELBs: self-serving vs. group-serving) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. We followed the paradigm developed for Study 1a with minor 
modifications. The main difference was the introduction of our ELBs (self-serving vs. 
group-serving) manipulation. Previous studies (e.g., Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) have 
successfully manipulated belief systems by providing participants with different reading 
passages claimed to represent research findings pertaining to the beliefs to be 
manipulated. Participants in the Chiu et al. (1997) studies were provided with a 
purported Psychology Today article persuading readers of one of two sets of beliefs. 
In the present study, we used a similar set-up for our ELBs manipulation. 
Participants were presented with excerpts from a purported Harvard Business Review 
(HBR) article describing research findings concerning leader effectiveness. The self-serving 
version of the article claimed that research had found leaders pursuing their own goals, 
investing minimal resources in the group, and enjoying traditional leader perks to be 
most effective (e.g., “Dr. Hull’s research team also found that leaders who maintained or 
increased traditional benefits such as a large office, an expensive company car, or 
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company stock option bonuses were in the long run more effective. In Dr. Hull’s 
opinion: These leaders increased some of their status symbols and gained increased 
respect from their followers.”). The group-serving version of the HBR article claimed that 
research had shown leaders pursuing group goals, investing a large amount of resources 
in the group, and giving up on traditional leader perks to be most effective (e.g., “Dr. 
Hull’s research team also found that leaders who gave up traditional benefits such as a 
large office, an expensive company car, or company stock option bonuses were in the 
long run more effective. In Dr. Hull’s opinion: These leaders gave up some of their 
status symbols and gained increased respect from their followers.”).  
The ELBs manipulation was introduced while participants were waiting for their 
cognitive style test results and thus before they were assigned the leader role. 
Participants were informed that while waiting for the results they could read an excerpt 
from a HBR article on leader effectiveness. All participants took the time to read the 
alleged article. 
While the number of points the team could earn remained the same as in Study 1a 
(i.e., 450 points) we increased subordinates’ base salary from 60 to 90 points, because in 
our previous study a number of participants had indicated that 60 points represented a 
low subordinate salary. Before the actual debriefing, participants answered some 
funneled debriefing questions testing for hypothesis guessing. None of our participants 
had correctly guessed our hypothesis. During debriefing participants were presented 
with both versions of the alleged HBR article, and after ensuring that they understood 
its entirely fabricated nature, they were thanked and paid.  
Dependent measures. As in Study 1a our main dependent variable was the number 
of points leaders self-awarded. Participants also answered demographic questions 
pertaining to their age, gender and study major. All dependent measures, unless 
otherwise stated, were measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (7).  
Manipulation checks. To check for the success of our self-definition manipulation 
we used the same leader self-definition scale as in Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c (7 items; 
Cronbach’s ơ = .90). To check the effectiveness of our ELBs manipulation, participants 
answered 10 questions (5 pertaining to the self and 5 to the group-serving ELBs) 
assessing their agreement with statements made in the HBR excerpt (e.g., “An effective 
leader is a leader who stresses group goals”; “An effective leader is a leader who stresses 
personal goals”). The five group-oriented items were reverse-scored and all items were 
combined into an average ELBs score (Cronbach’s ơ = .91).  
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Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) self-definition as a leader (high/low) and 
effective leadership beliefs (self-serving/group-serving) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. Testifying to the success of our manipulations, a two-way 
ANOVA on the average self-definition score yielded only a significant main effect of 
self-definition, F (1, 65) = 24.39, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .27, with participants in the high self-
definition condition (M = 4.81, SD = .84) self-defining more strongly as leaders than 
those in the low self-definition condition (M = 3.46, SD = 1.33). A two-way ANOVA 
on the average ELBs score revealed only a significant main effect of ELBs, F (1, 65) = 
36.86, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .36, with participants in the self-serving ELBs condition (M = 
4.64, SD = 1.16) being more likely to endorse self-serving ELBs than participants in the 
group-serving ELBs condition (M = 3.09, SD =. 85).  
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of ELBs, F (1, 65) = 10.18, p = .002, Ƨ²p = .13, with 
participants in the self-serving ELBs condition (M = 123.00, SD = 24.24) self-allocating 
more points than participants in the group-serving ELBs condition (M = 105.50, SD = 
22.46) (see Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 450 points) in Study 2a 
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As predicted, the main effect of ELBs was qualified by a Self-definition X ELBs 
interaction, F (1, 65) = 6.28, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .09. Thus, participants in the high self-
definition condition claimed more points when they endorsed self-serving ELBs (M = 
131.25, SD = 23.97) than when they endorsed group-serving ELBs (M = 100.00, SD = 
26.18), F (1, 65) = 16.14, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .19, CI (diff) = between 15.71 vs. 46.78. No 
such differential impact of ELBs on point allocations was shown by leaders in the low 
self-definition condition. The simple main effects analysis also indicated that in the self-
serving ELBs condition, those self-defining more strongly as leaders (M = 131.25, SD = 
23.97) self-allocated more points than those self-defining less strongly as leaders (M = 
114.75, SD = 22.38), F (1, 65) = 4.72, p = .03, Ƨ²p = .07, CI (diff) = between 1.33 and 
31.66. No such differences were found between leaders high and low in self-definition 
endorsing group-serving ELBs. 
 
Study 2b 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and seven Dutch students (53 females, 54 
males), receiving payment of 3 euro (approximately 4 US Dollars) for their time, were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Self-definition as a leader: high vs. low) X 2 
(ELBs: self-serving vs. group-serving) between-subjects factorial design. Participants’ 
mean age was 20.81 years (SD = 2.73). 
Procedure. Participants were approached in the student cafeterias of a Dutch 
University and asked whether they wanted to fill in a short paper and pencil 
questionnaire in exchange for 3 euro. The same scenario as in Study 1b was used, with 
the only difference being the replacement of our other leaders’ self-allocations 
manipulation with our ELBs manipulation. Following the same self-definition as a 
leader manipulation as in Study 1b participants were asked to visualize themselves sitting 
in their office reminiscing about the things they had learned at an Executive Coaching 
Seminar on leadership effectiveness.  
At this point we introduced our ELBs (self vs. group-serving) manipulation, which 
was similar to the ELBs manipulation used in Study 2a. Participants in the self-serving 
ELBs condition read: “You found out that effective leaders set their personal goals first; 
are driven by pursuing their own results, greatly benefit from having special privileges 
such as access to a company jet and stock-options and generally invest few of their 
resources and energy into their group.”, while participants in the group-serving ELBs 
condition read: “You found out that effective leaders set their group’s goals first; are 
driven by pursuing their group’s results, greatly benefit from relinquishing special 
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privileges such as access to a company jet and stock-options and generally invest a lot of 
their resources and energy into their group.” The rest of the text was identical to Study 
1b. 
Dependent measures. Identical to Study 1b, our main dependent measure 
represented the amount of money participants self-awarded out of the 2,445,000 euro 
budget. After answering our dependent measures, participants were thanked for their 
participation, paid, and debriefed.  
Manipulation checks. All items comprising our manipulation checks were again 
measured on a seven-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). To 
check the effectiveness of our self-definition manipulation we used the same leader self-
definition scale as we did in Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2a (7 items; Cronbach’s ơ = .93). To 
check the effectiveness of our ELBs manipulation, participants answered a shortened 
version of the 10-item scale used in Study 2a (6 items; Cronbach’s ơ = .84).  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) self-definition as a leader (high/low) and 
effective leadership beliefs (self-serving/group-serving) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. As expected, a two-way ANOVA on the average self-
definition score revealed only a significant main effect of self-definition, F (1, 103) = 
20.68, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .17, with participants in the high self-definition condition (M = 
4.72, SD = 1.00) self-defining more as leaders than those in the low self-definition 
condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.57). A two-way ANOVA on the average ELBs score 
revealed only a significant main effect of ELBs, F (1, 103) = 18.34, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .15, 
indicating that participants in the self-serving ELBs condition (M = 4.20, SD = 1.39) 
were more likely to endorse self-serving ELBs than participants in the group-serving 
ELBs condition (M = 3.19, SD = 1.03).  
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the amount of money leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of ELBs, F (1, 103) = 7.18, p < .01, Ƨ²p = .07, with 
participants in the self-serving ELBs condition (M = 257,863.50, SD = 196,891.42) self-
allocating more money than those in the group-serving ELBs condition (M = 
167,916.30, SD = 162,362.55). The main effect of ELBs was qualified by our predicted 
Self-definition X ELBs interaction, F (1, 103) = 10.85, p < .01, Ƨ²p = .09 (see Figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders (out of 2,445,000 euro) in Study 2b 
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As predicted, leaders in the high self-definition condition self-allocated more money 
when endorsing self-serving ELBs (M = 314,350.00, SD = 238,691.44) than when 
endorsing group-serving ELBs (M = 113,851.85, SD = 74,146.93), F (1, 103) = 18.36, p 
< .001, Ƨ²p = .15, CI (diff) = between 107,717.51 and 293,278.78. No such differential 
reliance on ELBs was found for leaders in the low self-definition condition. We also 
found that in the self-serving ELBs condition, those self-defining more strongly as 
leaders (M = 314,350.00, SD = 238,691.44) self-allocated more money than those self-
defining less strongly as leaders (M = 201,376.92, SD = 117,347.33), F (1, 103) = 5.72, p 
= .01, Ƨ²p = .05, CI (diff) = between 19,288.50 and 206,657.64. Additionally, we found 
that in the group-serving ELBs condition, those self-defining more strongly as leaders 
(M = 113,851.90, SD = 74,146.93) self-allocated less money than those self-defining less 
strongly as leaders (M = 221,980.80, SD = 207,171.33), F (1, 103) = 5.14, p = .02, Ƨ²p = 
.04, CI (diff) = between 13,612.71 and 202,645.12. Participants self-defining more 
strongly as leaders incorporated both self and group-serving ELBs to a greater extent 
into their decisions than those self-defining less strongly as leaders.  
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Study 2c 
 
Method 
Procedure and sample. We used exactly the same procedure as in Study 1c. The 
study was conducted online using panel respondents in the United Kingdom. Out of the 
199 emails sent out, 143 respondents completed the survey (71.8% response rate). The 
sample’s mean age was 41.76 years, (SD = 8.55) and women made up 36.4 % of the 
sample. Respondents’ fulltime work experience was on average 20.81 years (SD = 
10.33), their average tenure in a managerial or supervisory position was 11.10 years (SD 
= 8.57), and their average tenure on the current job was about 5.66 years (SD = 4.79). 
Respondents had on average about 22.66 direct subordinates (SD = 39.55) and 53.14 % 
of the sample had received a higher education degree (i.e., Bachelor degree or higher). 
All respondents worked in private sector organizations. Most respondents (83.22 %) 
were managers or senior managers and the rest held supervisory positions.  
Measures. All responses were measured on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). Self-definition as a leader was measured with the same 7-item scale used in 
Study 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, and 2b. ELBs were measured with 8 of the 10 items (4 self and 4 
group-serving items) that served as our ELBs manipulation checks in Study 2a (e.g., “To 
be effective, a leader should always pursue group goals even if this would come at the 
expense of his or her personal goals”; “A leader concerned with group outcomes is 
effective.”; “To be effective, a leader should pursue his or her own goals even if this 
would come at the expense of his or her group’s goals”; “A leader concerned with his or 
her personal outcomes is effective”). Again, the group-serving items were reverse scored 
and all items were combined into one average ELBs score. Our measure of leader self-
serving behavior consisted of the same 9-item scale used in Study 1c.  
 
Results 
We first performed a principal component analysis (PCA) with OBLIMIN rotation 
of the items of the predictor variables (i.e., self-definition as a leader and ELBs). This 
analysis yielded a two-factor solution with all items loading .57 or higher on the intended 
scale and all cross-loadings below |.15|. Then we performed a PCA of the items 
comprising our dependent variable (i.e., leader self-serving behaviors), which yielded a 
one-factor solution with item loadings of .58 or higher. Means, standard deviations, and 
intercorrelations for the study variables are displayed in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Study 2c 
(1) Leader self-definition
(2) Effective leadership beliefs
(3) Leader self-serving behaviors
M SD (1) (2) (3)
3.50 .63 (.85)
2.44 .50 .08 (.83)
1.83 .68 .12 .56** (.87)
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. N = 143 (listwise). 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.   
 
To test our hypothesis we performed a hierarchical regression analysis7 . Following 
Aiken and West (1991), self-definition as a leader and ELBs were centered, and the 
interaction term as well as the main effects were based on the centered scores. In Step 1, 
we regressed leader self-serving behaviors on leader self-definition and ELBs. In Step 2, 
we added the Leader self-definition X ELBs interaction to the equation (see Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4 Summary of Regression Analysis for Leader Self-definition and Effective Leadership Beliefs 
Predicting Leader Self-serving Behaviors in Study 2c 
Step 1
Leader self-definition
Effective leadership beliefs
b SE b ß t p
.08 .07 .07 1.07 .28
.75 .09 .55 7.97 .00
Step 2
Leader self-definition
Effective leadership beliefs
.03 .07 .03 .44 .66
.73 .09 .54 7.86 .00
Leader self-definition x Effective 
leadership beliefs
.35 .13 .18 2.61 .01
Variable
Note. The explained variance of Step 1 was R² = .32. Step 2 explained an 
additional variance of R² change = .03.  N = 143 (listwise).  
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The first step explained a significant amount of variance and we found a positive 
relationship between ELBs and leader self-serving behaviors. More importantly, the 
second step explained an additional significant proportion of variance in leader self-
serving behaviors. The positive relationship between ELBs and leader self-serving 
behaviors was qualified by our predicted self-definition as a leader by ELBs interaction. 
To further analyze the interaction, we conducted simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991). Although leader self-serving behaviors were positively related to ELBs both when 
leaders self-defined more strongly as leaders (1 SD above the mean; Ƣ = .70, p < .001), 
as well as when they self-defined less strongly as leaders (1 SD below the mean; Ƣ = .37, 
p < .001), the relationship was more pronounced when leaders self-defined more 
strongly as leaders (see Figure 2.6). In line with the findings of Study 2a and 2b, the 
results show that ELBs are more strongly related to leader self-serving behaviors, the 
more leaders self-define as leaders.  
 
Figure 2.6 Leader self-ratings of self-serving actions in Study 2c 
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Discussion Study 2a, 2b, and 2c 
 
The results of Study 2a, 2b, and 2c corroborate and extend our findings in Study 1a, 
1b, and 1c. In Study 2a, 2b, and 2c we found, in line with Hypothesis 1b, that the effects 
of ELBs on leader self-allocations were stronger for leaders self-defining more strongly 
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as leaders than for leaders self-defining less strongly as leaders. Contingent on the 
content of ELBs (group vs. self-serving) leaders who self-defined more strongly as 
leaders made either more group or more self-serving allocations. Our results also 
showed that leaders who self-defined more strongly in terms of the leader role and who 
endorsed self-serving ELBs acted more self-servingly than leaders self-defining less 
strongly as leaders who also endorsed self-serving ELBs. Additionally, in Study 2b we 
found that leaders who self-defined more strongly as leaders and endorsed group-
serving ELBs acted more group-servingly than leaders self-defining less strongly as 
leaders who also endorsed group-serving ELBs. In Study 2a, 2b, and 2c we have thus 
extended the findings of Study 1a, 1b, and 1c by showing that leader self-definition does 
not only moderate the relationship between descriptive normative information and 
leader self-serving behaviors, but also the relationship between injunctive normative 
information and leader self-serving behaviors.  
 
General Discussion 
Leader self-serving behaviors have been proposed both in academic circles and 
within the forum of public opinion to be a particularly destructive class of leadership 
behaviors (e.g., Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1998; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004) 
with negative consequences for the organization, as well as for followers’ motivation 
and performance. We posited that self-definition as a leader would moderate the 
processing of social information in resource allocation contexts and that contingent on 
the information used leader self-allocations would be more or less self-serving. This 
more general prediction, derived from an integration of theorizing on leader self-
definition (Kramer, 2003; Lord & Hall, 2005) and extensions of social comparison 
theory (Festinger, 1954), was tested in a series of four laboratory and scenario 
experiments and in two surveys.  
We consistently showed that leader self-definition interacts with normative social 
information, of both the descriptive (i.e., information about other leaders’ self-
allocations) and the injunctive variety (i.e., effective leadership beliefs) in predicting 
leader self-serving allocations. The six studies showed that the effects of descriptive and 
injunctive social reference information on leader resource allocations were stronger for 
leaders who self-defined more strongly as leaders than for those who self-defined less 
strongly in terms of the leader category. When other leaders’ self-allocations were high, 
or when they endorsed self-serving ELBs, leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders 
acted more self-servingly than when other leaders’ self-allocations were low, or when 
they endorsed group-serving ELBs. These effects were far less pronounced for leaders 
who self-defined less strongly as leaders. In our experimental studies we also 
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consistently showed that leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders acted more self-
servingly than leaders self-defining less strongly as leaders when other leaders’ self-
allocations were high or when they endorsed self-serving ELBs. Conversely, with the 
exception of Study 2b, we did not find leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders to 
act more group-servingly than leaders self-defining less strongly as leaders when others’ 
allocations were low or when they endorsed group-serving ELBs. Thus in Studies 1a, 
1b, and 2a high self-defining leaders were more likely to follow a self-interested than a 
group-oriented cue. The asymmetry in the effects of self and group-oriented 
information found in these studies could be due to the fact that in the high self-defining, 
high reference information conditions the effects of social information processing and 
of egocentric biases (e.g., Weary Bradley, 1978) converged. However, this asymmetry in 
the extent to which leaders relied on this social information was not found in the two 
surveys and in Study 2b. 
In sum, we consistently found that self-serving leader behaviors are the result of an 
interaction between self-definition as a leader and social information processing. 
Confidence in our results is bolstered not only by replication across studies, but also by 
the fact that the studies used different methodologies (i.e., laboratory experiment, 
scenario experiment, cross-sectional survey), different samples from two different 
countries (i.e., Dutch students, managers and supervisors in the United Kingdom), 
different conceptualizations of the social information concept: descriptive information 
(i.e., information about what is commonly done) and injunctive information (i.e., 
information about what should be done), different manipulations of the self-definition 
as a leader construct as well as its measurement in the field. 
Implications for the Study of Leader Self-serving Behaviors 
This research contributes first and necessary evidence that leaders’ self-concept, 
more precisely leaders’ self-definition as a leader, has a significant impact on leader self-
serving behaviors. By focusing on determinants of leader actions we followed a call 
made by House and Aditya (1997) for more systematic scientific inquiry into the 
antecedents of leader behaviors and added a social-psychological perspective to the 
dearth of empirical research on determinants of leader actions. Surprisingly, as 
compared to the voluminous body of work on leadership effectiveness, research on 
antecedents of leader behaviors has been scant, and has largely focused on individual 
difference factors (Bono & Judge, 2004; Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & 
Gerhardt, 2002) and on factors affecting leadership development (Day, 2001; Dvir, 
Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002). 
Our proposition that self-definition as a leader is a determinant of leader self-serving 
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behaviors builds upon, and conceptually extends, the self-concept stream of leadership 
research (Lord et al., 1999; Gardner & Avolio, 1998, Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993; 
van Knippenberg et al., 2004). We broaden previous self-concept theorizing in the 
leadership domain by taking the limelight off followers’ self-concept and by zooming in 
on leaders’ self-concept. Last but not least, by combining theorizing on leader self-
definition with concepts rooted in social comparison theory we extend the social 
comparison perspective to the study of leadership behaviors.  
Our self-concept analysis of leader self-serving behaviors also feeds into research on 
transformational/charismatic leadership (e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002) as 
well as into work from a social identity theory of leadership perspective (e.g., Hogg & 
van Knippenberg, 2003). Both aforementioned research streams have identified leader 
self-sacrificial or group-serving behaviors as being important determinants of leader 
effectiveness (e.g., Bass, 1990; Burns, 1978; Shamir et al., 1993; van Knippenberg & 
Hogg, 2003; Yukl, 2002). For example, research on charismatic leadership has shown 
that leaders engaging in self-serving behaviors are perceived as being less effective and 
charismatic (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; 
Sashkin, 1988) than their counterparts who perform self-sacrificing acts. Similarly, 
research from a social identity model of leadership perspective proposes and shows that 
leader group-serving behavior is an important component of leader effectiveness (e.g., 
van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). However, 
neither research on transformational leadership, nor work from a social identity analysis 
of leadership perspective has informed us on factors determining leader self versus 
group-serving behaviors. Our findings extend this previous research by highlighting 
factors that might influence the extent to which leaders engage in self or group-serving 
actions.  
The current work also links to, and extends the identity-based developmental 
leadership stream of research (e.g., Day & Harrison, 2007; Lord & Hall, 2005) by 
proposing and showing that leader self-definition is as a critical step in understanding 
leader behaviors. Whereas identity-based developmental leadership theories have 
proposed leader self-definitions to be critical sense-making tools and proximal 
precursors to action, our research represents the first empirical test of the effects of 
leader self-definition on leader actions.  
Additionally, our findings could inform certain facets of cross-cultural leadership 
research. Cross-cultural research has identified cultural differences in the societal and 
organizational-level implicit leadership theories that sanction leaders’ pursuit of 
individual and group interests (e.g., House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002; House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). In this respect, we see investigations of the 
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effects of culture on the types of effective leadership beliefs endorsed by leaders as 
particularly pertinent avenues for future research.  
As yet, our evidence is too modest to jump to far-reaching conclusions about the 
effects of leader self-definition, but we believe that it alludes to the concept’s potential 
to advance our understanding of leader behaviors in general, and leader self-serving 
behaviors more specifically. In this respect, we propose six directions for future research 
that seem particularly worthwhile. 
First, in this research we have focused on a specific aspect of the self-concept, 
namely leaders’ self-definition as leaders. The self-concept is however a 
multidimensional construct consisting of a multitude of different identities (e.g., Lord et 
al., 1999; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). The function of the self-schema is to organize 
these various self-definitions and to direct attention to new self-relevant information 
corresponding to the specific salient or activated identity. Importantly, only one 
particular identity can be salient or activated at any point in time, and people can differ 
in terms of the strength of their identification (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Thus, leaders 
could reasonably be expected to also possess self-definitions as members of their work 
groups or as members of their professional groups. Under conditions where any of 
these alternative self-definitions are active, salient, and strong, we predict that they 
would shape leader behaviors differently than self-definition as a leader.  
Our research has shown that leaders who self-define more strongly as leaders are 
more sensitive to information about what other leaders do as well as what an ideal leader 
should do. That is, we have shown that the salient self-definition (i.e., self-definition as a 
leader) directs attention towards information relevant to that specific identity. Following 
this logic, if professional affiliation (e.g., as a lawyer) would be the salient self-definition, 
then we would expect this identity to be used as the diagnostic sense-making tool in 
allocation contexts. The particular norms (i.e., descriptive and injunctive) associated with 
this professional affiliation would then shape those leaders’ behaviors that strongly 
identify with their profession. Furthermore, from a social identity analysis of leadership 
perspective (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003), if leaders construed the self in terms of 
membership in their work group and identified strongly with this group, they should be 
more sensitive to group normative information when allocating resources. Thus, we 
propose that conceptually different self-definitions (e.g., as a leader, as a member of the 
professional group, as a group member) would affect leader behaviors differently by 
focusing their attention on the specific norms associated with the salient identity. Future 
research could extend our self-concept analysis of leader self vs. group-serving 
behaviors by investigating such alternative leader self-definitions as antecedents of 
leader actions.  
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Second, a self-concept-based analysis of leader behaviors inevitably raises a host of 
other intriguing questions to be addressed in future research. Two questions which we 
see as presenting especially promising avenues are (1) how are these various self-
definitions interrelated, and (2) what factors influence the relative strengths of these 
identities? From a leader development perspective, self-definition as a leader represents 
a critical step in providing leaders with an understanding of their role, their goals, 
motivations and aspirations (e.g., Day & Harrison, 2007; Hall, 2004; Lord & Hall, 2005). 
Day and Harrison (2007) as well as Lord and Hall (2005) go further to propose that, 
over time and with more leadership experience, leaders’ individual-level identities would 
be first transcended by relational identities and subsequently by collective identities. The 
developmental view on leaders’ self-concept thus proposes a hierarchical relationship 
between self-definition as a leader, relational leader identities and collective leader 
identities. Moreover, this perspective also suggests that once these different self-
definitions have been formed, leaders can switch between them contingent on the task 
at hand. This implies that various self-definitions can co-exist and that their relative 
strength in affecting behaviors would be determined by situational factors (e.g., task at 
hand, accountability, legitimacy, goals). We deem these to be interesting propositions 
that could be tested longitudinally. Whereas our work only allows us to draw 
conclusions as to the effects of self-definition as a leader on resource allocations, we can 
envision the explanatory potential afforded by a fuller model of leader self-definitions.  
Third, a full model of the cognitive, motivational and temporal factors shaping the 
emergence of self-definition as a leader could be on the agenda of future research. 
Because in this research we focused on assessing effects of leader self-definition on 
leader behaviors, our work remains relatively mute as to potential factors facilitating the 
advent of self-definition as a leader. Our self-definition manipulations in the 
experimental studies do however allude to two important cognitive precursors to leader 
self-definition, namely self-categorizing as a leader, and seeing oneself as similar to a 
typical leader. Furthermore, motivational factors could play a role in the development of 
leader self-identities. First, leaders’ motivation to lead could provide us with better 
insights into the different types of motivations leaders associate with the leader role. 
Chan and Drasgow’s (2001) motivation to lead scale identifying affective-identity, 
noncalculative, and social-normative motivations could help shed some light on this 
issue. Second, one could argue that with increasing leader self-efficacy (e.g., Paglis & 
Green, 2002), self-definition as a leader would also increase. Third, different power 
motives, such as a personalized versus a socialized need for power (e.g., McClelland, 
1975; McClelland & Burnham, 1976) could potentially have different effects on self-
definition as a leader. Additionally, a longitudinal investigation of temporal influences on 
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leader self-definitions could provide us with a richer understanding of how they arise 
and evolve. Lord and Hall (2005) proposed that with increased experience as a leader, 
leader self-identities will emerge. Whereas in our studies we did not find leadership 
experience to directly affect leader self-definition, it is possible that the relationship 
between leadership experience and leader self-definition is more complex than 
previously assumed. It could be that the effects of leadership experience on the 
development of a leader self-identity are moderated by other factors such as leaders’ 
motivation to lead or active participation in a leader development program. Future 
research could explore a fuller model of precursors to self-definition as a leader by 
considering not only main effects but also potential interaction effects between 
cognitive, motivational and temporal factors. 
Fourth, because our research addressed factors affecting high self-defining leaders’ 
allocation behaviors, it appears valuable to understand how those who self-define less 
strongly as leaders make sense of ambiguous resource allocations. We have found that 
leaders who self-defined more strongly as leaders were more sensitive to information 
about what other leaders did as well as what an ideal leader should do. By relying on 
such descriptive and injunctive information related to the leader role, high self-defining 
leaders acted more self-servingly when presented with high other leaders’ outcomes or 
when they endorsed self-serving leadership beliefs, and more group-servingly when 
presented with low other leaders’ outcomes or when they endorsed group-serving 
beliefs. As expected from our identity-based social comparison perspective, low self-
defining leaders did not follow these cues related to the leader role as much as high self-
defining leaders. We argue that low self-defining leaders largely ignored these cues, 
because they did not perceive them to be relevant to the self. This is not to say that 
leaders who self-defined less strongly as leaders acted across the board less self-servingly 
than leaders who self-defined more strongly as leaders. They simply seem to have made 
sense of the ambiguous allocation decisions by relying on different cues. It is possible 
that other self-definitions were more important for these leaders (e.g., as a member of 
their profession) and that they based their actions on these alternative identities. Because 
our current data do not inform us on how these low self-defining leaders made sense of 
the situation, future research could investigate such alternative leader self-definitions as 
precursors to leader actions.  
Fifth, the present findings can potentially be linked to research on the use and abuse 
of power. Power and leadership are naturally related. However, they are different in that 
powerful individuals are not necessarily leaders, but leadership implies and requires 
power (Goodwin, 2003). High power has generally been linked to a host of “negative” 
behaviors such as the devaluation and increased stereotyping of subordinates (Fiske & 
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Neuberg, 1990; Kipnis, 1972), as well as increased positive self-evaluations of the 
powerful (Georgesen & Harris, 1998). With some exceptions (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 
2001; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006) power 
research has stressed its darker side without providing much evidence for its often-
discussed “noblesse oblige” effects. We argue that power, similar to leadership, can 
raise, next to entitlement concerns, responsibility concerns on the part of the powerful 
(Tjosvold & Wisse, 2009).  
Leaders can have varying amounts of power in organizations. Generally, the higher 
one moves in the organizational hierarchy, the more power one commands. Increased 
power has been linked to increased power distance from subordinates (Kipnis, 1972), 
which in turn could lead powerful leaders to identify less with their subordinates. Also, 
leadership positions of higher power are generally reached after years of climbing the 
corporate ladder, and from a leader development perspective (Lord & Hall, 2005) this 
would imply that the leader has reached a stage where self-definition as a leader has or 
could have become a central part of the self-concept. Hence, we propose that power 
and self-definition as a leader can be related in such a way, that the more power a leader 
has, the more he/she will self-define as a leader. Based on the findings of the present 
research and on the idea that high power individuals act more in tune with internal states 
and traits (Galinsky et al., 2003), we posit that high power leaders should rely more on 
their ELBs than low power leaders. This implies that high power leaders are expected to 
act self vs. group-servingly based on the content of their ELBs. This prediction can also 
be linked back to the Chen et al. (2001) study that showed that the effects of power 
depend on the power-holders’ social relationship orientation. In a resource allocation 
task, communally-oriented high power participants acted more selflessly and exchange-
oriented high power participants acted more selfishly than low power participants. While 
in the Chen et al. (2001) study high power participants acted more in line with internal 
traits, we propose that high power individuals should also act more in line with internal 
beliefs and values. This research area seems particularly exciting, given that theorizing 
and empirical research on power generally highlights power’s corruptive effects and high 
power individuals’ failure to exhibit group-serving behaviors. On the flipside, low power 
leaders (low in power distance to their subordinates) should perceive themselves to be 
more similar to their followers, and should therefore be more likely to use their 
followers as comparison targets in resource allocation contexts than high power leaders. 
Last but not least, future research might consider other factors affecting leader self-
serving behaviors in ambiguous resource allocation contexts. First, the incidence of 
leader self-serving behavior could be decreased if leaders were held accountable or if 
their actions were made transparent. Leaders whose actions are transparent to 
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subordinates might be motivated to maintain their followers’ support, and might 
therefore be less likely to engage in self-serving behaviors. Second, one could argue that 
leaders would act less self-servingly if clear standards of fairness were in place. In this 
research we have conceptualized leader self-allocations as being the result of an 
ambiguous sense-making process where absolute standards regarding appropriate leader 
earnings are absent. From this sense-making perspective, high self-defining leaders rely 
on social information pertaining to the leader role because the situation is ambiguous 
and it is unclear how much more than followers a leader is entitled to earn. We expect 
however, that, with the advent of clear standards of fairness for the distribution of 
resources, the effects of social information on leader allocations would become weaker. 
Thus, the clearer the company, group or societal standards are regarding how much a 
leader should earn, the more likely it is that these standards will be used in the 
distribution of resources. In short, we expect that the more the situation loses its 
ambiguity, the less there will be a need for leaders to rely on social information 
pertaining to the leader role. 
Caveats and Limitations 
Naturally, this research is not without limitations. Each paradigm we employed 
suffers from certain drawbacks in terms of generalizability, causality, manipulation or 
measurement. The experiments used student samples in laboratory settings which could 
raise external validity concerns. We did however consciously choose for this 
experimental set-up, high in internal validity, because our aim was to establish causality 
(Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) in the relationship between self-definition as a leader, 
the use of social information, and leader resource allocations. To alleviate some 
concerns regarding the artificiality of the minimal group set-up in Studies 1a and 2a, we 
complemented these studies with two scenario experiments, which generally score 
higher on levels of mundane realism. Previous research has also shown that there is no 
reason to suspect that students behave differently than other populations (Brown & 
Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990) and experimental findings using similar paradigms have 
been replicated in survey-based organizational research (De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). More 
important, the fact that Studies 1c and 2c, for which concerns about external validity 
pose less of a problem, also yielded support for our hypotheses and replicated the 
findings of our experimental studies, should serve as a counter-argument for the 
external validity criticism. 
Whereas our narrow focus on the allocation of monetary resources as a dependent 
measure can be considered a limitation of our experimental studies, we extended the 
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scope of our dependent variable in the surveys by also measuring leaders’ time 
investment in group projects as well as their attributions of credit for jobs performed. 
Although we believe that the present results provide useful insights into leader self-
serving behaviors, the nature and scope of our dependent variable should be borne in 
mind when generalizing conclusions. Future investigations might benefit from extending 
the scope of our dependent variable to other domains such as the relational domain (i.e., 
leaders’ treatment of subordinates in terms of showing respect or allowing for voice 
behaviors).  
Conversely, Studies 1c and 2c might be criticized for being correlational in nature 
(i.e., rendering them mute in matters of causality). Another potential criticism of Studies 
1c and 2c could be our measurement of undesirable behaviors via self-reports rather 
than via behavioral measures. There is however evidence suggesting that, when 
measuring undesirable behaviors, self-reports are as accurate as more ‘objective’ 
measures such as police reports or lie detector tests (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Hindelang, 
Hirschi, & Weiss, 1979). Nonetheless, we do not want to be presumptuous and assume 
that our self-reported measure of self-serving behaviors is necessarily accurate, just 
because similar research has found a correlation between self-reports of undesirable 
behaviors and their ‘objective’ measurement. Ultimately, this remains a question to be 
answered in future research and we wholeheartedly endorse future tests of our 
hypotheses in field settings with both follower and leader ratings of self-serving 
behaviors as well as more ‘objective’ measures. A third potential weakness of Studies 1c 
and 2c could be that all variables were measured in a single questionnaire (i.e., making 
common source and common method variance a potential problem). This type of 
design could lead to an inflation of the relationships between variables. The main effect 
of ELBs in Study 1c may thus be overestimated. Therefore, even though we also 
obtained experimental evidence for this main effect, it would be valuable if a future field 
study tested this relationship with a design that does not suffer from this problem. It is 
also important to note that common source or method bias cannot account for 
statistical interactions. Because it may inflate the main effects it may lead to an 
underestimation of the effect sizes for interactions (Evans, 1985; McClelland & Judd, 
1993). As such, common source or method bias does not pose a threat to the validity of 
our conclusions regarding the self-definition as a leader by other leaders’ outcomes and 
ELBs interactions. All in all, the combination of the experimental designs of Studies 1a, 
1b, 2a, and 2b, with the survey design of Studies 1c and 2c, leads us to see these 
concerns as less of a threat to the overall conclusions of the present study, given that the 
strengths of the one methodology may compensate for the weaknesses of the other.  
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Practical Implications 
Although conclusions regarding practical implications are to be regarded as tentative 
and as requiring further inquiry and clarification, we see potential for our findings to be 
used in applied settings, i.e., in organizations trying to curb leader self-serving behaviors. 
First, Lord and Hall (2005) provided a compelling argument for the desirability of 
developing leaders’ self-definitions as leaders. Taking this proposition as a starting point, 
there seems to be some value in promoting the development of group-serving ELBs. 
The leader development (London, 2002) and coaching literature (Smither & Reilly, 
2001) suggest that interventions directed at improving leadership generally work because 
they aim at creating new self-schemas. Some value might therefore be drawn from 
promoting group-serving ELBs as ideal leadership self-schemas. This could be done via 
leadership training and executive seminars as well as via teaching in MBA programs, 
where future leaders are formed. Second, if more leaders would endorse group-serving 
ELBs this could lead to a more general downward compensation spiral. As we have 
shown in Study 1a, 1b, and 1c, leaders self-defining strongly as leaders are more likely to 
use information about other leaders’ outcomes. If a high number of leaders endorses 
group-serving ELBs this could influence other leaders to claim lower outcomes for the 
self.  
To Conclude 
Leader self-serving actions are a particularly pernicious class of leadership behaviors 
carrying the specter of negative consequences for subordinates as well as for the 
organization at large. From this perspective, it is somewhat surprising that leadership 
research to date seems to have hardly concerned itself with factors causing leader self-
serving behaviors. As such, the present research hopes to have opened a new avenue for 
exploring factors causing leaders to act self-servingly by pointing at the value of a leader 
self-concept analysis. 
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Notes 
 
1Definitions of leaders and leadership are almost as numerous as the researchers studying them. In this 
research, we endorse the following definition of a leader: The leader is an individual holding a structural 
position of power which provides him/her with control over valuable resources and the ability to administer 
rewards and punishments (French & Raven, 1959); and who also influences others to act towards the 
achievement of group goals (Hollander, 1980; Yukl & van Fleet, 1992). Whereas the power associated with the 
structural position reflects influence potential, a leader enacts that potential (Farmer & Aquinis, 2005). 
2 The instructions informing participants of their assignment to the leader role made it clear that no value 
connotations were associated with being or not being similar to other leaders. Before debriefing, participants 
answered an open-ended question as to why they thought they had been selected as a leader. Most participants 
in the low self-definition condition thought they had been selected because they were somehow different from 
other leaders. None of the responses seemed to indicate a negative connotation with being different from or 
similar to others. We also assessed participants’ feelings of self-efficacy and power in the leader role. Two-way 
ANOVAs on the leader self-efficacy score and on the power score revealed no significant effects of our 
manipulations (all F’s < 1).This suggests that self-definition as a leader did not affect participants’ feelings of 
leader self-efficacy or of power. The same measure of leader self-efficacy and power in Studies 1b, 2a, and 2b 
yielded the same pattern of results. 
3 We report Ƨ2p in our studies which refers to the partial Ƨ2 values as reported in SPSS 15. 
4 We also conducted the analyses by excluding these two participants. Because neither the significance nor the 
pattern of our results changed, the analyses reported in the paper are based on the full sample of 80 
participants. 
5 Conceptually self-definition as a leader is independent from leaders’ team identification. To show that our 
effects were driven by differential levels of self-definition as a leader and not by differential levels of team 
identification, we assessed leaders’ identification with their team. Participants answered three questions 
adapted from van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) which were combined into an average team 
identification score (Cronbach’s ơ = .90). A two-way ANOVA on the team identification score revealed that 
as expected, our manipulations did not affect participants’ team identification. Thus, the relationship between 
our manipulations and leader self-allocations cannot be attributed to their team identification. The same 
measure of team identification was used in Study 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 2c and yielded the same pattern of results. 
6 We did not control in our analyses for any covariates because rather often – especially with survey data – 
controls serve the purpose of getting something significant that was not significant before. Becker (2005) 
refers to this practice as problematic and cautions against potential Type II errors. Moreover, we hypothesized 
an interaction. Thus merely controlling for covariates would not be the best option if we want to exclude them 
as alternative explanations for our moderated findings. Including controls, however, does not change the 
significance or pattern of our interactions (i.e., with controls: age, gender, number of subordinates, years of 
fulltime work experience, overall tenure in leadership position, tenure in current leadership position team 
identification). Because none of the control variables were related to our independent or dependent variables 
and we wanted to keep the survey studies as similar as possible to our experimental studies, we do not report 
regression results with covariates. 
7 Including the same control variables as in Study 1c does not change the significance or pattern of our 
interaction. 
 
 
59
Leader Power and Self-serving versus Group-serving Behavior 
51 
Chapter 3:Leader Power and Self-serving versus Group-serving 
Behavior 
 
We present five studies that examined the effects of power on leader resource self-allocations. From 
an approach-theory of power perspective, we argue that the more power a leader holds, the more the 
leader’s resource allocations become contingent on internal belief states (e.g., effective leadership beliefs) 
and the less they become contingent on contextual cues (e.g., performance information). First, two 
experimental studies indicated that performance information impacted high power leaders’ self-allocations 
less than low power leaders’ self-allocations. Second, data from two additional experiments showed that 
high power leaders’ self-allocations were more a reflection of their effective leadership beliefs than low 
power leaders’ self-allocations, causing them to act either more self or more group-servingly than low 
power leaders. Finally, we replicated both sets of findings in an organizational survey. We focus 
explicitly on how our findings explain why some leaders use their power to benefit the collective while 
others act self-servingly.  
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Introduction  
 
Leaders often have considerable control over the distribution of scarce resources 
within their organizations or groups (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Yukl, 2002). In the 
quintessentially interdependent organizational context these resources are typically 
needed to reach collective goals, and yet, some leaders choose to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the group. Recently, accounts of leader hubris coupled with the 
enjoyment of lavish perquisites, such as the personal use of company jets or gargantuan 
pay packages have permeated the business press. Next to the popular outcry against 
leader corruption and the blatant misallocation of resources, it has been argued that 
leaders who distribute resources to their own advantage harm group interests (Aquino & 
Reed, 1998) and are less effective than those who prioritize their group’s well-being 
(Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004). The question that 
thus arises is: Why do some leaders act self-servingly and fill their own coffers while 
others act to benefit their groups? 
Power has often been proclaimed to be the root cause of leader corruption and 
derailment. Whether in the halls of academia or in popular lore, the dictum that power 
corrupts has become almost a truism. In short, this notion intimates that it is the power 
associated with the leader role that causes leader self-serving behavior, and that greater 
leader power results in greater leader corruption. There are however indications that the 
link between leader power and leader corruption is not as straightforward as one might 
think. Recent insights in the psychology of power, as advanced in the power-approach 
theory (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), 
suggest that power does not so much corrupt as it reveals the actual person by 
psychologically freeing the individual from normative constraints. Specifically, the 
theory proposes that power has wide-ranging psychological and behavioral 
consequences by fundamentally affecting the way individuals perceive the world, others, 
and themselves. Power is posited to alter the processing of information, such that 
elevated power will render individuals less sensitive to situational constraints and more 
sensitive to internal cues as compared to low power. Translating these insights to a 
leader resource allocation context, we propose that leader power will influence the type 
of information (i.e., situational, context-specific versus internal, context-free 
information) leaders rely on in their resource distributions.  
Interestingly, leadership research has also identified situational cues, such as 
performance information (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005), as well as 
internal belief states, such as effective leadership beliefs (Lord & Maher, 1993), as being 
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vital influences on leader allocation behaviors. However, despite indications of its 
potential impact, the role that leader power may play in the relationship between 
contextual cues and leader allocation decisions on the one hand, and internal cues and 
leader allocation decisions on the other hand has not yet been clarified.  
Based on the power-approach theory, we propose that high power leaders’ 
allocations will be influenced less by contextual cues such as performance information 
than those of low power leaders. Conversely, we predict that high power leaders’ 
allocations will be more a reflection of their internal role-related schemas concerning 
effective leadership than low power leaders’ allocations. We thus argue that higher leader 
power will not inevitably result in higher leader self-servingness. Rather, we purport that 
the more power a leader holds, the more the leader’s actions become contingent on 
internal belief states and the less they become contingent on situational, contextual cues. 
Whether this results in more or less self-serving behaviors depends on the nature of 
these belief states and contextual cues.  
Our aim is thus three-fold: 1) to contribute to an understanding of how power 
informs leader decisions by integrating research on power and leadership; 2) to show 
that power diminishes the strength of the situation and increases the relevance of 
leaders’ beliefs about effective leadership; 3) to outline and demonstrate that this offers 
a viable perspective to understand variations in leader self versus group-serving 
behaviors.  
 
The Psychology of Leader Power 
 
There is an almost natural association between power and the leader role, and yet, 
the two are not the same (Goodwin, 2003). Power is often defined as asymmetric 
control over valued resources in social relations (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959).This conceptualization of power implies 
control over critical resources in any type of social relationship, and therefore suggests 
that, while power is relevant to the leader role, it is not limited to it. The leader role 
effectively places individuals in a position where, next to motivating, coordinating and 
directing group members’ efforts (e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2003; Farmer & 
Aquinis, 2005; Hollander, 1980; Yukl & van Fleet, 1992; Yukl, Wall, & Lepsinger, 1990), 
they have the authority to make decisions that affect individual and group level 
outcomes. The leader role thus entails control over valuable resources, and consequently 
it entails the possession of power. However, while typically leaders have more power 
than their subordinates, not all leaders will have the same amount of power at their 
disposal. Inevitably, some leaders will command more power than others. Based on the 
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power-approach theory, we propose that these power differences within the leader role 
can have sweeping consequences on leader actions. Therefore, we will examine the 
effects of varying amounts of power within the leader role on leader resource 
distributions. 
Research and everyday experience suggest that power can have a variety of effects 
on those who possess it. Although power can be used to the benefit of others, 
traditionally, research has emphasized power’s dire effects on behavior, perceptions and 
attitudes (for a recent review see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). The metamorphic effects of 
power have been demonstrated by Kipnis (1972, 1976) who showed that high power 
individuals were more likely to make influence attempts, to devalue others, to feel 
increased psychological distance from their subordinates, and to exhibit inflated self-
perceptions (e.g., O’Neal, Kipnis, & Craig, 1994; Rind & Kipnis, 1999). Additionally, 
power has been linked to increased subordinate stereotyping and decreased social 
attention (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; 
Keltner & Robinson, 1997), as well as to self-enhancement and subordinate derogation 
(Georgesen & Harris, 1998).  
More recently the power approach-theory (Keltner et al., 2003) has offered a lens to 
the study of power that paints a more balanced picture of its transformational effects. In 
essence, the theory suggests that power does not so much transform and corrupt, as it 
frees the individual from external constraints and reveals the ‘actual’ person.  
Indeed, one of the major arguments put forward by the authors is that the norms 
traditionally governing individuals’ thoughts and behaviors do not seem to hold for 
those in power. The theory proposes that elevated power entails freedom and reward-
abundant environments. This gives rise to a general approach tendency, increased 
attention to rewards and results in disinhibited behavior. That is, elevated power frees 
the individual from potential behavior-inhibiting constraints. In contrast, low power 
individuals have less access to material and social resources and are more subject to 
social threats and punishments. Therefore, they are more sensitive to evaluations as well 
as to potential external constraints (Fiske, 1993; Steele & Aronson, 1995), which in turn, 
may direct their attention to multiple aspects of the situation and lead them to devote 
more attention to others. Low power is associated with an avoidance tendency and an 
increased focus on threats and punishments, which results in behaviors constrained by 
situational forces (Keltner et al., 2003).  
A fair number of recent studies have provided support for the idea that high power 
individuals may feel less constrained by social norms, others’ evaluations and contextual 
cues than low power individuals. Thus, high power individuals have been shown to act 
more at will (Galinsky et al., 2003), to engage in more goal-directed behavior (Anderson, 
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Keltner, & John, 2003; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 
2007a, 2007b) and to act in more variable ways (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002) than 
their low power counterparts. High power, as opposed to low power, has also been 
linked to increased optimism, confidence and risk-taking behavior (Anderson & 
Galinsky, 2006). Moreover, in negotiations, high power parties were more likely to 
initiate the negotiation, to make a first offer (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007) and 
to respond less to their opponents’ emotional displays of anger than low power parties 
(Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). High power persons have also been 
shown to be less concerned with how others see them or judge their actions (Galinsky, 
Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008), to speak more and to speak out of 
turn (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998), to express their true attitudes and to be less likely to 
fall prey to influence attempts than low power individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; 
Berdahl & Martorana, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008). Importantly, Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, 
and Gruenfeld (2006) also demonstrated that the powerful were less likely than the 
powerless to spontaneously take the perspective of others and to take others’ 
background knowledge into account. That is, the powerful anchored more heavily on 
their own points of view and were less accurate than low power individuals in assessing 
others’ thoughts and feelings (Galinsky et al., 2006). Although power holders can be 
careful information processors (Overbeck & Park, 2001, 2006), especially when they 
have the explicit goal to process information about subordinates thoroughly or when 
they see subordinates as instrumental to reaching a goal (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & 
Galinsky, 2008), power will have a negative effect on the tendency to understand what 
others see, think and feel. Evidently thus, power may guard the individual from the 
influence of situational forces (Galinsky et al., 2008; Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006).  
But if the powerful are relatively shielded from external constraints on their thoughts 
and behaviors, what does influence them? The power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 
2003) suggests that power deflects attention away from situational cues and toward 
internal states, goals, attitudes, and beliefs, which in turn, would lead to high power 
individuals’ actions being guided by their internal preferences. That is, the behaviors of 
the powerful are purported to be more in line with their intra-psychic states, traits, 
attitudes and beliefs than the behaviors of the less powerful.  
Some recent research provides evidence supporting this line of reasoning. In three 
studies, Chen et al. (2001) found that power-primed communally-oriented participants 
acted more selflessly and power-primed exchange-oriented participants acted more 
selfishly than participants exposed to neutral primes. The authors argued that power 
activated social responsibility goals in communals and self-interest goals in exchangers, 
thus leading to different behavioral outcomes. Similarly, Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, and 
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Strack (1995) showed that the activation of the concept of power in men who had a 
predisposition towards sexual harassment led to an automatic triggering of sex-related 
concepts and consequently to viewing female discussion partners as sexual objects. 
More recently, Galinsky et al. (2008) demonstrated that in a negotiation task, high power 
participants’ social value orientations were better predictors of their negotiation 
behaviors than their partners’ reputations. In these studies, the relationship between 
internal states, such as existing dispositions, and subsequent actions seemed to be 
stronger for high than for low power individuals.  
In sum, both theory as well as existing empirical evidence suggests that high power 
individuals, in contrast to low power individuals, are more immune to the influence of 
situational cues and more open to the influence of internal belief states.  
 
Leader Resource Allocations 
 
Importantly, none of the aforementioned research on the psychology of power 
focuses directly on the core issue at stake here – the influence of power on leader self-
serving behaviors. Given that the manner in which organizational resources are 
distributed can influence employee motivation and performance (De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2004) it is surprising that our understanding of how leaders make 
allocation decisions in general, or decide on making self-serving allocations in particular, 
is rather limited and has thus far not been informed by research on the psychology of 
power. Yet, we believe that insights derived from this research may help us understand 
leaders’ decision making in the distribution of resources.  
Specifically, we anchor our argument on the suggestion that high power individuals 
process information differently than low power individuals. While leaders are typically 
more powerful than their subordinates, we argue that the relative power differences 
within the leader role will have similar effects on information processing as they would 
have in more traditional conceptualizations of high and low power. Therefore, we posit 
that leader power will influence the type of information leaders rely on when distributing 
resources. We argue that high power leaders, in contrast to low power leaders, will be 
more immune to the influence of situational cues and more open to the influence of 
internal belief states when deciding on resource allocations. From a leadership 
perspective, two instantiations of situational and internal cues are particularly promising 
candidates for further investigation, namely leaders’ and subordinates’ performance 
within the group, and role-related schemas pertaining to effective leadership. In the 
following we will discuss performance information and effective leadership beliefs as 
they relate to power and leader allocation decisions.  
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Leader Allocation Decisions and Performance Information 
Leaders are generally expected to make allocation decisions based on their own and 
their subordinates’ performance. These allocations may pertain to monetary assets such 
as promotions, pay increases and bonuses, but they may also pertain to other types of 
assets such as office space, parking lots, praise, and recognition. Prior research has 
already indicated that power may affect the way that leaders evaluate subordinate 
performance (Georgesen & Harris, 1998), particularly when there is room for leaders’ 
subjective interpretations of subordinates’ accomplishments. However, performance 
information can be relatively clear cut, and it can provide insights into how the leader 
performed as compared to his or her subordinates. In such instances, how will a leader 
decide upon resource allocations, and what role can we expect power to play? This 
question is crucial because most resources are not unlimited. As a consequence, the 
more of the organizational resource the leader allocates to one person (for instance him 
or herself), the less is left over for the others.  
One possible way for leaders to distribute resources within their groups would be to 
follow equity considerations. Everyday experience as well as research (e.g., Adams, 1965; 
Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) suggests that, in resource allocation contexts, 
individuals are more likely to perceive their outcomes to be fair if they are a reflection of 
their relative performance. From an equity theory perspective (Adams, 1965), 
performance per se is not as important in determining the fairness of one’s outcomes, as 
is the comparison of one’s own performance and outcomes with those of relevant 
others. Importantly, applications of equity theory in the arena of leadership suggest that 
leaders follow equity rules (as opposed to equality rules) to decide on resource 
distributions between themselves and their followers (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & 
Van Dijk, 2005, 2008; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). In 
principle thus, one would expect leaders to distribute resources between the self and 
their subordinates by comparing their and their underlings’ performance. That is, one 
would expect information about leaders’ and followers’ performance to affect leader 
resource allocation decisions. In this respect, two performance situations appear to be 
especially interesting: (1) where the leader outperforms the subordinates, and (2) where 
the subordinates outperform the leader. The basic prediction derived from notions of 
equity theory would be that leaders who outperform their subordinates should claim 
more resources for the self, while leaders who perform worse than their subordinates 
should claim fewer resources for the self.  
However, from an approach-theory of power perspective, we expect leader power to 
moderate the effects of performance information on leader allocation decisions. Because 
performance information is inherently contextual and situation-specific and high power 
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shields the individual from the effects of situational forces, we expect high power 
leaders to rely less on performance information when allocating resources than low 
power leaders. As a consequence, we predict that low power leaders are more likely to 
rely on performance information in their allocation decisions than high power leaders, 
and that they will self-allocate more resources when they performed better than their 
subordinates than when they performed worse than their subordinates.  
Leader Allocation Decisions and Effective Leadership Beliefs 
But if we expect high power leaders to rely less on performance information in their 
allocation decisions than low power leaders, what type of information could they be 
expected to make use of? As already stated, we predict that high power leaders are more 
sensitive to internal cues than low power leaders. From a leader categorization theory 
perspective (Lord & Maher, 1993) role-related schemas seem to be especially likely 
candidates to serve as internal behavioral guides. Leader categorization theory suggests 
that leaders have behavioral schemas that pertain directly to the leader role (i.e., implicit 
leadership theories) and that these schemas represent a foundation for the generation of 
behaviors (Lord & Maher, 1993; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). These schemas contain the 
attributes, features, images and ideas that define the schema category (Wofford & 
Goodwin, 1994) and they can be related to tasks, goals, roles or any other work-related 
situation. 
One such specific type of leader behavioral schema is an effective leadership 
schema. Although typically, leader categorization theory has been invoked to show that 
perceivers hold different schemas for, and associate different behavioral categories with, 
effective and ineffective leaders (e.g., Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Phillips & Lord, 
1982), the theory also includes propositions more relevant to the current analysis, 
namely that leaders also hold effective leadership schemas. Thus, we argue that leaders 
hold a schema of an effective leader that “provides a self-standard about how the leader 
should behave in a given situation” (Lord & Maher, 1993, p. 132). Needless to say, 
definitions of leadership effectiveness may vary widely, and leaders may differ in how 
they envision their role and their relationship to their subordinates. In this respect, most 
social relationship models suggest that individuals implicitly understand their 
interactions with others as functioning along a particular dimension: self vs. other-
orientation (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Mills & Clark, 1984; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976). 
Thus, leaders can either see their role as primarily being in the service of the self or of 
the group. Consequently, we argue that leaders’ effective leadership schemas can vary 
along the self vs. group-serving dimension. Some leaders may think that effective leaders 
should fully take advantage of their status by enjoying the perks associated with the 
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position, while others may think that they should renounce their status symbols by 
forfeiting perks. We therefore argue that the content of effective leadership beliefs 
(ELBs) (self vs. group-serving) will determine the extent to which leader resource 
allocations may reflect a self or group-orientation.  
However, from an approach-theory of power perspective, we argue that high power 
leaders should be more likely to attend to their own beliefs regarding effective leadership 
when allocating resources, than low power leaders. As a consequence, high power 
leaders endorsing self-serving effective leadership beliefs should make more self-serving 
allocations than high power leaders endorsing group-serving effective leadership beliefs. 
 
Overview of the Present Research 
In sum, we predict that low power leaders’ allocation decisions are influenced more 
by performance feedback information, while high power leaders’ allocations are more in 
line with their effective leadership beliefs. Specifically, we test two different hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Performance feedback will influence low power leaders’ self-allocations more than high 
power leaders’ self-allocations. Low power leaders’ self-allocations will be higher (vs. 
lower) when the leaders’ performance feedback is high (vs. low).  
 
Hypothesis 2: High power leaders’ self-allocations are influenced more by effective leadership beliefs than 
low power leaders’ self-allocations. High power leaders’ self-allocations will be higher (vs. 
lower) when the leaders endorse self-serving (vs. group-serving) effective leadership beliefs.  
 
To test our proposed relationships we opted for a multiple-study, multiple-method 
approach. To allow us to draw causal conclusions we first tested our hypotheses 
separately in two sets of two studies each. We tested Hypothesis 1 in Study 1a and 1b 
and Hypothesis 2 in Study 2a and 2b by using two different types of experimental 
methods: laboratory experiments (Study 1a and 2a) and scenario experiments (Study 1b 
and 2b). To determine whether our predicted relationships may also be observed in 
organizational settings, we tested both hypotheses simultaneously in a survey (Study 3) 
where we measured leader power, performance feedback, effective leadership beliefs, 
and self-serving behaviors in a cross-sectional sample of organizational leaders.  
In Study 1a and 2a participants were led to believe that they were the leader of a 
four-person group engaged in computer-mediated task performance. In reality, the 
group interaction was simulated via the experimental set-up. In Study 1b and 2b 
participants were asked to imagine being a leader facing an organizational resource 
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allocation problem, thus increasing the mundane realism of the studies, while at the 
same time maintaining the experimental nature of the test.  
Our main dependent variable across our experimental studies was the amount of 
resources (points in Study 1a, 2a or money in Study 1b, 2b) leaders self-allocated out of 
a shared group resource. In the survey (Study 3) we measured self-serving behaviors by 
having leaders report how often they had engaged in certain self-serving behaviors 
during the past year (e.g., used their position to secure benefits for the self).  
 
Study 1a 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty Dutch business administration students (33 
females, 47 males) with a mean age of 20.53 years (SD = 2.00) participated in exchange 
for € 10 (approximately 14 US dollars). Participants were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 (Performance feedback: high vs. low) 
between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants arrived in groups of twelve to participate in a computer-
mediated study on “virtual group decision making” and were seated in individual 
cubicles, each equipped with a computer. All instructions and stimuli were presented on 
the computer screens and all dependent measures were recorded by the program 
software. 
After being informed about random assignment to a four-person team, participants 
learned that their team had a hierarchical team structure (i.e., a leader and three 
subordinates) and that team members were to be rewarded for their work. To ensure the 
credibility of the computer-mediated virtual group interaction space, participants had to 
wait for two minutes for the establishment of a bogus “network connection” between 
the team members. Next, they completed a purported cognitive style test and all 
participants were assigned the leader role allegedly based on their test results.  
Participants then learned that their group would work on a number of different tasks 
and that, as leaders, they were to ensure their team’s optimal performance. Leaders had 
to decide on how the tasks should be implemented and assign specific tasks to 
subordinates. The power manipulation was embedded in the leader role description. 
Although all our participants were leaders - and thus, one could argue, were in higher 
power positions - some had more reward and coercive power than others. In the low 
power condition, leaders learned that they only had the power to evaluate subordinates’ 
work for feedback purposes, and could not use these evaluations to fire, reprimand or 
reward subordinates. Conversely, in the high power condition, leaders learned that they 
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could evaluate subordinates’ work, and use these evaluations to fire, reprimand and 
reward subordinates.  
Participants then learned that their team had to perform two different tasks: a 
contrast-sensitivity task (see van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & De Cremer, 2007) 
and a desert survival task (see Lafferty & Pond, 1974). The contrast sensitivity task was 
introduced as a cover story for our performance feedback manipulation. The 
instructions stressed that the task was designed to measure the degree to which 
individual team members were contrast-sensitive. Contrast-sensitivity was presented as a 
trainable ability unrelated to intelligence or mathematical acumen. Participants also read 
that they would receive privileged feedback information regarding their and their team-
mates’ performance.  
In the contrast-sensitivity task participants had to estimate as accurately as possible 
the number of black squares in a checkerboard grid containing 180 randomly arranged 
black and white squares. Participants did not know that each grid always consisted of 90 
black and 90 white squares. Each grid was presented for 5 seconds. After two practice 
rounds, participants estimated the number of black squares in a total of 10 grids. Next, 
leaders were presented with bogus performance feedback, regarding their and their 
subordinates’ performance. This represented our performance feedback manipulation. 
In the high performance feedback condition, participants read that they had scored 88 points 
on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, while their subordinates had scored 55, 53 and 51 
points respectively. In the low performance feedback condition, leaders read that they had 
scored 53 points, while their subordinates had scored 86, 88 and 84 points respectively. 
Participants were also presented with a rank ordering of their and their subordinates’ 
performance, thus stressing the performance differences within the group. In the high 
performance condition, the leader was ranked first, while in the low performance 
condition, he/she was ranked last.  
Subsequently, the desert survival task started. Leaders learned that their team could 
earn 500 points for successful task completion and that the allotted time for the task was 
10 minutes. The task consisted of ranking 12 utensils found after a plane crashed in the 
desert. The leader’s task was to delegate 4 of the utensils to each subordinate for ranking 
purposes, to decide on the point distribution (out of the total of 500 points) to the self 
and the other team members, and to create the final item ranking. Moreover, it was the 
leaders’ job to motivate their subordinates to perform well (via emails). All leaders took 
the opportunity to send emails to their subordinates. They spent an average of 7 minutes 
composing the emails and wrote an average of 123 words. There were no significant 
differences between conditions in the amount of time spent writing the emails or in the 
70
Leader Power and Self-serving versus Group-serving Behavior 
62 
number of words used. In combination, this suggests that participants took the leader 
role seriously and believed to be working in a real team. 
Participants never got to the last stage of the task, namely, the final rank-ordering. 
After having sent emails to their subordinates and having delegated the utensils, leaders 
were asked to divide the 500 points the team could earn between themselves and their 
subordinates. Finally, after answering our dependent measures, including demographic 
indicators such as age, gender, and study major, participants answered some funneled 
debriefing questions probing for hypothesis guessing. None had correctly guessed our 
hypothesis. We also randomly probed participants for suspicion regarding the reality of 
the virtual team environment. None of the probed participants indicated any suspicion. 
Finally participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked for their participation and paid. 
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the number of 
points leaders self-awarded. Each compensation point counted as one lottery entry for 
several 50 euro prizes, meaning that the more points they self-awarded, the more lottery 
entries they had and the higher the chances of winning one of the prizes. All 
manipulation check measures were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). As a check of our power manipulation, participants 
responded to a 6-item scale (e.g., “I have significant power in administering negative 
consequences to my followers.”). These items were averaged into one power score 
(Cronbach’s ơ = .83). As a check of our performance feedback manipulation, 
participants answered three questions (“My score on the contrast sensitivity task was 
better than that of my team members.”; “My score on the contrast-sensitivity task was 
worse than that of my team members.”(R); “I performed better than my team members 
on the contrast sensitivity task.”). The reverse-scored item was recoded and all items 
were averaged into a performance feedback score (Cronbach’s ơ = .95)1 .  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) power (high/low) and performance feedback 
(high/low) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. A two-way ANOVA on the power score yielded only a 
significant main effect of power, F (1, 76) = 77.64, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .50, indicating that 
participants in the high power condition (M = 5.69, SD = .79) felt more powerful than 
participants in the low power condition (M = 4.06, SD = .84). A two-way ANOVA on 
the performance feedback score revealed only a significant main effect of feedback, F (1, 
76) = 983.19, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .92, with participants in the high feedback condition 
perceiving that they had performed better (M = 6.39, SD = .76) than participants in the 
low feedback condition (M = 1.57, SD = .60).  
71
Leader Power and Self-serving versus Group-serving Behavior 
63 
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of performance feedback, F (1, 76) = 8.05, p = .006, 
Ƨ²p = .10, with participants who believed that they had outperformed their subordinates 
(M = 186.47, SD = 34.45) self-allocating more points than participants who believed 
that their subordinates had outperformed them (M = 162.79, SD = 45.53). As predicted, 
this main effect was qualified by a Power X Performance feedback interaction, F (1, 76) 
= 11.27, p = .001, Ƨ²p = .13 (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 500 points) in Study 1a 
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A simple main effects analysis indicated that low power leaders self-awarded more 
points when they thought they had outperformed their subordinates (M = 201.38, SD = 
22.73) than when they thought their subordinates had outperformed them (M = 148.05, 
SD = 31.29), F (1, 76) = 18.68, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .20, CI (diff) = between 28.76 vs. 77.92. 
No such differential impact of performance evaluations on the point allocation decision 
was shown by high power leaders (MHPF = 173.05, SD = 38.06 versus MLPF = 177.52, 
SD = 53.04), F (1, 76) < 1. The simple main effects analysis also revealed that, when 
they perceived to have outperformed their subordinates, low power leaders (M = 
201.38, SD = 22.73) self-allocated more points than high power leaders (M = 173.05, 
SD = 38.06), F (1, 76) = 5.15, p = .02, Ƨ²p = .06, CI (diff) = between 3.47 and 53.20. 
Conversely, when they thought their subordinates had outperformed them, low power 
leaders (M = 148.05, SD = 31.29) self-allocated less points than high power leaders (M 
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= 177.52, SD = 53.04), F (1, 76) = 6.18, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .07, CI (diff) = between -53.09 
and -5.86. In line with Hypothesis 1, this suggests that, while high power leaders were 
relatively unaffected by situational contingencies in their self-allocations (i.e., 
performance feedback), low power leaders were more likely to factor such external 
influences into their decisions. In the next study we aim to replicate the findings of our 
laboratory experiment in a scenario experiment.  
 
Study 1b 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and seventeen undergraduates (41 females, 
76 males), receiving payment of € 3 (approximately 4 US Dollars) for their voluntary 
participation, were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 
(Performance feedback: high vs. low) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants were approached in the cafeterias of a Dutch University 
and asked whether they wanted to fill in a short paper and pencil questionnaire in 
exchange for 3 euro.  
Participants were informed that they would read the description of an organizational 
situation and that they had to answer a few questions pertaining to it. The scenario text 
prompted participants to imagine being the R&D director of a pharmaceutical company 
directly leading a department of 31 employees. At this point we introduced our power 
manipulation, which was similar to the power manipulation used in Study 1a. In the high 
power condition participants read that: “As Head of R&D you have the following power-
means at your disposal. You have the power to evaluate your subordinates’ performance 
and to use these evaluations in deciding whether subordinates will get a promotion or 
not. You can also withhold bonuses or freeze salaries if subordinates’ performance is 
not satisfactory. Furthermore, you have the power to fire subordinates whose 
performance is not satisfactory.” In the low power condition, participants read that: “As 
Head of R&D you have the following power-means at your disposal. You have the 
power to evaluate your subordinates’ performance and to use these evaluations for 
feedback purposes. However, you cannot withhold bonuses or freeze salaries if 
subordinates’ performance is not satisfactory. Furthermore, you do not have the power 
to fire subordinates whose performance is not satisfactory.” 
Following the power manipulation we introduced our performance feedback 
manipulation. Participants read that their company had a public performance evaluation 
system, where everyone’s performance feedback scores were available on the firm’s 
intranet. In the high performance feedback condition, participants read that: “You are checking 
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your and your subordinates’ performance feedback scores and are surprised to find out 
that you widely outperformed your subordinates. You scored 6.12 points out of 7 while 
the average score of your subordinates was approximately 3.85 points out of 7.” In the 
low performance feedback condition, participants read that: “You are checking your and your 
subordinates’ performance feedback scores and are surprised to find out that you widely 
underperformed your subordinates. You scored 3.85 points out of 7 while the average 
score of your subordinates was approximately 6.12 points out of 7.” 
The text continued by having the director’s secretary bring an urgent matter to 
his/her attention: the department’s salary budget for the year which was € 2,450,000. 
Based on company policy, each of the 31 employees earned, on average, a fixed salary of 
€ 57,200, with the possibility of earning a bonus. Company policy did not dictate the 
directors’ salaries and they could decide on how much they would earn out of the € 
2,450,000 allocated to the department. The remainder of the € 2,450,000 (after 
subtracting the leader’s self-assigned salary and the employees’ fixed salaries) was to be 
used for employees’ bonuses. The text stressed that leaders were not eligible for a 
bonus, above and beyond their salary self-allocation. Finally, participants answered our 
dependent measures, were thanked for their participation, paid and debriefed.  
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the amount of 
money participants self-awarded out of the € 2,445,000 available to their department. All 
responses to our manipulation checks were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). As a check of our power manipulation participants 
answered the same 6-item scale (Cronbach’s ơ = .81) as in Study 1a. As a check of our 
performance feedback manipulation, participants answered the same 3-item scale 
(Cronbach’s ơ = .81) as in Study 1a.  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) power (high/low) and performance feedback 
(high/low) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. A two-way ANOVA on the average power score revealed 
that participants in the high power condition (M = 5.38, SD = .82) felt more powerful 
than participants in the low power condition (M = 3.79, SD = .82), F (1, 113) = 108.81, 
p < .001, Ƨ²p = .49. A two-way ANOVA on the average performance feedback score 
revealed only a significant main effect of performance feedback, F (1, 113) = 367.40, p < 
.001, Ƨ²p = .76, with participants in the high performance feedback condition perceiving 
themselves to have performed better (M = 6.27, SD = 1.30) than participants in the low 
performance feedback condition (M = 1.70, SD = 1.23). No other effects reached 
significance, which leads us to conclude that our manipulations were successful.  
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Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the amount of money leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of performance feedback, F (1, 113) = 4.42, p = .04, 
Ƨ²p = .04, with participants in the high performance feedback condition (M = 
179,930.20, SD = 158,639.10) self-allocating more money than participants in the low 
performance feedback condition (M = 128,549.20, SD = 104,893.31). As predicted, this 
main effect was qualified by a Power X Performance feedback interaction, F (1, 113) = 
8.40, p = .005, Ƨ²p = .07 (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Figure 3.2 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders (out of 2,445,000 euro) in Study 1b 
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In line with Study 1a, a simple main effects analysis showed that participants in the 
low power condition self-awarded more money when they had outperformed their 
subordinates (M = 214,777.78, SD = 197,720.14) than when their subordinates had 
outperformed them (M = 92,550.00, SD = 55,684.82), F (1, 113) = 11.43, p = .001, Ƨ²p 
= .09, CI (diff) = between 50,615.70 and 193,839.85. No such differential impact of 
performance feedback on the salary allocation decision was shown by leaders in the high 
power conditions (MHPF = 145,082.58, SD = 111,279.22 versus MLPF = 164,548.39, SD 
= 124,542.58), F (1, 113) < 1. The simple main effects analysis also indicated that, when 
they had outperformed their subordinates, low power leaders (M = 214,777.78, SD = 
197,720.14) self-allocated more money than high power leaders (M = 145.082.58, SD = 
111,279.22), F (1, 113) = 4.17, p = .04, Ƨ²p = .04, CI (diff) = between 2,062.98 and 
137,327.42. Conversely, when their subordinates had outperformed them, low power 
leaders (M = 92,550.00, SD = 55,684.82) self-allocated less money than high power 
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leaders (M = 164,548.39, SD = 124,542.58), F (1, 113) = 4.23, p = .04, Ƨ²p = .04, CI 
(diff) = between -141,306.93 and -2,689.84. Thus, similar to Study 1a, low power 
leaders’ self-allocations were influenced by performance feedback, while high power 
leaders’ self-allocations did not reflect an incorporation of performance feedback.  
 
Discussion Study 1a and 1b 
In line with our theoretical framework, the present data suggest that high power 
leaders are relatively unaffected by situational contingencies in their self-allocations, as 
compared to low power leaders. In two studies, we confirmed Hypothesis 1 and showed 
that performance feedback impacted high power leaders’ allocations less than low power 
leaders’ allocations. Low power leaders who thought they had outperformed their 
subordinates claimed more resources than low power leaders who thought they 
underperformed their subordinates. Interestingly, and contrary to the popular 
perception that high power inevitably leads to self-servingness, we found that low power 
leaders who thought they had outperformed their subordinates self-allocated more 
resources than high power leaders.  
Studies 1a and 1b did however only test Hypothesis 1 and therefore remain mute as 
to possible influences on high power leaders’ allocations. As already stated in 
Hypothesis 2, from an approach-theory of power perspective, high power leaders are 
expected to act more in line with their internal belief states than low power leaders. 
Therefore, in Study 2a and 2b we set out to test Hypothesis 2 aiming to show that 
effective leadership beliefs (ELBs) affect high power leaders’ allocations more than low 
power leaders’ allocations.  
 
Study 2a 
 
Method 
Participants and design. Ninety eight business administration students (27 
females, 71 males) with a mean age of 20.22 years (SD = 2.13) participated voluntarily in 
the study in exchange for € 10 (approximately US $14). Participants were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 (Effective leadership beliefs: 
self vs. group-serving) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. We followed the paradigm developed for Study 1a with a few 
modifications. The main difference was the introduction of our ELBs (self vs. group-
serving) manipulation. Previous studies (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) have successfully 
manipulated belief systems by providing participants with different reading passages 
claiming to represent research findings pertaining to the beliefs to be manipulated. 
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Participants in the Chiu et al. (1997) studies were presented with an alleged Psychology 
Today article persuading readers of one of two sets of beliefs. 
In the present study, we used a similar set-up for our ELBs manipulation (see also 
Rus, van Knippenberg, & van Knippenberg, 2007). The ELBs manipulation was 
introduced while participants were waiting for their cognitive style test results and thus 
before they were assigned the leader role. Participants were informed that while waiting 
for their score they could read an excerpt from a Harvard Business Review (HBR) article on 
leader effectiveness. All participants took the time to read the alleged HBR excerpt. The 
self-serving version of the article claimed that research had found leaders pursuing their own 
goals, investing minimal resources in the group, and enjoying traditional leader perks to 
be most effective (e.g., “Dr. Hull’s research team also found that leaders who 
maintained or increased traditional benefits such as a large office, an expensive company 
car, or company stock option bonuses were in the long run more effective. In Dr. Hull’s 
opinion: These leaders increased some of their status symbols and gained increased 
respect from their followers.”). The group-serving version of the HBR article claimed that 
research had shown leaders pursuing group goals, investing a large amount of resources 
in the group, and giving up on traditional leader perks to be most effective (e.g., “Dr. 
Hull’s research team also found that leaders who gave up traditional benefits such as a 
large office, an expensive company car, or company stock option bonuses were in the 
long run more effective. In Dr. Hull’s opinion: These leaders gave up some of their 
status symbols and gained increased respect from their followers.”).  
The rest of the experimental set-up was identical to Study 1a, with the omission of 
the contrast-sensitivity task and the performance feedback manipulation. Thus, after 
reading the HBR article, being assigned the leader role and being exposed to our power 
manipulation, participants proceeded to give subordinates instructions for the group 
task, and to make the point allocation. After answering our dependent measures and 
demographic questions pertaining to their age, gender and study major, participants 
answered some funneled debriefing questions to test for hypothesis guessing. None of 
our participants had correctly guessed our hypothesis. We also randomly probed 
participants for suspicion regarding the reality of their team. None of the probed 
participants indicated any suspicions. Finally participants were thoroughly debriefed and 
were presented with both versions of the alleged HBR article. After ensuring that they 
understood the entirely fabricated nature of the article they were thanked for their 
participation and paid.  
Dependent measures. As in Study 1a our main dependent variable was the number 
of points leaders self-awarded. All manipulation check measures were recorded on a 7-
point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). To check for the success 
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of our power manipulation we used the same power scale as in Studies 1a and 1b (6 
items; Cronbach’s ơ = .83). As a check of our ELBs manipulation, participants answered 
four questions (Rus, van Knippenberg, & van Knippenberg, 2007) assessing their 
agreement with statements made in the HBR article. Two questions pertained to the 
self-serving and two to the group-serving ELBs (e.g., “An effective leader is a leader 
who stresses group goals”). The two group-oriented items were reverse-scored and all 
items were combined into an average ELBs score (Cronbach’s ơ = .85). 
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs), effective leadership beliefs (self-
serving/group-serving) and power (high/low) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. A two-way ANOVA on the average power score revealed 
only a significant main effect of power, F (1, 94) = 9.83, p = .002, Ƨ²p = .10, indicating 
that leaders in the high power conditions (M = 5.18, SD = .93) felt more powerful than 
leaders in the low power conditions (M = 4.61, SD = .81). A two-way ANOVA on the 
average ELBs score revealed only a significant main effect of ELBs, F (1, 94) = 35.92, p 
< .001, Ƨ²p = .27, indicating that leaders in the self-serving ELBs conditions (M = 4.48, 
SD = 1.29) were more likely to endorse self-serving ELBs than leaders in the group-
serving conditions (M = 3.01, SD = 1.10).  
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of ELBs, F (1, 94) = 8.86, p = .004, Ƨ²p = .08. 
Leaders endorsing self-serving ELBs claimed more points for themselves (M = 182.48, 
SD = 40.61) than those endorsing group-serving ELBs (M = 159.32, SD = 38.32). As 
predicted, the main effect of ELBs was qualified by a Power X ELBs interaction, F (1, 
94) = 18.15, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .16 (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 500 points) in Study 2a 
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We had predicted that high power leaders would rely more on their ELBs in making 
resource self-allocations than low power leaders. A simple main effects analysis 
indicated that high power leaders self-awarded more points when they endorsed self-
serving ELBs (M = 194.28, SD = 34.71) than when they endorsed group-serving ELBs 
(M = 141.08, SD = 36.88), F (1, 94) = 27.30, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .22, CI (diff) = between 
32.98 and 73.41. No such differential reliance on ELBs was found for low power leaders 
(MSELB = 169.65, SD = 43.34 vs. MGELB = 179.08, SD = 29.44). In addition, the simple 
main effects analysis also showed that high power leaders endorsing self-serving ELBs 
(M = 194.28, SD = 34.71) self-allocated more points than low power leaders endorsing 
self-serving ELBs (M = 169.65, SD = 43.34), F (1, 94) = 5.50, p = .021, Ƨ²p = .05, CI 
(diff) = between 3.77 and 45.47. Interestingly, high power leaders endorsing group-
serving ELBs (M = 141.08, SD = 36.88) claimed less points for themselves than low 
power leaders endorsing group-serving ELBs (M = 179.08, SD = 29.44), F (1, 94) = 
13.64, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .12, CI (diff) = between -58.43 and -17.57. This suggests that high 
power leaders’ self-allocations were significantly influenced by their endorsed ELBs, 
while low power leaders’ were not. More importantly, contingent on the nature of the 
endorsed ELBs (i.e., whether they were self or group-serving), high power leaders’ self-
allocations were more self or more group-serving than low power leaders’ self-
allocations.  
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Study 2b 
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and two Dutch undergraduates (48 females, 
54 males) participated voluntarily in the study in exchange for € 3 (approximately US 
$4). Participants’ mean age was 22.12 years (SD = 3.11) and they were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 (ELBs: self vs. group-
serving) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants were approached in the student cafeterias of a Dutch 
University and asked whether they wanted to fill in a short paper and pencil 
questionnaire in exchange for € 3. The same scenario as in Study 1b was used, with the 
only difference being the replacement of our performance feedback manipulation with 
our ELBs manipulation. Following the same power manipulation as in Study 1b 
participants were asked to visualize sitting in their office reminiscing about things they 
had learned at an Executive Coaching Seminar on leadership effectiveness.  
At this point we introduced our ELBs (self vs. group-serving) manipulation, which 
was similar to the ELBs manipulation used in Study 2a. Participants in the self-serving 
ELBs condition read: “You found out that effective leaders set their personal goals first; 
are driven by pursuing their own results, greatly benefit from having special privileges 
such as access to a company jet and stock-options and generally invest few of their 
resources and energy into their group.”, while participants in the group-serving ELBs 
condition read: “You found out that effective leaders set their group’s goals first; are 
driven by pursuing their group’s results, greatly benefit from relinquishing special 
privileges such as access to a company jet and stock-options and generally invest a lot of 
their resources and energy into their group.” The rest of the text was identical to Study 
1b. After answering our dependent measures, participants were thanked, paid, and 
debriefed. 
Dependent measures. Identical to Study 1b, our main dependent measure 
represented the amount of money participants self-awarded out of the € 2,445,000 
budget. All items comprising our manipulation checks were measured on a 7-point scale 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). To check the effectiveness of our 
power manipulation we used the same power scale as we did in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2a (6 
items; Cronbach’s ơ = .86). To check the effectiveness of our ELBs manipulation, 
participants answered the same ELBs scale as in Study 2a (4 items; Cronbach’s ơ = .87).  
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Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs) power (high/low) and ELBs (self/group-
serving) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. As expected, a two-way ANOVA on the average power 
score revealed only a significant main effect of power, F (1, 98) = 97.66, p < .001, Ƨ²p = 
.50, with participants in the high power conditions (M = 5.47, SD = 1.03) feeling more 
powerful than participants in the low power conditions (M = 3.26, SD = 1.20). A two-
way ANOVA on the average ELBs score revealed only a significant main effect of 
ELBs, F (1, 98) = 34.37, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .26, indicating that leaders in the self-serving 
ELBs conditions (M = 4.19, SD = 1.45) were more likely to endorse self-serving ELBs 
than leaders in the group-serving conditions (M = 2.73, SD = 1.03). 
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the amount of money leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of ELBs, F (1, 98) = 5.79, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .05. 
Participants endorsing self-serving ELBs (M = 207,736.17, SD = 168,565.32) self-
allocated more money than participants endorsing group-serving ELBs (M = 
144,976.25, SD = 99,230.16). As predicted, the main effect of ELBs was qualified by a 
Power X ELBs interaction, F (1, 98) = 9.84, p = .002, Ƨ²p = .09 (see Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders (out of 2,445,000 euro) in Study 2b 
150000
50000
100000
300000
200000
250000
0
Low High
Power
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f m
on
ey
 le
ad
er
s 
se
lf-
al
lo
ca
te
d Self-serving ELBs
Group-serving ELBs
 
 
In line with Study 2a, a simple main effects analysis indicated that high power leaders 
self-allocated more money when they endorsed self-serving ELBs (M = 252,583.33, SD 
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= 201,550.92) than when they endorsed group-serving ELBs (M = 108,761.56, SD = 
37,146.63), F (1, 98) = 15.41, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .14, CI (diff) = between 71,133.91 and 
216,509.64. As predicted, no such ELBs contingent differences in self-allocations were 
found for low power leaders (MSELB = 160,939.13 SD = 111,618.85 vs. MGELB = 
179,897.57 SD = 125,651.55). The simple main effects analysis also showed that high 
power leaders endorsing self-serving ELBs (M = 252,583.33, SD = 201,550.92) claimed 
more money for themselves, than low power leaders endorsing self-serving ELBs (M = 
160,939.13 SD = 111,618.85), F (1, 98) = 5.78, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .06, CI (diff) = between 
16,040.39 and 167,248.01. More interestingly, high power leaders endorsing group-
serving ELBs (M = 108,761.56, SD = 37,146.63) self-allocated less money than low 
power leaders endorsing group-serving ELBs (M = 179,897.57 SD = 125,651.55), F (1, 
98) = 4.08, p = .04, Ƨ²p = .04, CI (diff) = between -141,021.14 and -1250.88. In sum, the 
results of our simple main effects analyses suggest that high power leaders’ allocation 
decisions are more or less self-serving contingent on the endorsed ELBs (self vs. group-
serving), while low power leaders’ decisions do not seem to be affected by endorsed 
ELBs. 
 
Discussion Study 2a and 2b  
In line with Hypothesis 2, in Studies 2a and 2b we found that effective leadership 
beliefs impacted high power leaders’ self-allocations more than low power leaders’ self-
allocations. More importantly, contingent on the endorsed ELBs, high power leaders’ 
self-allocations were more or less self-serving. High power leaders endorsing self-serving 
ELBs acted more self-servingly than high power leaders endorsing group-serving ELBs 
as well as more self-servingly than low power leaders endorsing self-serving ELBs. 
Interestingly, high power leaders endorsing group-serving ELBs acted more group-
servingly than low power leaders endorsing group-serving ELBs. 
 
Study 3 
 
In this study we measured leader power, performance feedback, effective leadership 
beliefs, and self-serving leader behaviors in an organizational context. The survey was 
designed to further elucidate some potential questions that may have arisen from our 
previous studies. First, while our experimental studies yielded consistent causal evidence 
in support of our hypotheses, they do not speak to whether we can find support for our 
theoretical framework in a field context in a sample of organizational leaders. Second, 
because we tested our two hypotheses in independent studies, one may wonder whether 
performance information and effective leadership beliefs are independent concepts or 
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whether they are related. Third, although we have no reason to believe that relying on 
Dutch samples in our experimental studies poses a limitation to the generalizability of 
our conclusions, we nevertheless used the opportunity for a replication with a sample 
from a different country, namely the United Kingdom. To address these potential open 
questions we tested both hypotheses simultaneously in a sample of organizational 
leaders. 
 
Method 
Procedure. The study was conducted online as a leadership survey. Respondents 
were recruited via a panel firm located in the United Kingdom. Emails with personalized 
survey links were sent to a panel of individuals in managerial or supervisory positions 
who had a minimum of 3 direct subordinates and a minimum of 5 years of work 
experience. 
Importantly, the survey was conducted in line with recommendations given in the 
field (Birnbaum, 2004; Dillmann, 2007). By utilizing server-sided survey programming 
we avoided common technical selection biases, which generally exclude people who do 
not meet special browser requirements (e.g., Java Script). Moreover, prior to going live 
with the survey we pre-tested the layout on a number of different computers varying the 
browsers used as well as the screen resolutions to ensure that the survey would look the 
same on different systems. We also assigned each potential respondent a unique session 
ID, resulting in individualized survey links. This made it impossible for any respondent 
to participate in the survey more than once. To increase response rate, respondents 
received a monetary incentive for their participation. On the first page of the survey we 
guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of individual surveys and emphasized that 
participation was voluntary. Respondents interested in our results were given the 
opportunity to provide their email addresses in a different database so that names and 
email addresses could not be linked to individual responses. These measures taken to 
prevent common pitfalls of online research lead us to be at least as confident about the 
quality of our data as we would have been had we conducted a traditional paper and 
pencil survey.  
Sample. Two hundred and twenty eight respondents meeting the study’s 
requirements completed the survey out of a total of 340 emails sent out to potential 
respondents (67 % response rate). The sample’s mean age was 42.99 years, (SD = 9.76) 
and women made up 39 % of the sample. Respondents’ average fulltime work 
experience was 23.21 years (SD = 10.31), their average tenure in a managerial or 
supervisory position was 12.28 years (SD = 7.96), and their average tenure on the 
current job was 6.95 years (SD = 5.17). All respondents worked in private organizations 
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and had on average 13.29 subordinates (SD = 14.30). Respondents with a higher 
education degree (i.e., Bachelor degree or higher) made up 71.1% of the sample and the 
majority (84.12 %) held management or senior management positions.  
Measures. All responses were assessed on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). Leader power was measured with 9 items of the Yukl and Falbe (1991) 
position power scale (i.e., three of the position power subscales: coercive, reward, and 
legitimate power). We used the original items and only adapted the instructions given to 
respondents (i.e., “My supervisor can…” was changed to “As a supervisor I can…”). All 
items were averaged into one leader power score2 . Leader performance was measured with 
one item, which was designed to be similar to the performance feedback leaders had 
received in Study 1a and 1b (“On average, compared to my subordinates, my 
performance last year was 1 = much better; 5 = much worse). The item was reverse-scored 
prior to using it in any analyses. ELBs were measured with eight items (4 self and 4 
group-serving) similar to our ELBs manipulation checks in Studies 2a and 2b (e.g., “To 
be effective, a leader should always pursue group goals even if this would come at the 
expense of his or her personal goals.”; “A leader concerned with group outcomes is 
effective.”; “To be effective, a leader should pursue his or her own goals even if this 
would come at the expense of his or her group’s goals.”; “A leader concerned with his 
or her personal outcomes is effective.”). The group-serving items were reverse-scored 
and all items were combined into an average ELBs score. 
An 8-item scale, inspired by work by Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998) and van 
Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) comprised our measure of leader self-serving 
behavior. Arguably, leaders can act self-servingly by securing higher monetary benefits for 
themselves, but they can also act self-servingly by making self-serving causal attributions 
such as taking unwarranted credit for group accomplishments or by denying 
responsibility for failure on group projects (cf. Weary Bradley, 1978). While in Study 1a, 
1b, 2a, and 2b, our dependent measure tapped into the allocation of monetary resources, 
in the survey we also measured the allocation of other resources, such as time and credit 
for jobs performed. Our self-serving behaviors measure in the survey is thus more 
encompassing than our measure in the experimental studies. For each of the 8 items of 
the scale, respondents had to indicate the number of times they had performed the 
described behavior during the past year (1 = never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = usually; 5 
= always). Items included: “I have negotiated a bonus for myself that was substantially 
higher than the bonus my subordinates received.”; “Instead of giving credit to my 
subordinates for jobs requiring a lot of time and effort, I took the credit myself.”; “I 
have used my leadership position to obtain benefits for myself.”; “Although I was partly 
to be blamed, I did not take personal responsibility for my group’s failure to meet a 
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goal.”; “I have pursued my personal interests, even if those interests were not serving 
my group’s interests”. 
 
Results 
We first performed a principal components analysis (PCA) with OBLIMIN rotation 
of our predictor variable items (i.e., leader power, performance feedback, and ELBs) 
which yielded a three-factor solution with all items loading .64 or higher on the intended 
scale and all cross-loadings below |.30|. Then we performed a PCA of our dependent 
variable items (i.e., leader self-serving behaviors) which yielded a one-factor solution 
with item loadings of .68 or higher. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for 
the study variables are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Study 3 
(1) Leader power
(2) Performance feedback
M SD (1) (2) (3)
3.16 .77 (.82)
2.32 .70 -.09 n/a
(3) Effective leadership beliefs
(4) Leader self-serving behaviors
2.18 .48 .11 .05 (.82)
2.40 .43 .08 .06 .34**
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. All constructs were measured 
by Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5. N = 228 (listwise). ** p < .01. 
(4)
(.85)
 
 
Leader self-serving behaviors. To test our hypotheses that high power leaders’ 
actions are influenced less by performance feedback and are more in line with their 
effective leadership beliefs than low power leaders’ actions, we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis in which leader self-serving behaviors were predicted by main effect 
terms (leader power, performance feedback, and ELBs) at Step 1 and the interaction 
terms (Leader power X Performance feedback and Leader power X ELBs) at Step 2 3. 
Following Aiken and West (1991), leader power, performance feedback, and ELBs were 
centered by subtracting the mean from each score, and the interaction terms as well as 
the main effects were based on the centered scores.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of Regression Analysis for Leader Power, Performance Feedback and Effective 
Leadership Beliefs Predicting Leader Self-serving Behaviors in Study 3 
Step 1
Leader power
Performance feedback
b SE b ß t p
.03 .03 .05 .82 .41
.03 .04 .05 .86 .38
Note. The explained variance of Step 1 was R2 = .13. Step 2 explained an
additional variance of R2 change = .05. N = 228 (listwise). 
Step 2
Leader power
Performance feedback
.04 .03 .07 1.20 .23
.04 .04 .07 1.15 .25
Effective leadership beliefs .31 .05 .35 5.71 <.001
Variable
Effective leadership beliefs .30 .05 .34 5.40 <.001
Leader power x Performance 
feedback -.15 .05 -.19 -3.11 .002
Leader power x Effective 
leadership beliefs
.21 .07 .19 2.96 .003
 
 
Table 3.2 shows the regression results: Step 1 explained a significant proportion of 
variance in leader self-serving behaviors and we found a positive relationship between 
ELBs and leader self-serving behaviors. More importantly, Step 24 explained an 
additional significant proportion of variance in leader self-serving behaviors and it 
revealed our predicted Leader power X Performance feedback (see Figure 3.5) and 
Leader power X ELBs (see Figure 3.6) interactions.  
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Figure 3.5 Leader self-serving behaviors as predicted by power and performance feedback in Study 3 
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Figure 3.6 Leader self-serving behaviors as predicted by power and effective leadership beliefs in Study 3 
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To further analyze the interactions, we conducted simple slopes analyses (Aiken & 
West, 1991) and determined the simple slopes for high and low power leaders 
separately. As predicted, performance feedback yielded a positive relationship to leader 
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self-serving behaviors for low power leaders (1 SD below the mean; Ƣ = .26, p = .004), 
but not for high power leaders (1 SD above the mean; Ƣ = -.11, p = .161). Also as 
predicted, ELBs yielded a strong positive relationship to leader self-serving behaviors 
for high power leaders (1 SD above the mean; Ƣ = .53, p < .001) but a much weaker 
relationship for low power leaders (1 SD below the mean; Ƣ = .16, p = .046). Thus, in 
line with the findings of Study 1a and 1b we found that performance feedback is related 
to leader self-serving behaviors for low power, but not for high power leaders. 
Moreover, in line with the findings of Study 2a and 2b, the current data suggest that 
ELBs are more strongly related to leader self-serving behaviors for high than for low 
power leaders.  
 
Discussion Study 3 
In line with our theoretical framework, we replicated the results of Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 
and 2b in a field setting, and showed that low power leaders’ actions were influenced 
more by performance information than high power leaders’ actions, while high power 
leaders’ behaviors were more in line with their effective leadership beliefs than low 
power leaders’ behaviors. The current study is thus not only an extension of our earlier 
findings to a field setting in a different country, but it also scrutinizes a greater variety of 
leader self-serving behaviors which go above and beyond simple monetary allocations. 
Moreover, by testing both our hypotheses simultaneously, the current study also 
established that our proposed Power X Performance feedback and Power X Effective 
leadership beliefs interactions are independent from each other.  
 
General Discussion 
Leader self-serving behaviors have been proposed both in academic circles and 
within the forum of public opinion to be a particularly destructive class of leadership 
behaviors (e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004) with negative consequences for 
the organization, as well as for followers’ motivation and performance. We posited that 
power would moderate leaders’ sensitivity to different cues that may inform leader 
behavior in resource allocation contexts. Specifically, we predicted that high power 
leaders’ resource allocations would be impacted less by contextual cues and would be 
more representative of leaders’ internal beliefs as compared to low power leaders’ 
allocations. These predictions, derived from an integration of the power-approach 
theory (Keltner et al., 2003), equity theory (Adams, 1965), and leader categorization 
theory (Lord & Maher, 1993), were tested in a series of four laboratory and scenario 
experiments as well as in an organizational survey.  
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We consistently showed that leader power interacted with situational information 
(i.e., performance feedback) and internal belief states (i.e., effective leadership beliefs) in 
predicting leader self-serving allocations. Thus, we found that the allocation decisions of 
high power leaders were not influenced by performance feedback information, but 
rather by their effective leadership beliefs. Confidence in our results is bolstered not 
only by replication across studies, but also by the fact that we employed different 
methodologies (i.e., laboratory experiment, scenario experiment, cross-sectional survey) 
and tapped into different samples from two different countries (i.e., Dutch students, 
managers and supervisors in the United Kingdom).  
Implications for the Study of Leader Self-serving Behaviors 
This research provides first evidence that leader power has a significant impact on 
leader self-serving behaviors. More precisely, contrary to popular opinion, we showed 
that high power leaders need not necessarily be corrupt. By virtue of their power, these 
leaders are free to act at will, unencumbered by social norms and rules. This freedom 
can however result in either self or group-serving actions, depending on the beliefs these 
leaders have regarding effective leadership. As such, our research bridges recent 
developments in social psychological research on power and leadership research. 
Specifically, we have shown that different power levels, even within a role traditionally 
considered to be a high power role, lead to different decisions and behaviors. This 
suggests that from a leadership perspective it is important to consider not only the 
effects of power differences between leaders and subordinates, but also the effects of 
power differentials within the leadership role on decision making and behavior. Our 
findings are also congruent with some earlier research on the power motive by Winter 
(e.g., 1973, 1998) who showed that those US presidents scoring high on power 
motivation exhibited both more pro and more antisocial behaviors than those presidents 
scoring low in power motivation.  
By focusing on power as a determinant of leader actions we followed a call made by 
House and Aditya (1997) for more systematic scientific inquiry into the antecedents of 
leader behaviors and added a social-psychological perspective to the dearth of empirical 
research on determinants of leader actions. Surprisingly, as compared to the voluminous 
body of work on leadership effectiveness, research on antecedents of leader behaviors 
has been scant, and has largely focused on individual difference factors (Bono & Judge, 
2004; Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002) and on factors 
affecting leadership development (Day, 2001; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002).  
Our finding that leader power moderates the effects of contextual and internal cues 
on leader self-allocations has a number of implications for the study of leader behaviors 
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in general, and leader allocation decisions in particular. First, it seems that high power 
leaders do indeed follow their internal radar more than situational cues when making 
allocation decisions. While in this research we zoomed in on leaders’ beliefs regarding 
leadership effectiveness, future studies trying to elucidate leaders’ decision making 
processes in resource allocation contexts could take into consideration leaders’ 
dispositional attributes, such as their social values (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976) or 
social relationship orientation (Mills & Clark, 1984). In line with our current argument, 
we would expect high power leaders, in contrast to low power leaders, to allocate 
resources by relying on these dispositional attributes.  
Second, the fact that power has been shown to anchor individuals more heavily on 
their own points of view (Galinsky et al., 2006) can raise particular problems in a 
leadership context, where leaders are expected to prioritize responsibilities towards the 
group over personal predilections and desires. Previous research has amply 
demonstrated that a lack of perspective-taking, that is, the inability to see the world 
from another person’s perspective, can lead to stereotyping and subordinate derogation 
(e.g., Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Wang, & Ku, 2008). Therefore, we see leader perspective-
taking as a moderator of the potential negative effects of leader power as a particularly 
promising avenue for research on leader self-serving behaviors. Perspective-taking, as an 
individual difference variable or as a trainable ability, could serve to direct high power 
leaders’ attention towards their subordinates’ thoughts and feelings, and by doing so, 
prompt them to act according to their employees’ interests. Thus, we expect that leader 
power and perspective-taking would interact such that high power leaders who are also 
high in perspective-taking should act more group-servingly than high power leaders who 
are low in perspective-taking. Moreover, we see perspective-taking as potentially playing 
an important role in the study of leadership effectiveness. Leaders are generally expected 
to motivate their subordinates toward the achievement of group goals (e.g., Hollander, 
1980). But leaders can only be effective motivators if they understand their audience, 
and we suggest that this understanding relies largely on leaders’ capacity to see the world 
from their subordinates’ perspective. Therefore, we argue that leader perspective-taking, 
especially when coupled with the action-orientation and optimism that comes with high 
leader power can be an important precursor of leader effectiveness.  
Caveats and Limitations 
Naturally, this research has limitations that deserve comment. Each paradigm we 
employed suffers from certain drawbacks in terms of generalizability, causality, 
manipulation or measurement. First, the use of student samples in the laboratory 
experiments could raise external validity concerns. However, because our aim was to 
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establish causality (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) in the relationship between power, 
the use of information, and leader resource allocations, we consciously chose for this 
experimental set-up, high in internal validity (Ilgen, 1986; Mook, 1983). Moreover, to 
increase the mundane realism of our studies, we complemented our laboratory 
experiments (Study 1a and 2a) with two scenario experiments (Study 1b and 2b). 
Previous research has also shown that there is no reason to suspect that students behave 
differently than other populations (Brown & Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990) and 
experimental findings using similar paradigms have been replicated in survey-based 
organizational research (De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004; van Knippenberg & van 
Knippenberg, 2005). More important, the fact that Study 3, for which concerns about 
external validity pose less of a problem, also yielded support for our theoretical 
framework and replicated the findings of our experimental studies, should serve as a 
counter-argument for the external validity criticism. Conversely, Study 3 might be 
criticized for being correlational in nature (i.e., rendering it mute in matters of causality) 
and for the measurement of undesirable behaviors via self-reports rather than via 
behavioral measures. There is however evidence suggesting that, when assessing 
undesirable behaviors, self-reports are as accurate as more ‘objective’ measures such as 
police reports or lie detector tests (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weiss, 
1979). Prior research has also argued that the use of self-reports for undesirable 
behaviors is not as problematic as the use of self-reports for desirable behaviors, as they 
might be more prone to under- than to over-reporting (Aquino & Douglas, 2003). 
Furthermore, it is also more probable that if undesirable behaviors are self-reported, 
they are actually quite accurate renditions of behavior. Ultimately however, this remains 
a question to be answered by future research and we wholeheartedly endorse future tests 
of our hypotheses in field settings with both follower and leader ratings of self-serving 
behaviors as well as more ‘objective’ measures. Another potential weakness of Study 3 
could be that all variables were measured in a single questionnaire (i.e., making common 
source and common method variance a potential problem). This type of design could 
lead to an inflation of the relationships between variables, and therefore, the main effect 
of ELBs in Study 3 might be overestimated. It is however important to note that 
common source or method bias cannot account for statistical interactions. Because it 
may inflate the main effects it may lead to an underestimation of the effect sizes for 
interactions (Evans, 1985; McClelland & Judd, 1993). As such, common source or 
method bias does not pose a threat to the validity of our conclusions regarding the 
Power X Performance feedback and Power X ELBs interactions. All in all, the 
combination of the experimental designs of Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, with the survey 
design of Study 3, leads us to see these concerns as less of a threat to the overall 
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conclusions of the present study, given that the strengths of the one methodology may 
compensate for the weaknesses of the other.  
Practical Implications 
Although conclusions regarding practical implications are to be regarded as tentative 
and as requiring further inquiry and clarification, we see potential for our findings to be 
used in applied settings, i.e., in organizations trying to curb leader self-serving behaviors. 
First, there seems to be some value in promoting the development of group-serving 
ELBs. The leader development (London, 2002) and coaching literature (Smither & 
Reilly, 2001) suggest that interventions directed at improving leadership generally work 
because they aim at creating new self-schemas. Some value might therefore be drawn 
from promoting group-serving ELBs as ideal leadership self-schemas. This could be 
done via leadership training and executive seminars as well as via teaching in MBA 
programs, where future leaders are formed. Second, we showed that high power leaders 
are less likely to rely on situational cues in their allocation decisions and are more likely 
to rely on their internal belief states. Although it might seem that these findings do not 
bode well for organizations trying to curb self-interested leader behaviors, we argue that 
this could be good news. For instance, organizations could select individuals into 
leadership roles who score high on integrity or perspective-taking measures. Moreover, 
organizations could invest in training programs that teach leaders to take others’ 
perspective. The simple act of trying to see the world through their subordinates’ eyes 
could make leaders aware of their employees’ interests and act accordingly.  
To Conclude 
Leader self-serving actions are a particularly pernicious class of leadership behaviors 
carrying the specter of negative consequences for subordinates as well as for the 
organization at large. From this perspective, it is somewhat surprising that leadership 
research to date seems to have hardly concerned itself with factors causing leader self-
serving behaviors. As such, the present research hopes to have opened a new avenue for 
exploring factors causing leaders to act self-servingly by pointing at the value of a power 
analysis.  
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Notes 
 
1 We found no differences between conditions in terms of mood or self-efficacy. We also did not find any 
differences between conditions in actual performance on the contrast sensitivity task. Introducing these actual 
performance scores as covariates in our analyses does not change the significance or pattern of our results. 
2 All items loaded on a single factor. We also measured respondents’ subjective sense of power via the 8-item 
sense of power scale developed by Anderson and Galinsky (2006). Substituting the sense of power score for 
the position power score does not change the significance or pattern of our predicted interactions. For the 
sake of consistency with our experimental studies we report the results of the analyses based on the position 
power scale. 
3 We did not control for any covariates because rather often – especially with survey data – controls serve the 
purpose of getting something significant that was not significant before. Becker (2005) refers to this practice as 
problematic and cautions against potential Type II errors. Moreover, we hypothesized two interactions and 
controlling for covariates would not be the best option if we want to exclude them as alternative explanations 
for our moderated findings. However, including controls (i.e., age, gender, number of subordinates, years of 
fulltime work experience, overall tenure in managerial or supervisory position, tenure in current managerial or 
supervisory position, educational level, team identification), does not change the significance or pattern of our 
interactions. Because we wanted to keep the survey study as similar as possible to our experimental studies, we 
do not report regression results with covariates. 
4 Although not part of our predictions, we also tested a third step in the hierarchical regression model where 
we included the Performance feedback X ELBs interaction and the Power X Performance feedback X ELBs 
interaction. None of these additional two interactions reached significance and the significance and pattern of 
our two predicted interactions did not change. 
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Chapter 4:Myopia of Power: Procedural Justice Systems, 
Perspective-taking and Self-serving Behavior 
 
The present research investigated the relationship between power and leader self-serving behaviors. 
Specifically, we hypothesized and showed in two experiments and an organizational survey that 
procedural justice systems and leader perspective-taking influence the relationship between leader power 
and self-serving allocations. In Experiment 1, the presence of procedural justice systems increased high 
power leaders’ perspective-taking and resulted in lower self-allocations in contrast to conditions where 
procedural justice systems were absent. In Experiment 2, we manipulated leader power, perspective-
taking, and procedural justice systems and found that high power leaders in the no perspective-taking 
conditions, self-allocated less money when procedural justice systems were present than when they were 
absent, replicating the results of Experiment 1. However, high power leaders in the high perspective-
taking conditions, self-allocated about the same (low) amount of money regardless of the presence or 
absence of procedural justice systems. Finally, we replicated our findings in an organizational survey. 
Across these studies, procedural justice systems and leader perspective-taking mitigated the effects of a 
power-induced egocentric focus on leader resource allocations.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2008, John Thain, the ousted CEO of Merrill Lynch, spent $ 1.2 Million on 
redecorating his downtown Manhattan office, as the company was firing employees and 
was on the brink of bankruptcy. Needless to say, this lavish spending of company 
money at a time when rank and file employees were losing their livelihoods drew the ire 
of the general public and the body politic. Perhaps not surprisingly, it has been 
suggested that it is power that drives leaders to divest scarce organizational resources 
away from collective purposes and toward endeavors that benefit themselves (e.g., 
Kipnis, 1972, 1976). Indeed, a growing body of research suggests that powerful 
individuals seem to disproportionately anchor on their own vantage points, to be poor 
assessors of others’ perspectives and interests, and to be primarily concerned with their 
own desires and well-being (e.g., Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, Gruenfeld, 2006; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).  
In the quintessentially interdependent organizational context, leaders are however 
expected to employ their power in the pursuit of collective interests (Aquino & Reed, 
1998; Hollander, 1980), and a failure to do so has been associated with decreased leader 
effectiveness (e.g., Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 
2004; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). Not only can self-interested leader 
behaviors promote decreased follower motivation and performance, but they can also 
result in public relations debacles for the organization, as well as in the leader’s loss of 
power and status. Because leader self-serving behaviors can lead to such a variety of 
negative consequences it seems essential to identify factors that could dampen the 
tendencies of those in power to act in self-interested ways.  
In order to develop our understanding of how power affects leader self-serving 
behaviors, in this research, we develop and extend recent insights in the psychology of 
power (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003) by identifying factors that may 
attenuate a power-induced egocentric focus: procedural justice systems and perspective-
taking. Because leader self-interested allocations appear to stem from a power-induced 
myopia that narrows the focus of attention to one’s own vantage point, one way to 
mitigate the occurrence of such behaviors would be to increase the extent to which 
powerful individuals consider others’ perspectives and interests. To this end, we argue 
that (1) perspective-taking can serve to broaden powerful individuals’ attention to 
incorporate consideration of others’ interests, and that (2) procedural justice systems can 
lead to increased perspective-taking on the part of powerful leaders.  
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Our take on how procedural justice systems and perspective-taking can counteract a 
power-induced egocentric focus breaks down into two interrelated positions that we 
develop and test in the three studies reported in this research. First, we argue and show 
that the presence of procedural justice systems (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & 
Ng, 2001; Leventhal, 1980) leads to increased perspective-taking on the part of powerful 
leaders. This in turn, facilitates powerful leaders’ active consideration of subordinate 
interests, resulting in lower self-allocations in contrast to conditions where procedural 
justice systems (PJS) are absent (Study 1). Second, we argue and show that, under 
conditions where high power leaders are directly induced to take their subordinates’ 
perspectives (Study 2), or score high on an individual difference measure of perspective-
taking (Study 3), the effect of procedural justice systems on leader resource self-
allocations will be weaker, than under conditions where high power leaders do not take 
their subordinates’ perspectives. In short, we argue that powerful leaders’ selfish 
resource allocations can be reduced by either directly increasing their perspective-taking 
or by indirectly inducing them to take their subordinates’ perspectives via the presence 
of procedural justice systems.  
The aim of the present research is thus three-fold: 1) to contribute to an 
understanding of how power informs leader decisions by integrating research on power 
and leadership; 2) to identify two important factors influencing powerful leaders’ 
resource allocations: procedural justice systems and leader perspective-taking; (3) to 
outline both the theoretical and practical relevance of procedural justice systems and 
perspective-taking in mitigating the negative effects of power in the service of 
leadership.  
 
The Psychology of Leader Power 
There is an almost natural association between power and the leader role, and yet, 
the two are not the same (Goodwin, 2003). Power has often been considered to be a 
fundamental force governing social relationships and has usually been defined as 
asymmetric control over valued resources (Fiske, 1993; French & Raven, 1959; Keltner 
et al., 2003). Moreover, it has been argued that this structural difference in the control 
over critical resources directly translates into psychological experience. That is, power 
and its effects can become a psychological property of the individual (e.g., Galinsky et 
al., 2003; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007).  
The leader role effectively places individuals in a position where, next to motivating, 
coordinating and directing group members’ efforts (e.g., De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; Farmer & Aquinis, 2005; Hollander, 1980; Yukl & van Fleet, 1992; 
Yukl, Wall, & Lepsinger, 1990), they have the authority to make decisions that affect 
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individual and group level outcomes. The leader role thus entails control over valuable 
resources, and consequently, it entails the possession of power. However, there will 
inevitably be some variation in the structural amount of power available within the 
leader role, and we argue that these structural differences translate directly into different 
psychological experiences of power. From an approach-theory of power perspective 
(Keltner et al., 2003), we propose that the foundation of the relationship between power 
and the leader role resides within these psychological effects of power (see also 
Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008). Because we posit that the amount of power 
psychologically experienced by individuals in leadership positions is a proximal 
motivator of their actions, in this research, we examine the effects of varying amounts 
of power within the leader role on resource distributions.  
The power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003) suggests that power has wide-
ranging psychological and behavioral consequences by fundamentally altering the way 
individuals perceive the world, others and themselves. Although a deluge of recent 
research based on this theory has documented a number of both positive and negative 
effects associated with elevated power (for a review see Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 
2008), in this research, we will primarily focus on two broad effects of power relevant to 
explaining leader resource allocations: (1) power increases a focus on rewards, and (2) 
power reduces social attention.  
First, a growing body of research has provided support for the notion that power 
increases a focus on rewards. High power individuals have been shown to be more 
attentive to, and to more assertively pursue rewards (Galinsky et al., 2003) than their low 
power counterparts. Moreover, elevated power, as opposed to low power has been 
associated with an increased focus on, and relentless pursuit of personally rewarding 
goals (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a; Smith, 
Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 2008).  
Second, power does not only increase a general focus on rewards, but it also 
decreases social attentiveness by deflecting attention away from others and toward the 
self. Thus, powerful individuals seem to disproportionately anchor on their own vantage 
points, to be poor assessors of others’ perspectives and interests, and to generally view 
the world through a lens of self-interest by being primarily concerned with their own 
desires and well-being (e.g., Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 
2003; Galinsky et al., 2006; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Keltner et al., 
2003; Kipnis, 1972). Elevated power has been associated with feelings of increased 
psychological distance from subordinates, subordinate devaluation and derogation (e.g., 
Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Kipnis, 1972; O’Neal, Kipnis, & Craig, 1994; Rind & Kipnis, 
97
Myopia of Power 
89 
1999), as well as increased stereotyping (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 
1998).  
Notably, power influences both how much attention as well as what kind of attention is 
directed at others. On the one hand, Galinsky et al. (2006) demonstrated that possessing 
power seems to impair the ability to take others’ perspectives and to consider their 
interests. In their studies, the powerful were less likely than the powerless to 
spontaneously take the visual perspective of others, to take others’ background 
knowledge into account, and to correctly identify others’ emotional expressions. That is, 
the powerful anchored more heavily on their own points of view and were less accurate 
than low power individuals in understanding how others experience the world. On the 
other hand, Gruenfeld and colleagues (2008) showed that power tends to increase 
objectification, or the tendency to view others as tools for one’s own purposes. Their 
studies suggest that the powerful, as opposed to the powerless, tend to view others in 
instrumental terms and therefore, approach and attend to individuals who are perceived 
to help them achieve their goals. This tendency toward instrumental attention exhibited 
by the power-wielders was also found by Overbeck and Park (2001, 2006). In their 
studies, the powerful paid increased attention to subordinates as long as individuating 
their followers was in line with their goals. All in all power seems to be associated with 
(1) reduced social attention and an inability to step into others’ shoes, as well as with (2) 
instrumental attention where others are seen through a lens of self-interest.  
We argue that this dual focus on pursuing personally satisfying rewards and a lack of 
attention to others’ unique points of view and interests creates a predisposition for 
powerful leaders to act more selfishly in resource allocation contexts than their less 
powerful counterparts.  
 
Procedural Justice Systems, Perspective-taking and Leader Self-serving 
Behaviors 
Our previous analysis of the effects of power suggests that high power leaders are 
more likely than low power leaders to allocate resources self-servingly. These allocation 
decisions are however made within a larger social or organizational context, and an 
extensive body of research suggests that organizational members’ behaviors tend to be 
influenced not only by their individual attributes and characteristics, but also by 
elements of social structure (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1966; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Pfeffer, 1991). By integrating ideas from both the procedural justice and power 
literatures, we posit that characteristics of formally institutionalized structures regarding 
the process of making allocation decisions - procedural justice systems - moderate the 
effects of power on leader allocations, by either facilitating power-induced allocation 
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tendencies or by constraining them. For reasons to be set forth below, we argue that the 
presence of PJS constrains high power leaders’ selfish resource allocations by increasing 
the extent to which they consider their subordinates’ perspectives, in contrast to 
conditions where PJS are absent.  
PJS are formalized sets of policies, practices and procedures that determine the rules 
to be used in making decisions about employee outcomes (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 
2001; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), such 
as for example resource allocations. To be considered fair, such systems would generate 
procedures that are consistent, bias-free, accurate, correctable, representative of all 
concerned (a criterion related to voice) and based on prevailing ethical standards 
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Moreover, PJS are 
institutional-level variables that can influence the attitudes and behaviors of leaders as 
well as subordinates. To date, most procedural justice research has treated PJS as formal 
institutional policies that influence employee perceptions of procedural justice, which, in 
turn, positively affect work-related employee attitudes and behaviors (for reviews see 
Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & 
Schminke, 2001; Greenberg, 1990; Konovsky, 2000). However, much less attention has 
been devoted to understanding the effects of PJS on the behaviors of leaders.  
We argue that PJS do not only influence employee perceptions and behaviors, but 
also impact leader allocation decisions by providing the features of the decision 
architecture. Specifically, they provide a decision-making frame that directs allocators’ 
attention toward their recipients’ perspectives. We posit that the presence (vs. absence) 
of such a structural system increases the likelihood that high power leaders take their 
subordinates’ perspectives into account by rendering the allocation decision’s recipients 
with their distinct interests more salient. In turn, we expect that this increased 
perspective-taking on the part of high power leaders in the presence of PJS, will directly 
translate into less self-serving leader allocations, in contrast to conditions where PJS are 
absent.  
We argue that in the absence of PJS, high power leaders are more likely than low 
power leaders to approach the allocation decision from an egocentric vantage point and 
to ignore the perspectives and interests of their decision’s recipients. This egocentric 
focus should render high power leaders more likely to allocate resources in a way that 
favors satisfying their own desires. When present, PJS communicate system norms, that 
is, explicit system-sanctioned behaviors that are expected and considered to be 
appropriate for members of the system (e.g., Katz & Kahn, 1966). Because PJS signal to 
employees that the organization respects their dignity (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; 
Lind & Tyler, 1988), and that their interests will be considered (Chen, Brockner, & 
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Greenberg, 2003), they should also communicate to leaders that (1) the organization 
values its employees, and (2) that the prevalent norm within the organization requires 
the employment of fair procedures in the allocation of resources. Whereas these 
procedural rules do not require that allocation decisions ensure outcome favorability for 
employees, they do stress the need to treat recipients with dignity and respect. 
Additionally, procedural justice rules such as voice, consistency, ethicality and bias-
suppression should highlight the fact that the recipients of the allocation decision may 
have unique expectations, interests and desires. This, in turn, should elicit a more 
detailed contemplation of alternative viewpoints on the part of high power leaders. In 
sum, we argue that PJS render the recipients of allocation decisions more salient which 
should broaden powerful leaders’ focus of attention to include a consideration of their 
perspectives in the resource-allocation process.  
Based on this logic, PJS should increase high power leaders’ perspective-taking by 
rendering them more aware of their employees’ unique interests and perspectives. 
Perspective-taking is often defined as the cognitive ability to step outside of one’s own 
experience and to actively consider the viewpoint of another person (e.g., Davis, 1980, 
1983; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005), and has been both 
theoretically and empirically distinguished from affective empathy (Coke, Batson, & 
McDavis, 1978; Davis, 1980, 1983; Epley Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Hogan, 1969; 
Oswald, 1996). Whereas perspective-taking can be a relatively stable trait or general 
ability (Davis, 1980, 1983), it can also be directly induced (e.g., Batson, 1991; Galinsky & 
Ku, 2004; Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), as well as shaped by 
situational factors (Parker & Axtell, 2001) such as, for example, accountability (Tetlock, 
Skitka, & Boettger, 1989) or systemic procedural justice.  
Perspective-taking has been related to smoother social functioning (Davis, 1980; 
Mead, 1934; Piaget, 1932), increased helping and cooperative behaviors in organizational 
settings (Parker & Axtell, 2001), reduced stereotyping (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), 
increased empathic feeling (Betancourt, 1990; Coke et al., 1978) and altruistic motivation 
(Batson, 1991), as well as to a reduction in a number of egocentric biases in judgment 
(Galper, 1976; Regan & Totten, 1975; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996).  
We believe perspective-taking may affect high power leaders’ allocation decisions, 
because the act of taking another person’s viewpoint can serve as a corrective lens for 
the myopic egocentric focus induced by high power. Individuals who fail to see others’ 
vantage points and remain locked in their own perspective are more likely to react based 
on immediate self-interest (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998). Perspective-takers however are 
more likely to engage in increased self-other merging (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), which implies both seeing more of oneself in the 
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other and more of the other in oneself (see Galinsky et al., 2005; Galinsky, Wang, & Ku, 
2008). This increased self-other overlap combined with perspective-takers’ relatively 
accurate perceptions of others’ interests (Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shepard, 1997) may 
stimulate showing greater concern for others’ needs, interests and desires (Arriaga & 
Rusbult, 1998). Thus, high power leaders who, in the presence of PJS, take their 
subordinates’ perspectives should self-allocate lower amounts of resources than high 
power leaders who, in the absence of PJS, remain blindly locked in their own 
perspectives.  
In sum, we predict that in the presence of PJS high power leaders’ self-allocations 
will be lower than in the absence of PJS. Specifically, we argue that PJS constrain high 
power leaders’ egocentric allocation tendencies by increasing the extent to which they 
take their subordinates’ perspectives. Moreover, we expect this effect of PJS on leader 
allocations to be stronger for high than for low power leaders. Because low power 
leaders are inherently more likely to spontaneously take their subordinates’ perspectives 
(Galinsky et al., 2006) than their high power counterparts, a system that would direct 
their attention toward their subordinates’ interests should have less of an impact on their 
actions than on the actions of high power leaders. 
 
Study 1 
In a first test of our predictions we conducted a computer-mediated experiment, 
specifically, testing the following moderation and mediated moderation hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: PJS will influence high power leaders’ resource self-allocations more than low power 
leaders’ self-allocations. High power leaders’ self-allocations will be lower (vs. higher) 
when PJS are present (vs. absent). Low power leaders’ self-allocations will vary less in 
the presence or absence of PJS than high power leaders’ self-allocations.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The interaction between PJS and leader power on leader resource allocations is mediated 
by leader perspective-taking. The presence of PJS increases high power leaders’ 
perspective-taking and leads to lower self-allocations in contrast to conditions where PJS 
are absent. The presence (vs. absence) of PJS should have less of an effect on low power 
leaders’ perspective-taking than on high power leaders’ perspective-taking.  
 
In Study 1, participants were led to believe that they were the leaders of a four-
person group engaged in computer-mediated task performance. In reality, the group 
interaction was simulated via the experimental set-up and participants proceeded 
through the experiment individually. Whereas we acknowledge that this simulated group 
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interaction may seem artificial when compared to real organizations, previous leadership 
research using similar paradigms has successfully shown that the experimental 
environment seems real to participants (e.g., van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 
2005) (cf. experimental vs. mundane realism; Ilgen, 1986; Mook, 1983).  
In line with previous experimental work on procedural justice, we employed the 
most accepted and most frequently used manipulation of procedural justice, namely a 
voice manipulation (e.g., Brockner, et al., 1998; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2003; 
Lind, Kanfer, & Early, 1990). The concept of voice introduced by Thibaut and Walker 
(1975) is related to the Leventhal criterion of representativeness and it emphasizes the 
extent of opportunity recipients of allocation decisions have in controlling the process 
or outcome of allocation decisions. As such, voice can be related to the leader (i.e., the 
leader allows employees voice) or it can be a formalized, structural aspect of procedures. 
In this study, in line with our theoretical argument, we manipulated voice as a structural, 
systemic property of the procedural arrangements for making allocation decisions.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. One hundred and one Dutch business administration 
students (39 females, 62 males) with a mean age of 18.70 years (SD = 1.27) participated 
voluntarily in the study in exchange for € 10 (approximately US $ 12). Participants were 
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 (Systemic voice: 
voice vs. no voice) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants arrived in groups of twelve to participate in a computer-
mediated study on “virtual group decision making” and were seated in individual 
cubicles, each equipped with a computer. All instructions and stimuli were presented on 
the computer screens and all dependent measures were recorded by the program 
software. 
After being informed about random assignment to a four-person team, participants 
learned that their team had a hierarchical structure (i.e., a leader and three subordinates) 
and that team members would be rewarded for their work. To ensure the credibility of 
the computer-mediated virtual group interaction space, participants had to wait for two 
minutes for the establishment of a bogus network connection between the team 
members. Next, they completed a purported cognitive style test and all participants were 
assigned the leader role allegedly based on their test results.  
Participants then learned that their group would work on a number of different tasks 
and that, as leaders, they were to ensure their team’s optimal performance. Leaders had 
to decide on how the tasks should be implemented and assign specific tasks to 
subordinates. The power manipulation was embedded in the leader role description. 
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Although all our participants were leaders - and thus, one could argue, were in higher 
power positions - some had more reward and coercive power than others. In the low 
power condition, leaders learned that they only had the power to evaluate subordinates’ 
work for feedback purposes, and could not use these evaluations to fire, reprimand or 
reward subordinates by assigning them easier or more fun tasks. Conversely, in the high 
power condition, leaders learned that they could evaluate subordinates’ work, and use 
these evaluations to fire, reprimand and reward subordinates by assigning them easier or 
more fun tasks.  
Subsequently, participants read the instructions for their first group task, namely the 
desert survival task (see Lafferty & Pond, 1974). Leaders learned that their team could 
earn 500 points for successful task completion and that the allotted time for the task was 
10 minutes. The task consisted of ranking 12 utensils found after a plane crashed in the 
desert. The leader’s task was to delegate 4 of the utensils to each subordinate for ranking 
purposes, to decide on the point distribution (out of the total of 500 points) to the self 
and the other team members, and to create the final item ranking. Moreover, it was the 
leaders’ job to motivate their subordinates to perform well (via emails). All leaders took 
the opportunity to send emails to their subordinates. They spent an average of 8 minutes 
composing the emails and wrote an average of 116 words. There were no significant 
differences between conditions in the amount of time spent writing emails or in the 
number of words used. In combination, this suggests that participants took the leader 
role seriously and believed to be working in a real team. 
Participants never reached the last stage of the task, the final rank-ordering. After 
having sent emails to their subordinates and having delegated the utensils, leaders were 
told that they would engage in a number of decision making tasks. One of these tasks 
was the distribution of the 500 points between themselves and their subordinates. 
Before participants could engage in the actual point distribution they were exposed to 
our systemic voice manipulation. The voice manipulation was inspired by previous work 
(e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002) and was couched in terms of ‘simulation’ 
rules established for proper team functioning. In the systemic voice condition leaders were 
informed that in this game the simulation rules allow subordinates to voice their 
opinions regarding decisions that affect them. That is, the game rules allow subordinates 
to voice their opinions and to directly express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the final point distribution, and with the tasks they have been assigned during the 
simulation. Conversely, in the no systemic voice condition leaders were informed that in this 
game the simulation rules do not allow subordinates to voice their opinions regarding 
decisions that affect them. That is, the game rules do not allow subordinates to voice 
their opinions and to directly express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the final 
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point distribution and with the tasks they have been assigned during the simulation. It is 
important to note, that this systemic voice manipulation suggested to participants - prior 
to making their allocation decisions - that subordinates did (systemic voice) or did not 
(no systemic voice) have the potential to express their opinions. In fact, subordinates 
never expressed their opinions regarding the point distribution.  
Finally, after answering our dependent measures, including demographic indicators 
such as age, gender, and study major, participants answered some funneled debriefing 
questions probing for hypothesis guessing. None had correctly guessed our hypothesis. 
We also randomly probed participants for suspicion regarding the reality of the virtual 
team environment. None of the probed participants indicated any suspicion. Finally 
participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked for their participation and paid. 
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the number of 
points leaders self-awarded. Each compensation point counted as one lottery entry for 
several 50 euro prizes, meaning that the more points they self-awarded, the more lottery 
entries they had and the higher the chances of winning one of the prizes. All other 
measures were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(7). Leader perspective-taking was measured with a 3-item scale (“I tried to imagine my 
subordinates’ interests before making a decision.”; “I tried to put myself in my 
subordinates’ shoes before making a decision.”; “I did not try to look at my 
subordinates’ point of view before making a decision.” (R)). The reverse-scored item 
was recoded and all items were averaged into one perspective-taking score (Cronbach’s 
ơ = .77). As a check of our power manipulation, participants responded to a 5-item scale 
(e.g., “I have significant power in administering negative consequences to my 
subordinates.”). These items were averaged into one power score (Cronbach’s ơ = .91). 
As a check of our systemic voice manipulation, participants answered nine questions 
adapted from De Cremer and van Knippenberg (2002) (e.g., “My subordinates were not 
given voice in the point allocation decision.” (R); “My subordinates can complain about 
the final point distribution.”). The negative items were reverse-scored and all items were 
combined into an average voice score (Cronbach’s ơ = .92).  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs), power (high/low) and systemic voice 
(voice/no voice) were factors in the design.  
Manipulation checks. A two-way analysis of variance on our average power score 
revealed a significant main effect of power, F (1, 97) = 183.11, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .65, 
indicating that leaders in the high power condition (M = 5.95, SD = .92) perceived 
themselves to have more power than leaders in the low power condition (M = 2.82, SD 
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= 1.34). A two-way analysis of variance on the average voice score revealed only a 
significant main effect of voice, F (1, 97) = 178.74, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .65, indicating that 
leaders in the voice conditions (M = 4.68, SD = 1.24) perceived the system to allow 
their subordinates more voice than participants in the no voice conditions (M = 2.03, 
SD = .69). No other effects reached significance. Thus, we may conclude that our 
manipulations were successful.  
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of voice, F (1, 97) = 11.11, p = .001, Ƨ²p = .10, with 
participants in the no voice conditions (M = 192.78, SD = 41.47) self-allocating more 
points than participants in the voice conditions (M = 167.62, SD = 34.43). As predicted, 
this main effect was qualified by our predicted Power X Voice interaction, F (1, 97) = 
5.77, p = .02, Ƨ²p = .06 (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 500 points) in Study 1 
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We had predicted that systemic voice would moderate the effects of power on leader 
self-allocations. Specifically, we expected high power leaders to claim more points in the 
no voice condition than in the voice condition. A simple effects analysis indicated that 
high power leaders self-awarded more points in the no voice (M = 207.14, SD = 43.27) 
than in the voice condition (M = 164.70, SD = 29.20), F (1, 97) = 16.55, p < .001, Ƨ²p = 
.14, CI (diff) = between 21.73 and 63.15. No such differential voice effects on leader 
self-allocations were found for low power leaders (MVoice = 170.42, SDVoice = 39.22 vs. 
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MNo Voice = 177.31, SDNo Voice = 33.83). In addition, the simple effects analysis also revealed 
that high power leaders in the no voice condition (M = 207.14, SD = 43.27) self-
allocated more points than low power leaders in the no voice condition (M = 177.31, 
SD = 33.83), F (1, 97) = 8.72, p = .004, Ƨ²p = .08, CI (diff) = between 9.79 and 49.87. 
Thus, it appears that the presence of voice (i.e., PJS) can mitigate high power leaders’ 
tendency to claim more resources for the self.  
Mediation analyses. The second set of analyses examined the hypothesized 
relationships of mediated moderation. We predicted that perspective-taking would 
mediate the relationship between the interaction of systemic voice and leader power on 
leader self-allocations. We tested moderation for each path of the mediated model using 
the procedures for moderated regression analysis and path analysis recommended by 
Edwards and Lambert (2007) to integrate moderation and mediation. We centered the 
continuous variable (perspective-taking) to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 
1991). Expressions involving products of coefficients (indirect effects, total effects, and 
differences across levels of the moderator variable) were tested with bias-corrected 
confidence intervals (Efron & Tibshirani. 1993; Stine, 1989) using coefficients estimated 
from 1,000 bootstrap samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In this approach, mediation is 
framed as a path model, and relationships among variables are expressed using 
regression equations. Moderation is incorporated by supplementing these equations with 
the moderator variable, its product with the independent variable, and its product with 
the mediator variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The equations are integrated through 
reduced-form equations by substituting the regression equation for the mediator variable 
into the equation for the dependent variable. This approach produces tests for direct, 
indirect, and total effects for different values of the moderator variable. It offers the 
advantage of pinpointing which paths of a mediated model are moderated and provides 
statistical tests of moderation for each path (Edwards & Lambert, 2007). Regression 
results are reported in Table 4.1. Simple effects for each path of the mediated model, as 
well as the indirect and total effects, are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Results for the Moderated Path Analysis Approach in Study 1 
Perspective taking
Leader allocations
X
Systemic
voice
M
Perspective-
taking
Z
Power
XZ MZ
1.05** 0.40* 1.06**
-8.92 -10.23** 16.97* -4.98 -18.71*
Note. N = 101. Entries in columns X, M, Z, XZ, and MZ are unstandardized regression 
coefficients. In the perspective-taking row, the regression equation used systemic 
voice, power and the interaction term between systemic voice and power as predictors 
for leader perspective-taking. In the leader allocation decision row, the regression 
equation used systemic voice, perspective-taking, power, and the interaction terms 
between systemic voice and power, and perspective-taking and power to predict leader 
allocation decisions. * p < .05. ** p .01. 
R²
.32**
.27**
 
 
Table 4.2 Analysis of Simple Effects Moderation by Power in Study 1 
Low
High
First Second
Stage
Direct Indirect
0.52* -6.43 -0.46
1.58** -19.59** -11.41 -31.04**
Note. N = 101. For rows labeled low and high, table entries are simple effects 
computed by using coefficient estimates from Table 4.1. Zs = -0.5 and 0.5 for low and 
high power, respectively. Differences in simple effects were computed by subtracting 
the effects for low power from the effects for high power. Tests of differences for the 
first stage, second stage, and direct effect are equivalent to tests of systemic voice by 
power on perspective-taking, perspective-taking by power on leader allocations, and 
systemic voice by power on leader allocations respectively as reported in Table 4.1. 
Effects involving products of coefficients (indirect effect, total effect) were tested 
using bias-corrected confidence intervals derived from bootstrap estimates. * p < .05.  
** p < .01.
Total
-6.90
-42.45
-0.88
Differences 1.06** -18.71** -4.98 -30.58** -35.55**
Power
EffectModerator
variable
 
 
For leader self-allocations, regression analyses in Table 4.1 indicate that leader power 
moderated the path from systemic voice to perspective-taking (XZ on perspective-taking = 1.06, p 
< .01) as well as the path from perspective-taking to leader self-allocations (MZ on leader 
allocations = -18.71, p < .05). Expressed as simple effects in Table 4.2, systemic voice 
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increased perspective-taking significantly more for high power leaders (first stage 
indirect effect equals 1.58, p <.01) than for low power leaders (first stage indirect effect 
equals 0.52, p <.05). This significant difference between high and low power leaders on 
perspective-taking as a function of systemic voice is in line with our prediction that 
whereas high power leaders need systemic voice to activate their perspective-taking, low 
power leaders are more likely to automatically take their subordinates’ perspective. In 
Table 4.2, the simple effects also suggest that at the second stage (the path from 
perspective-taking to leader self-allocations), the indirect effect of systemic voice on 
leader self-allocations is significant for high power leaders (second stage indirect effect 
equals -19.59, p <.01) but not for low power leaders (second stage indirect effect equals 
-0.88, p = ns). Differences in the effects for low and high power leaders indicate that the 
first stage of the indirect effect was stronger for high power leaders (1.58 – 0.52 = 1.06, 
p <.01), and similarly, the second stage of the indirect effect was also stronger for high 
power leaders [-19.59 – (-0.88) = -18.71, p <.01]. These differences contributed to a 
significantly stronger total indirect effect for high power leaders [-31.04 – (-0.46) = -
30.58, p <.01]. Taken together, the results of Table 4.2 suggest that perspective-taking 
mediated the relationship between systemic voice and leader self-allocations only under 
conditions of high leader power (an indirect effect computed as the product of the first 
and second stages that equals –31.04, p < .01). This pattern of results indicates both 
first-stage and second stage moderation or mediated moderation for leader self-
allocations. 
 
Discussion Study 1 
We had proposed that systemic voice would interact with leader power in predicting 
leader self-allocations. Specifically, we have argued that in the presence of voice, high 
power leaders would claim lower amounts of resources than in the absence of voice. 
Moreover, we have posited that this inverse relationship between high power leaders’ 
self-allocations and the presence of voice would be due to increased perspective-taking 
on the part of high power leaders. In line with our predictions, the results of Study 1 
suggest that in the presence of voice, high power leaders’ self-allocations were lower 
than in the absence of voice. Additionally, the results of the mediation analyses 
corroborate the idea that the effects of voice on high power leaders’ allocation behaviors 
are due to an increase in perspective-taking. Thus, it seems that one possible way to 
reduce high power leaders’ tendency to engage in selfish allocation behaviors would be 
to lead them to consider their subordinates’ perspectives and interests via the presence 
of systemic procedural justice. 
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Whereas the results of this study do provide first evidence suggesting that the 
interaction between power and systemic procedural justice is mediated by leader 
perspective-taking, the current study also suffers from potential shortcomings. First, 
from a methodological standpoint, the fact that our mediator variable (i.e., perspective-
taking) is measured and not manipulated weakens the causal inferences we could make 
regarding the association between perspective-taking and leader allocations (e.g., Sigall & 
Mills, 1998; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005; Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008). Second, 
because we measured perspective-taking after our participants made their allocation 
decisions, questions could be raised regarding our proposed causal chain. Whereas we 
consciously chose this post-hoc measure of perspective-taking to avoid priming all of 
our participants (regardless of condition) with perspective-taking prior to their decisions 
(for a similar argument see Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2008; Sigall & Mills, 1998), we do 
acknowledge that it constitutes a flaw in our study design. One way to potentially 
circumvent the weaknesses associated with (1) measuring mediating processes under 
conditions where the actual measurement may in fact be problematic, as well as with (2) 
inferring causal relations based on correlational evidence, would be to test underlying 
processes by means of moderation (e.g., Kenny, 2008; Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2008; 
MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; Sigall & Mills, 1998; Sobel, 2008; Spencer et al., 2005; 
Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008). In other words, one can reformulate mediation 
hypotheses as moderation hypotheses and orthogonally manipulate in an experimental 
design the independent and the ‘mediator’ variables (e.g., Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2008; 
MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; Sigall & Mills, 1998).  
In Study 2 we decided to employ this alternative way of testing our proposed 
relationship between power, PJS, perspective-taking and leader allocations. To this end, 
we reformulated our mediated moderation hypothesis as a moderation hypothesis and 
orthogonally manipulated leader power, PJS, and perspective-taking. Specifically, we 
predicted a three-way interaction between leader power, PJS and perspective-taking on 
leader resource allocations. We expected that under conditions of no perspective-taking, 
high power leaders should act more selfishly when PJS are absent than when they are 
present. In other words, under conditions of no perspective-taking we expect to 
replicate the two-way interaction between power and systemic procedural justice. 
However, under conditions of high perspective-taking, we expect smaller differences in 
the self-allocations of high and low power leaders, regardless of the presence or absence 
of PJS. That is, we expect that, under conditions of high perspective-taking, the 
interaction between power and systemic procedural justice should be weakened, because 
high power leaders who are directly induced to take their subordinates’ perspectives do 
no longer need procedural justice systems to indirectly trigger perspective-taking.  
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Study 2 
 
In this study, we aimed to (1) further develop our understanding of the relationship 
between power, PJS, perspective-taking and leader allocation behaviors by conceptually 
replicating and extending the results of Study 1, as well as to (2) ameliorate some of the 
aforementioned concerns potentially associated with our mediation test in Study 1. In 
Study 2, we therefore investigated the interactive effect of systemic procedural justice, 
perspective-taking, and power on leader self-serving behaviors in a scenario experiment. 
Participants were presented with a hypothetical organizational situation describing a 
resource allocation problem faced by a leader. They had to imagine being the leader in 
the scenario and had to make the resource allocation decision. Specifically, Study 2 
tested the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of PJS on leader resource self-allocations is stronger for high than for low power 
leaders, but only under conditions of no perspective-taking. When perspective-taking is 
high, the effect of PJS on leader resource self-allocations will be weaker.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Two hundred and three Dutch business administration 
students (97 females, 106 males) participated voluntarily in exchange for course credit. 
Participants’ mean age was 19.36 years (SD = 1.81) and they were randomly assigned to 
the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 (Systemic voice: voice vs. no voice) X 2 
Perspective-taking (high vs. none) between-subjects design.  
Procedure. Upon arrival to the lab, participants were seated in individual cubicles, 
each equipped with a computer. Once seated, participants could neither see one another, 
nor could they communicate with each other. All instructions and stimuli were 
presented on the computer screens and all dependent measures were recorded by the 
program software. 
Participants were informed that they would read the description of an organizational 
situation and were asked to imagine that they were the leader in that particular scenario. 
The instructions also stressed that after reading the text, participants were expected to 
answer a few questions pertaining to it. The vignette prompted participants to imagine 
that they were the R&D director of a large pharmaceutical company, and that they were 
directly leading a department of thirty-one employees. They also read that, as Head of 
R&D, their goal was to ensure that their department reached or even exceeded its 
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performance goals. Moreover, it was their responsibility to motivate their subordinates 
to be creative and to give their best in performing their jobs.  
At this point we introduced our power manipulation, which was similar to the power 
manipulation used in Study 1. In the high (low) power condition participants read that:  
“As Head of R&D you also have the following power-means at your disposal. You 
have the power to evaluate your subordinates’ performance and to use these 
evaluations to decide whether subordinates will get a promotion or not (for feedback 
purposes only). You can also (cannot) withhold bonuses or freeze salaries if 
subordinates’ performance is not satisfactory. Furthermore, you have (do not have) 
the power to fire subordinates whose performance is not satisfactory.”  
The scenario text continued with the department head’s secretary bringing an urgent 
matter to his/her attention: the department’s salary budget for the year. The new budget 
for the department consisting of 31 employees and the department head was 2,450,000 
euro. Based on company policy, each of the employees earned, on average, a fixed salary 
of 57,200 euro, with the possibility of earning a year-end bonus, contingent on good 
performance. Moreover, there was no company policy dictating the department head’s 
salary and he/she could decide on the size of the salary he/she would earn. The leader’s 
salary was included in the 2,450,000 euro allocated to the department and the remainder 
of the 2,450,000 (after subtracting the leader’s self-assigned salary and the employees’ 
fixed salaries) was to be used for employees’ end-of-year bonuses. It was also stressed 
that the leader was not eligible for an end-of-year bonus and that he/she would need to 
factor that into the salary self-allocation.  
Before the leader could make the actual resource allocation decision, we introduced 
our systemic voice manipulation, which was similar to the voice manipulation used in 
Study 1. Participants in the voice (no voice) condition read:  
“Your company has (does not have) a system of rules in place that allows for fair 
procedures. That is why subordinates in your department are allowed (are not 
allowed) voice regarding decisions that affect them. That means subordinates have 
(do not have) the opportunity to state their opinion regarding the size of the salary 
budget left over for their bonuses. The rules also allow (do not allow) subordinates to 
express their (dis)satisfaction with the bonus pot left over for them, after you have 
made your salary decision.”  
Finally we introduced our perspective-taking manipulation, which was adapted from 
Batson et al. (2003). All participants read that: “We know that this is a lot of 
information. To be sure that you understand the salary allocation decision you will 
make, we would like for you to engage in a brief thought exercise. This exercise is meant 
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to improve your understanding of the task.” In the perspective-taking condition, participants 
were then instructed that:  
“In this exercise we would like you to imagine yourself in your subordinates’ place. 
In preparing for the salary allocation decision and while making the allocation 
decision take your subordinates’ viewpoint. That is, try to imagine what your 
subordinates are thinking while waiting for your decision. Take one minute for this 
thought exercise, getting as clear a sense as possible of your subordinates’ 
perspective. Then, at the end of the minute, write down in the space at the top of 
the next page what you imagined. Research has found that carefully following this 
procedure can ensure understanding of the task.”  
In the no perspective-taking condition, participants read:  
“In this exercise we would like that you think about the salary allocation decision 
you are about to make. In preparing for the salary allocation decision and while 
making the allocation decision think about the decision itself. Take one minute for 
this thought exercise, getting as clear a sense as possible of the upcoming decision. 
Then, at the end of the minute, write down in the space at the top of the next page 
what you imagined. Research has found that carefully following this procedure can 
ensure understanding of the task.” 
Before participants could make the allocation decision they were asked to write what 
they had imagined and were presented with the equivalent of five lines to enter their 
answers. We included the writing part of the exercise to ensure that participants 
imagined as instructed. Moreover, we couched the thought exercise as an understanding 
exercise in order to provide participants with some plausible rationale for engaging in it, 
as well as to reduce potential experimental demand issues (see Batson et al., 2003). 
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the amount of 
money participants self-awarded. After answering our dependent measures, including 
demographic indicators, participants were thanked for their participation, paid, and 
debriefed.  
Manipulation checks. All dependent measures, unless otherwise stated, were 
assessed on a seven-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). As a 
check of our power manipulation participants answered the same 5-item scale used in 
Study 1. These five items were combined to form one average power score (Cronbach’s 
ơ = .93). As a check of our voice manipulation, participants answered the same nine-
item scale used in Study 1. The nine items were combined to form one average voice 
score (Cronbach’s ơ = .95). As a check of our perspective-taking manipulation, 
participants answered the following multiple-choice question: “During the thought 
exercise I was asked to (1) Take the perspective of my subordinates; (2) Take my own 
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perspective; (3) Think about the decision itself; (4) I did not receive any information on 
that”.  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance power (high/low); systemic voice (voice/no voice) and 
perspective-taking (high/none) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. As expected, a three-way analysis of variance on the average 
power score revealed only a significant main effect of power, F (1, 195) = 1101.71, p < 
.001, Ƨ²p = .85, indicating that participants in the high power condition (M = 5.94, SD = 
.75) felt more powerful than participants in the low power condition (M = 2.02, SD = 
.93). No other effects reached significance. A three-way analysis of variance on the 
average voice score revealed only a significant main effect of voice, F (1, 195) = 
1329.45, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .87, indicating that participants in the voice condition (M = 
5.24, SD = .60) perceived the system to allow their followers more voice than 
participants in the no voice condition (M = 1.95, SD = .67). No other effects reached 
significance. As a testament to our perspective-taking manipulation, 198 out of 203 
participants answered the multiple-choice question correctly. The five individuals 
answering incorrectly chose the “I did not receive any information on that” option, and 
they were distributed across four different conditions1. The results of our manipulation 
checks lead us to conclude that our manipulations were successful.  
Leader allocation decision. A three-way analysis of variance on the amount of 
euro leaders self-awarded revealed a main effect of perspective-taking, F (1, 195) = 4.11, 
p = .04, Ƨ²p = .02. Participants in the perspective-taking conditions (M = 114,408.82, SD 
= 66,452.22) self-allocated less money than participants in the no perspective-taking 
conditions (M = 141,670.30, SD = 115,185.98). Furthermore, the two-way Power X 
Voice interaction was significant, F (1, 195) = 4.48, p = .03, Ƨ²p = .02, replicating the 
results of Study 1. However, more interestingly and in line with our prediction, the main 
effect of perspective-taking and the two-way power by voice interaction were qualified 
by a significant Perspective-taking X Power X Voice interaction, F (1, 195) = 4.42, p = 
.03, Ƨ²p = .02.  
We had predicted a significant Power X Voice interaction on leader self-serving 
behaviors in the no perspective-taking condition (a replication of Study 1), but not in the 
perspective-taking condition. In other words, we had predicted that perspective-taking 
would reduce the effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors, regardless of the 
presence or absence of a procedural justice system. Simple interaction analyses were 
conducted within the perspective-taking conditions (i.e., no perspective-taking and 
perspective-taking). As predicted, we found a significant simple interaction effect within 
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the no perspective-taking condition, F (1, 195) = 8.83, p = .003, Ƨ²p = .04 (see Figure 
4.2).  
The pattern of this simple interaction supports our hypothesis and replicates the 
results of Study 1. High power leaders in the no voice condition (M = 204,071.43, SD = 
168,758.19) claimed more money than high power leaders in the voice condition (M = 
109,386.21, SD = 73,537.31), F (1, 195) = 15.44, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .07. Moreover, high 
power leaders in the no voice condition (M = 204,071.43, SD = 168,758.19) self-
allocated more money than low power leaders in the no voice condition (M = 
116,336.36, SD = 83,361.09), F (1, 195) = 11.46, p = .001, Ƨ²p = .05. Also as predicted, 
we found no simple interaction effect within the perspective-taking conditions, F (1, 
195) = .00, p = .99, Ƨ²p = .00 (see Figure 4.3).  
In line with our hypothesis, within the perspective-taking conditions, both high and 
low power leaders claimed similar (low) amounts of money regardless of the presence or 
absence of systemic voice.  
 
Figure 4.2 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders in the no perspective-taking conditions in Study 2 
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Figure 4.3 Amount of money self-allocated by leaders in the perspective-taking conditions in Study 2 
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Study 3 
In this study we measured leader power, systemic procedural justice, perspective-
taking, and self-serving leader behaviors in an organizational context. The survey was 
designed to further elucidate some potential questions that may have arisen from our 
previous studies. First, while our experimental studies yielded consistent causal evidence 
in support of our hypotheses, they do not speak to whether we can find support for our 
theoretical framework in a field context in a sample of organizational leaders. Second, 
we expanded our conceptualization of procedural justice as well as of leader self-serving 
behaviors. Whereas in our experimental studies we had manipulated systemic voice as an 
instantiation of systemic procedural justice, in the survey we used a broader measure of 
PJS (Colquitt, 2001) – thus showing that our effects are not only unique to voice. The 
dependent measures in Study 1 and 2 tap exclusively into the allocation of monetary 
resources, whereas leader self-serving behaviors may extend to other domains. In Study 
3 we therefore expanded the scope of our dependent variable by scrutinizing a greater 
variety of leader self-serving behaviors which go above and beyond simple monetary 
allocations (e.g., time investment, credit allocated for jobs performed). Study 3 thus taps 
into a greater variety of leader self-serving acts. Third, in line with previous research 
conceptualizing perspective-taking as both a trait measure (Davis, 1980, 1983), as well as 
a more general ability that can be situationally induced (e.g., Batson, 1991; Galinsky & 
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Ku, 2004; Parker & Axtell, 2001), in this study, we aim to extend the findings of our 
experimental studies, where we treated perspective-taking as a situationally-induced 
variable, by considering the effects of perspective-taking as a trait measure. Last but not 
least, although we have no reason to believe that relying on Dutch samples in our 
experimental studies poses a limitation to the generalizability of our conclusions, we 
nevertheless used the opportunity for a replication with a sample from a different 
country, namely the United Kingdom. To address these potential open questions we 
tested Hypothesis 3 in a sample of organizational leaders. 
 
Method 
Procedure. The study was conducted online as a leadership survey. Respondents 
were recruited via a panel firm located in the United Kingdom. Emails with personalized 
survey links were sent to a panel of individuals in managerial or supervisory positions 
who had a minimum of 3 direct subordinates and a minimum of 3 years of work 
experience. 
We conducted the survey in line with recommendations given in the field 
(Birnbaum, 2004; Dillmann, 2007). Prior to going live with the survey we pre-tested the 
layout on a number of different computers varying the browsers used as well as the 
screen resolutions to ensure that the survey would look the same on different systems. 
We also assigned each potential respondent a unique session ID, resulting in 
individualized survey links that made it impossible for any single respondent to 
participate in the survey more than once. To increase response rate respondents 
received a monetary incentive for their participation. On the first page of the survey we 
guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of individual surveys and emphasized that 
participation was voluntary. Respondents interested in our results were given the 
opportunity to provide their email addresses in a different database so that names and 
email addresses could not be linked to individual responses. These measures taken to 
prevent common pitfalls of online research lead us to be at least as confident about the 
quality of our data as we would have been had we conducted a traditional paper and 
pencil survey.  
Sample. Three hundred and forty respondents meeting the study’s requirements 
completed the survey out of a total of 500 emails sent out to potential respondents (68 
% response rate). The sample’s mean age was 41.46 years (SD = 9.62) and women made 
up 52.9 % of the sample. Respondents’ average fulltime work experience was 21.18 
years (SD = 9.74), their average tenure in a managerial or supervisory position was 11.94 
years (SD = 7.99), and their average tenure on the current job was 6.64 years (SD = 
5.56). All respondents worked in private organizations and had on average 10.96 
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subordinates (SD = 8.80). Respondents with a higher education degree (i.e., Bachelor 
degree or higher) made up 74.1% of the sample and the majority (81.23 %) held 
management or senior management positions.  
Measures. All responses were assessed on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). Leader power was measured with 9 items of the Yukl and Falbe (1991) 
position power scale (i.e., three of the position power subscales: coercive, reward, and 
legitimate power). We used the original items and only adapted the instructions given to 
respondents (i.e., “My supervisor can…” was changed to “As a supervisor I can…”). All 
items were averaged into one leader power score 2. Systemic procedural justice was measured 
with the seven items of the Colquitt (2001) procedural justice scale which was adapted 
such that the items were phrased to reflect systemic procedural justice (e.g., “To what 
extent do employees have influence over the outcomes arrived at by these 
procedures?”). The seven items were combined to form one average procedural justice 
score. Perspective-taking was measured with the perspective-taking subscale of the Davis 
(1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The subscale consisted of seven items, which 
were combined to form one average perspective-taking score.  
An 8-item scale, inspired by work by Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998) and van 
Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) comprised our measure of leader self-serving 
behavior. Arguably, leaders can act self-servingly by securing higher monetary benefits for 
themselves, but they can also act self-servingly by making self-serving causal attributions 
such as taking unwarranted credit for group accomplishments or by denying 
responsibility for failure on group projects (cf. Weary Bradley, 1978). While in Study 1 
and 2 our dependent measure tapped into the allocation of monetary resources, in the 
survey we also measured the allocation of other resources, such as time and credit for 
jobs performed. Our self-serving behaviors measure in the survey is thus more 
encompassing than our measure in the experimental studies. For each of the 8 items of 
the scale, respondents had to indicate the number of times they had performed the 
described behavior during the past year (1 = never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = usually; 5 
= always). The 8 items of our scale were the following: “ I have negotiated a bonus for 
myself that was substantially higher than the bonus my subordinates received.”; “I have 
used my leadership position to obtain benefits for myself.”; “I have pursued my 
personal interests, even if those interests were not serving my group’s interests.”; “I did 
not put my own position at risk, even when I thought that this could have helped 
promote my group’s goals.”; “Instead of giving credit to my subordinates for jobs 
requiring a lot of time and effort, I took the credit myself.”; “Although I was partly to 
be blamed, I did not take personal responsibility for my group’s failure to meet a goal.”; 
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“I have shifted the blame for a mistake of mine onto one of my subordinates.”; “I did 
not work overtime, although this would have helped my group meet its goals.” 
 
Results 
We first performed a principal-component analysis with OBLIMIN rotation of the 
items comprising our independent variables (i.e., power, procedural justice and 
perspective-taking). This analysis yielded a three-factor solution with all items loading 
|.72| or higher on the intended scale and all cross-loadings below |.20|. Second we 
performed a principal-component analysis of the items comprising our dependent 
variable (i.e., leader self-serving behaviors). This analysis yielded a one-factor solution 
with item loadings of |.69| or higher. Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations 
for the study variables are displayed in Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Study 3 
(1) Leader power
(2) Procedural justice
M SD (1) (2) (3)
3.81 .53 (.79)
3.42 .84 .26** (.90)
(3) Perspective-taking
(4) Leader self-serving behaviours
3.83 .61 .16** .25** (.78)
1.61 .51 .04 -.24** -.24**
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. All constructs were measured 
by Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5. N = 340 (listwise). ** p < .01. 
(4)
(.83)
 
 
Leader self-serving behaviors. To test our hypothesis we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis3 in which leader self-serving behaviors were predicted by main effect 
terms (leader power, procedural justice and perspective-taking) at Step 1, the interaction 
terms for the two-way interactions at Step 2, and the interaction term for the three-way 
interaction at Step 3 (see Table 4.4).  
118
Myopia of Power 
110 
 
Table 4.4 Summary of Regression Analysis for Leader Power, Procedural Justice, and Perspective-
taking Predicting Leader Self-serving Behaviors in Study 3 
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Following Aiken & West (1991), power, procedural justice and perspective-taking 
scores were centered (i.e., by subtracting the mean from each score), and the interaction 
terms as well as the main effects were based on the centered scores. Table 4.4 shows the 
regression results. Step 1 explained a significant proportion of variance in leader self-
serving behaviors and we found a positive relationship between power and leader self-
serving behaviors, as well as a negative relationship between procedural justice, 
perspective-taking and leader self-serving behaviors. Step 2 explained an additional 
significant proportion of the variance in leader self-serving behaviors, and it revealed 
our predicted significant Power X Procedural justice interaction, thus replicating the 
results of Study 1 and 2. More importantly however, Step 3 explained an additional 
significant proportion of variance in leader self-serving behaviors and it revealed our 
predicted Power X Procedural justice X Perspective-taking interaction, replicating the 
three-way interaction found in Study 2. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that the pattern 
of the interaction essentially replicates the pattern of results found in Study 2.  
 
Figure 4.4 Low perspective-taking leaders’ self-ratings of self-serving actions in Study 3 
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Figure 4.5 High perspective-taking leaders’ self-ratings of self-serving actions in Study 3 
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To further analyze the 3-way interaction we calculated the simple slopes (Aiken & 
West, 1991) at different levels of our predictor variable (i.e., leader power). We had 
predicted that the effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors would be stronger 
when procedural justice was low rather than high under conditions of low perspective-
taking, but that these effects would be weaker under conditions of high perspective-
taking. In essence, this implies that we expect the slope for low perspective-taking/low 
procedural justice to be steeper than the slopes for low perspective-taking/high 
procedural justice, high perspective-taking/high procedural justice, and high 
perspective-taking/low procedural justice. Indeed, in line with our predictions, we found 
that only the slope for low perspective-taking/low procedural justice (t (332) = 4.78, p < 
.001) reached significance, whereas the slopes for low perspective-taking/high 
procedural justice (t (332) = -.62, p = .53), high perspective-taking/high procedural 
justice (t (332) = -.17, p = .87), and high perspective-taking/low procedural justice (t 
(332) = .28, p = .77) did not.  
 
General Discussion 
Organizations headed by leaders who hubristically plunder the company coffers to 
satisfy their own whims and desires face not only public scorn and anger, but also losses 
in wealth and standing as well as decreases in employee performance and satisfaction. 
We predicted that the interplay between systemic procedural justice and leader 
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perspective-taking would mitigate the myopic self-centered focus induced among leaders 
by the experience of elevated power. These predictions, derived from an integration of 
the power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003), procedural justice research (Colquitt, 
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and insights from 
work on perspective-taking (Davis, 1980, 1983; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky et al., 
2005), were tested in a series of two laboratory and scenario experiments as well as in an 
organizational survey. In Study 1, we argued that systemic procedural justice would 
facilitate perspective-taking among high power leaders, which should, in turn, directly 
translate into lower self-allocations as compared to conditions where PJS are absent. In 
line with our prediction, we found that high power leaders self-allocated a lower amount 
of points when subordinates were afforded voice than when they were not. Moreover, 
we showed that these effects of procedural justice and power on leader self-allocations 
were mediated by leader perspective-taking. In Study 2, we further extended our 
reasoning from Study 1 by reformulating our mediation hypothesis as a moderation 
hypothesis. Therefore, in Study 2 we tested the three-way interaction between power, 
PJS and perspective-taking on leader allocations, predicting that under conditions of no 
(or low) perspective-taking, high power leaders should self-allocate fewer resources 
when PJS are present than when they are absent. However, under conditions of high 
perspective-taking, this interaction between power and procedural justice systems 
should be weakened, and we expected high power leaders to exercise restraint in their 
self-allocations across the board, regardless of the presence or absence of PJS. As 
expected, we found that PJS and power interacted in their prediction of leader self-
allocations in the no perspective-taking conditions, whereas in the perspective-taking 
conditions, high power leaders made other-oriented allocations across the board, 
independent of the presence or absence of procedural justice systems. In Study 3, we 
replicated and extended these findings to an organizational context, with a broader 
conceptualization of procedural justice systems, an individual difference measure of 
perspective-taking and a broader dependent variable as compared to our experimental 
studies. We demonstrated these effects across methodologies (i.e., laboratory 
experiment, scenario experiment, cross-sectional survey), across different samples from 
two different countries (i.e., Dutch students, managers and supervisors in the United 
Kingdom), with multiple instantiations of procedural justice systems, multiple measures 
of leader self-serving behaviors and both manipulations and measures of perspective-
taking.  
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Implications for the Study of Leader Self-serving Behaviors  
This research provides first evidence that the interplay between procedural justice 
systems and leader perspective-taking can serve to mitigate some of the negative effects 
of power on leader self-allocations. The present findings contribute to the study of 
leader allocation behaviors specifically, and leader behaviors more generally in a number 
of important ways.  
First, by focusing on power as a determinant of leader actions we followed a call 
made by House and Aditya (1997) for more systematic scientific inquiry into the 
antecedents of leader behaviors and added a social-psychological perspective to the 
dearth of empirical research on determinants of leader actions. Surprisingly, as 
compared to the voluminous body of work on leadership effectiveness, research on 
antecedents of leader behaviors has been scant, and has largely focused on individual 
difference factors (Bono & Judge, 2004; Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & 
Gerhardt, 2002), and on factors affecting leadership development (Day, 2001; Dvir, 
Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002).  
Second, our finding that systemic procedural justice moderates the effects of power 
on leader allocations contributes to the procedural justice literature in two different 
ways. First, we showed that, at least in a context where leader self-serving behaviors 
occur at the expense of followers’ outcomes, systemic procedural justice can lead to 
higher subordinate outcome favorability. Typically, procedural justice research has 
studied the interactive effect of procedural justice and outcome favorability on employee 
fairness perceptions and attitudinal and behavioral reactions (see Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996, for a review). However, by studying systemic procedural justice as an 
antecedent of leader allocation behaviors, we found that higher procedural justice at the 
system level can result in fairer resource distributions on the part of the leader. Of 
course this particular finding is bound by the specific context under investigation in our 
research, where the more the leader self-allocated the less was left over for followers. 
Whether these results can be generalized to different contexts remains an intriguing 
question to be answered by future research. Second, in the present research we treated 
procedural justice as an exogenous variable influencing leader behaviors. Typically, 
procedural justice research has studied procedural justice as an exogenous variable 
influencing employee perceptions and behaviors. Much less attention has been devoted 
to understanding when, why and how leaders might in fact act in accordance with 
procedural justice rules (see also Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). By shifting the 
focus from the employee, as the recipient of procedural justice, to the leader, as the 
enactor of procedural justice, we opened a new research avenue that could provide us 
with valuable insights into how systems of procedural justice can influence leader 
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behaviors. For example, one could envision systemic procedural justice having a positive 
effect on leader implementation of procedural justice as well as on leader expressions of 
interactional justice. From a theoretical standpoint, examining factors that influence 
leader expressions of justice can provide us with new directions for building 
organizational justice models. From a practical standpoint, understanding the conditions 
that would facilitate leader engagement in distributive justice as well as leader 
expressions of procedural and interactional justice, could aid organizations in preventing 
injustice.  
Third, we have shown in Study 3 that perspective-taking as an individual difference 
variable is a potent mitigator of the effects of power on leader self-serving behavior. 
This finding is in line with previous power research suggesting that the personalities of 
high power individuals are better predictors of their behaviors than the personalities of 
low power individuals (e.g., Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen et al., 2001; 
Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). For example, Chen and 
colleagues found that power-primed communally-oriented participants acted more 
selflessly and power-primed exchange-oriented participants acted more selfishly than 
participants exposed to neutral primes. Similarly, Galinsky and colleagues (2008) 
demonstrated that in a negotiation task, high power participants’ social value 
orientations (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976) were better predictors of their negotiation 
behaviors than their partners’ reputations. This suggests that future studies, trying to 
elucidate leaders’ decision making processes in resource allocation contexts, may benefit 
from considering other dispositional attributes that could attenuate some of the 
potentially negative effects associated with high power. For example, research might 
consider the effects of justice orientation (Rupp, Byrne, & Wadlington, 2003) on leader 
allocation behaviors. In line with our current argument, we would expect high power 
leaders to rely more on these dispositional attributes in their resource allocations, in 
contrast to low power leaders.  
Fourth, because perspective-taking can be activated by situational contingencies such 
as procedural justice systems, future research may investigate other situational factors 
that could feed into perspective-taking and thereby serve as moderators of the more 
pernicious effects of power. To this end, leader accountability emerges as one obvious 
contender, given that accountability concerns would also increase perspective-taking 
(Tetlock et al., 1989). This would suggest that accountable leaders should act less self-
servingly than leaders who are not held accountable for their actions. Whereas this idea 
has been advanced in previous theorizing (Keltner et al., 2003; Magee, Gruenfeld, 
Keltner, & Galinsky, 2005), to our knowledge, it has not yet been tested empirically.  
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Fifth, we argue that perspective-taking can be a powerful moderator of the effects of 
power on a multitude of organizationally relevant variables, above and beyond leader 
resource allocations. In fact we would propose that perspective-taking is part and parcel 
of effective leadership. Leaders are generally expected to motivate their subordinates 
toward the achievement of group goals (e.g., Hollander, 1980). But leaders can only be 
effective motivators if they understand their audience, and we suggest that this 
understanding relies largely on leaders’ capacity to see the world from their subordinates’ 
perspective. Therefore, we argue that leader perspective-taking, especially when coupled 
with the action-orientation and optimism that comes with high leader power can be an 
important precursor of leader effectiveness. For example, previous research has found 
that employees, who perceive that their leaders do not treat them with dignity and 
respect (i.e., interactional justice), are more likely to trust these leaders less (e.g., Folger 
& Cropanzano, 1998), to exhibit worse performance (e.g., Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, 
& Taylor, 2000), and to engage in more retaliatory behaviors (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 
1997) than employees who perceive that their supervisors are treating them fairly. We 
argue that leader perspective-taking could serve to mitigate some of these negative 
effects by increasing the extent to which high power leaders engage in expressions of 
interactional justice.  
Caveats and Limitations 
Of course, the present work also has a number of limitations and shortcomings that 
deserve comment. Each paradigm we employed suffers from certain drawbacks in terms 
of generalizability, causality, manipulation or measurement. First, the use of student 
samples in the laboratory experiments could raise external validity concerns. However, 
because our aim was to establish causality (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) in the 
relationship between power, systemic procedural justice, perspective-taking and leader 
resource allocations, we consciously chose for this experimental set-up, high in internal 
validity (Ilgen, 1986; Mook, 1983). Previous research has also shown that there is no 
reason to suspect that students behave differently than other populations (Brown & 
Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990) and experimental findings using similar paradigms have 
been replicated in survey-based organizational research (De Cremer & van 
Knippenberg, 2004; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). More important, the 
fact that Study 3, for which concerns about external validity pose less of a problem, also 
yielded support for our theoretical framework and replicated the findings of our 
experimental studies, should serve as a counter-argument for the external validity 
criticism. Conversely, Study 3 might be criticized for being correlational in nature (i.e., 
rendering it mute in matters of causality) and for the measurement of undesirable 
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behaviors via self-reports rather than via behavioral measures. There is however 
evidence suggesting that, when assessing undesirable behaviors, self-reports are as 
accurate as more ‘objective’ measures such as police reports or lie detector tests (Clark 
& Tifft, 1966; Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weiss, 1979). Prior research has also argued that 
the use of self-reports for undesirable behaviors is not as problematic as the use of self-
reports for desirable behaviors, as they might be more prone to under- than to over-
reporting (Aquino & Douglas, 2003). Furthermore, it is also more probable that if 
undesirable behaviors are self-reported, they are actually quite accurate renditions of 
behavior. Ultimately however, this remains a question to be answered by future research 
and we wholeheartedly endorse future tests of our hypotheses in field settings with both 
follower and leader ratings of self-serving behaviors as well as more ‘objective’ 
measures. Another potential weakness of Study 3 could be that all variables were 
measured in a single questionnaire (i.e., making common source and common method 
variance a potential problem). This type of design could lead to an inflation of the 
relationships between variables, and therefore, the main effects of PJS and perspective-
taking in Study 3 might be overestimated. It is however important to note that common 
source or method bias cannot account for statistical interactions. Because it may inflate 
the main effects it may lead to an underestimation of the effect sizes for interactions 
(Evans, 1985; McClelland & Judd, 1993). As such, common source or method bias does 
not pose a threat to the validity of our conclusions regarding the Power X Procedural 
justice and Power X Procedural justice X Perspective-taking interactions. All in all, the 
combination of the experimental designs of Studies 1 and 2 with the survey design of 
Study 3, leads us to see these concerns as less of a threat to the overall conclusions of 
the present study, given that the strengths of the one methodology may compensate for 
the weaknesses of the other.  
Practical Implications 
Although inferences for practice should be seen as tentative and as requiring further 
inquiry and clarification, we see potential for our findings to be used in applied settings, 
i.e., in organizations trying to ensure that leaders subordinate their personal goals to 
those of the organization. First, there seems to be value in the institution of procedural 
justice systems that goes above and beyond the positive effects documented in the 
procedural justice literature. While procedural justice research has typically shown that 
procedural justice systems increase employee satisfaction, well-being, performance, and 
organizational citizenship behaviors (for a review see Colquitt et al. 2001), our research 
suggests that the simple presence of procedural justice systems can serve to temper 
leader resource self-allocations. Moreover, institutionalized procedural justice systems 
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can also lead to increased leader perspective-taking. Second, in situations where 
procedural justice systems are absent, leader perspective-taking can also act as a damper 
on self-serving leader allocations. This finding has two different practical implications. 
First, because power increases the correspondence between traits and behavior (Bargh 
et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2001), the personalities of high power individuals are better 
predictors of their behaviors than the personalities of low power individuals. 
Consequently, organizations could select individuals into leadership roles who score 
high on perspective-taking measures. Second, because perspective-taking is a highly 
trainable ability (Parker & Axtell, 2001), organizations could invest in training programs 
that provide leaders with an appreciation of as well as the skills necessary to engage in 
perspective-taking. The simple act of trying to see the world through their subordinates’ 
eyes could make leaders aware of their employees’ interests and act accordingly. This 
could be done via leadership training and executive seminars as well as via teaching in 
MBA programs, where future leaders are formed.  
To Conclude 
Leader self-serving actions are a particularly nefarious class of leader behaviors 
carrying the specter of negative consequences for subordinates as well as for the 
organization at large. From this perspective, it is somewhat surprising that leadership 
research to date seems to have hardly concerned itself with factors that could mitigate 
the occurrence of leader self-serving actions. As such, the present research hopes to 
have opened a new avenue for exploring potential ways to mitigate some of the more 
pernicious effects of power on leader behaviors. 
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Notes 
 
 
1 We also conducted the analyses by excluding these five participants. Because neither the significance nor the 
pattern of our results changed, the analyses reported in the paper are based on the full sample of 203 
participants. 
2 All items loaded on a single factor. We also measured respondents’ subjective sense of power via the 8-item 
sense of power scale developed by Anderson and Galinsky (2006). Substituting the sense of power score for 
the position power score does not change the significance or pattern of our predicted interactions. For the 
sake of consistency with our experimental studies we report the results of the analyses based on the position 
power scale. 
3 We did not control in our analyses for any covariates because rather often – especially with survey data – 
controls serve the purpose of getting something significant that was not significant before. Becker (2005) 
refers to this practice as problematic and cautions against potential Type II errors. Moreover, we hypothesized 
an interaction. Thus merely controlling for covariates would not be the best option if we want to exclude them 
as alternative explanations for our moderated findings. Including controls, however, does not change the 
significance or pattern of our interactions (i.e., with controls: age, gender, number of subordinates, years of 
fulltime work experience, overall tenure in leadership position, tenure in current leadership position). Because 
none of the control variables were related to our independent or dependent variables and we wanted to keep 
the survey study as similar as possible to our experimental studies, we do not report regression results with 
covariates. 
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Chapter 5:Leader Power, Accountability, and Self-serving 
Behavior 
 
Leaders sometimes use their power to engage in self-serving behaviors that have the potential to harm 
group interests. The present research investigated the relationship between power and leader self-serving 
behaviors. We hypothesized that the effects of power on leader self-serving actions are moderated by leader 
accountability. Specifically, we examined the interactive effect of accountability and leader power on self-
serving behaviors in one experiment and one organizational survey. In the laboratory experiment, high 
power leaders self-allocated more points when they were not held accountable than when they were held 
accountable. Subsequently, we replicated these findings in a cross-sectional survey of organizational 
leaders by using measures of a subjective sense of power, perceived accountability, and self-serving 
behaviors. We focus explicitly on the theoretical and practical implications of our findings for the study of 
leader self versus group-serving behaviors.  
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Introduction 
 
Recently the popular media has become replete with headlines decrying top 
executives’ lofty bonuses and profligate spending at a time when their companies are 
relying on taxpayer money to save them from bankruptcy. For example, executives of 
corporations at the root of the subprime mortgage crisis have met with scathing 
criticism for their buoyant compensation packages after their companies lost billions in 
the US housing market. In the ubiquitously interdependent organizational context, 
where leaders are expected to exert their power in the service of the collective interest, 
engaging in such profligate behaviors can lead to disastrous consequences, ranging from 
public embarrassment to decreased leader effectiveness (Aquino & Reed, 1998; Choi & 
Mai-Dalton, 1999; De Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004; van 
Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005), and even to organizational collapse. Although 
self-serving leader behaviors can beget such a wide variety of negative consequences, to 
date, unfortunately, we know preciously little why they occur and how they can 
eventually be reigned in. Therefore, an understanding of why such behaviors occur and 
how they can be mitigated appears to be of paramount importance.  
Perhaps not astonishingly, it has been suggested that it is power left unchecked that 
drives leaders to divest scarce organizational resources away from collective purposes 
and toward endeavors that benefit themselves (e.g., Kipnis, 1972). Indeed, a growing 
body of research suggests that power psychologically frees the individual from the 
shackles of normative constraints, directs attention toward the self, and results in 
disinhibited behaviors in the pursuit of personally satisfying goals (e.g., Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). One way to 
potentially dampen such egocentric action tendencies would be to impose constraints on 
the behaviors of the powerful. In this vein, previous theorizing (Keltner et al., 2003; 
Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Galinsky, 2005) has suggested that organizational systems 
of checks and balances could counteract some of the more pernicious effects of power. 
According to this insight, leader accountability should serve as a moderator of the 
effects of power on leader actions.  
In this research we therefore investigate the interactive effect of power and 
accountability on leader self-serving behaviors. In line with previous thinking (Keltner et 
al., 2003; Magee et al., 2005), we argue that accountability may heighten the pressure to 
justify one’s decisions, and therefore, it should increase the extent to which individuals 
consider possible consequences of their actions. Consequently, we predict that 
accountability can counteract a power-induced egocentric pursuit of personally satisfying 
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rewards. Specifically, we argue that in resource allocation contexts, high power leaders 
who are held accountable should self-allocate a lower amount of resources in 
comparison to high power leaders who are not held accountable. Moreover, we argue 
that accountability should have less of an effect on the actions of low power leaders, 
because they are implicitly more likely to consider the consequences of their actions.  
The aim of the current research is two-fold: 1) to contribute to an understanding of 
how power informs leader decisions by integrating research on power and leadership, 
and 2) to provide first empirical evidence of the moderating role of accountability in the 
relationship between power and leader resource allocations.  
 
The Psychology of Leader Power  
The leader role places individuals in a position where, next to motivating, 
coordinating and directing group members’ efforts (e.g., Farmer & Aquinis, 2005; 
Hollander, 1980; Yukl & van Fleet, 1992), they are also licensed to make decisions that 
affect individual and group outcomes. Therefore, the leader role entails control over 
valuable resources, and thereby, it implies the possession of power. Indeed, power has 
usually been defined as asymmetric control over valued resources (Fiske, 1993; French 
& Raven, 1959; Keltner et al., 2003). However, typically there is some variation in the 
structural amount of power available within the leader role, and we argue that these 
structural differences translate directly into different psychological experiences of power. 
In this research, we therefore examine the effects of varying amounts of power within 
the leader role on leader self-allocations. 
The power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003) suggests that, although power 
typically emerges in a specific social context, the mere possession of power 
fundamentally transforms individual psychological states and processes. That is, power 
and its effects can become a psychological property of the individual (e.g., Bargh, 
Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; 
Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). According to this theory, the experience of power 
tips the balance of activation between the behavioral approach and inhibition systems, 
which in turn drive behavior and cognition. Power triggers the behavioral approach 
system, which is posited to regulate behavior associated with rewards. That is, power 
triggers a general approach tendency, increases attention to rewards, frees the individual 
from the shackles of normative constraints and facilitates disinhibited behavior. In 
contrast, powerlessness activates the behavioral inhibition system, which is analogous to 
an alarm system triggering avoidance and response inhibition. That is, low power is 
associated with an avoidance tendency, an increased focus on threats and punishments 
and inhibited behaviors.  
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Although a deluge of recent research based on the power-approach theory has 
documented a number of both constructive as well as dysfunctional effects associated 
with elevated power (for a review see Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008), in this 
article, we will primarily focus on two effects of power potentially relevant to explaining 
leader resource allocations: (1) power increases a general approach tendency and a focus 
on rewards, and (2) power affects social attention.  
First, the possession or experience of power has been shown to lead to assertive 
action in a variety of contexts. Thus, powerful individuals have been shown to be more 
attentive to, and to more assertively pursue rewarding outcomes (Galinsky et al., 2003) 
than their low power counterparts. Additionally, high power, as opposed to low power 
has been associated with an increased focus on, and relentless pursuit of personally 
rewarding goals (Chen et al., 2001; Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007a).  
Second, power decreases attentiveness to others’ internal experiences. Notably, 
power influences both how much attention as well as what kind of attention is directed at 
others. For example, Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006) demonstrated that 
power seems to impair the ability to take others’ perspectives and to consider their 
interests. In their studies, the powerful were less likely than the powerless to 
spontaneously take the visual perspective of others, to take others’ background 
knowledge into account, and to correctly identify others’ emotional expressions. 
Because the power-wielders anchored more heavily on their own vantage points they 
were less accurate than their low power counterparts in understanding how others 
experience the world. Furthermore, Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, and Galinsky (2008) 
showed that power increases objectification - the tendency to view others as tools for 
one’s own purposes - and focuses one’s attention on those aspects of others that serve 
one’s salient interests or goals. Their research suggests that the powerful, as opposed to 
the powerless, view others through an instrumental lens and therefore, approach and 
attend to those who are perceived to aid them achieve their goals (cf. Overbeck & Park, 
2001, 2006). Thus, the powerful disproportionately anchor on their own vantage points, 
are poor assessors of others’ perspectives and interests, and view the world through a 
lens of self-interest by being primarily concerned with their own desires and well-being  
Because power (1) reduces attention to others’ internal experiences and increases 
instrumental attention, as well as (2) exacerbates a focus on rewards, we argue that 
powerful leaders should be more likely to act more self-servingly in resource allocation 
contexts than their less powerful counterparts.  
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Accountability as a Moderator of the Effects of Power 
Given that power processes are typically embedded in a larger societal context, social 
institutions often find themselves faced with the difficult but important task of trying to 
mitigate the potential negative effects arising from elevated power. Likewise, one of the 
major challenges of contemporary organizations is to find a way to balance the positive 
and negative forces stemming from the power associated with the leader role. One of 
the more common strategies in this respect seems to be that organizations often hold 
leaders accountable for their actions, as well as for the success or failure of their groups 
(e.g., Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). However, whereas organizations can, and 
typically do, institute systems of checks and balances aimed at reigning in the behaviors 
of leaders, to date, it is unclear whether such accountability systems do in fact dampen 
the effects of power on leader allocations. Below we will outline several converging 
reasons supporting the proposition that accountability should moderate the effects of 
power on leader allocations.  
First, we define accountability as “the implicit or explicit expectation that one may 
be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999, p. 255). It has previously been argued that accountability can serve as an enforcer 
of societal or organizational norms (see Keltner et al., 2003; Magee et al., 2005). That is, 
accountability 1, as a social structure, or an element of a social situation, can constrain 
the effects of power by inducing accountability pressures (Schlenker, Weigold, & 
Doherty, 1991). These accountability pressures have been shown to increase judgmental 
accuracy (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), to lower susceptibility to 
judgmental biases (Simonson & Nye, 1992), to increase the thoroughness of information 
processing (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989), and 
to favor the use of more complex and analytic modes of processing (Ashton, 1992; 
Chaiken, 1980; McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock, 
Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Moreover, if the opinions of the evaluators are unknown and 
the decision situation is ambiguous, accountable individuals will try to find the most 
defensible course of action available. This in turn, would require that they process 
information more carefully or more “vigilantly” (e.g., Tetlock, 1985). Additionally, they 
are more likely to engage in pre-emptive self-criticism. That is, they are more likely to 
engage in self-critical integratively complex information processing by considering 
multiple perspectives on the issue at hand, and by trying to anticipate the objections that 
others might raise regarding their decisions (e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983; 
Tetlock & Boettger, 1989; Tetlock & Kim, 1987; Tetlock et al., 1989). In short, holding 
individuals accountable should lead them to engage in more thorough information 
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processing, as well as to consider potential decision alternatives in order to be able to 
justify their chosen courses of action. As a consequence, accountability may in fact 
enhance normative compliance.  
In the context of leader resource allocations, we expect that accountable high power 
leaders, feeling pressure to justify their actions, will be more likely to carefully weigh 
decision alternatives prior to making their allocation decisions, in contrast to non-
accountable high power leaders. This in turn, should result in lower self-allocations for 
accountable high power leaders as compared to high power leaders who are not held 
accountable. Additionally, we expect that low power leaders’ allocation decisions will not 
be affected as strongly by the explicit presence of accountability constraints, because 
accountability concerns are implicit in the psychology of low power individuals (Keltner 
et al., 2003). Therefore, low power leaders are more likely to be implicitly predisposed to 
feel normative constraints and to carefully consider how their actions influence others.  
In sum, we propose that accountability should moderate the effects of power on 
leader resource self-allocations. Specifically, we will test the following hypothesis in a 
laboratory experiment as well as in an organizational survey:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of accountability on leader self-serving behaviors is stronger for high than for low 
power leaders. High power leaders’ self-allocations are lower (vs. higher) when leaders are 
accountable (vs. not accountable). Low power leaders’ self-allocations are less contingent on 
being held accountable than high power leaders’ self-allocations.  
 
Study 1 
 
Because we wanted to be able to draw causal conclusions we first tested our 
hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. Participants were led to believe that they were the 
leader of a four-person group engaged in computer-mediated task performance. In fact, 
the group interaction was simulated via the experimental set-up. We manipulated power 
within the leader role, that is, some leaders had more power than others. Our primary 
dependent variable was the amount of points leaders self-allocated out of a shared 
resource pool.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. Eighty-two business administration students (19 females, 
63 males) participated voluntarily in the study and were paid 10 euro (approximately 12 
US dollars) for their time. Participants’ mean age was 20 years (SD = 1.81) and more 
than half were employed either part or full-time at the time of participation in our study. 
135
Leader Power, Accountability, and Self-serving Behavior 
127 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Power: high vs. low) X 2 
(Accountability: high vs. none) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure. Participants arrived in groups of twelve to participate in a computer-
mediated study on “virtual group decision making” and were seated in individual 
cubicles, each equipped with a computer. All instructions and stimuli were presented on 
the computer screens and all dependent measures were recorded by the program 
software. 
After being informed about random assignment to a four-person team, participants 
learned that their team had a hierarchical structure (i.e., a leader and three subordinates) 
and that individual team members would be rewarded for their work. To ensure the 
credibility of the computer-mediated virtual group interaction space, participants had to 
wait for two minutes for the establishment of a bogus “network connection” between 
the team members. Next, they completed a purported cognitive style test and all 
participants were assigned the leader role allegedly based on their test results.  
Participants then learned that their group would work on a number of different tasks 
and that, as leaders, they had to ensure their team’s optimal performance. Leaders had to 
decide on how the tasks should be implemented and assign specific tasks to 
subordinates. The power manipulation was embedded in the leader role description. 
Although all our participants were leaders - and thus, one could argue, were in higher 
power positions - some had more coercive power than others. In the low power condition, 
leaders learned that they only had the power to evaluate subordinates’ work for feedback 
purposes, and could not use these evaluations to fire or reprimand subordinates. 
Conversely, in the high power condition, leaders learned that they could evaluate 
subordinates’ work, and use these evaluations to fire or reprimand subordinates.  
Subsequently, the “team game” started, namely, the desert survival task (see Lafferty 
& Pond, 1974). Leaders learned that their team could earn 420 points for successful task 
completion and that the allotted time for the task was 10 minutes. The task consisted of 
ranking 12 utensils found after a plane crashed in the desert. The leader’s task was to 
delegate 4 of the utensils to each subordinate for ranking purposes, to decide on the 
point distribution (out of the total of 420 points) to the self and the other team 
members, and to create the final item ranking. Moreover, it was the leaders’ job to 
motivate their subordinates to perform well (via emails). All leaders took the 
opportunity to send emails to their subordinates. They spent an average of 4 minutes 
composing the emails and wrote an average of 96 words. There were no significant 
differences between conditions in the amount of time spent writing the emails or in the 
number of words used. In combination, this suggests that participants took the leader 
role seriously and believed to be working in a real team. 
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Participants never reached the last stage of the task, the final rank-ordering. After 
having sent emails to their subordinates and having delegated the utensils, leaders were 
asked to divide the 420 points the team could earn between themselves and their 
subordinates. At this point we introduced our accountability manipulation adapted from 
De Dreu and van Knippenberg (2005). In the high accountability condition, participants 
read that:  
“Before you decide on how to distribute the 420 points between yourself and your 
subordinates please keep in mind why you are doing so. At the end of the study, the 
experimenter will interview you in detail about the reasons and considerations you 
had for the particular point distribution you chose. We are not so much interested 
in the actual distribution of points you choose, but more in the underlying reasons 
you had for distributing the points the way you did. We want to know the 
procedures you followed in making your point distribution decision and the way in 
which you arrived at your decision. Again, the actual distribution of points is of no 
interest to us. If you want, you can make some notes using the scrap paper placed 
beside your computer and you can bring these notes to the interview.”  
In the no accountability condition, these instructions were absent. Participants did however 
also find a sheet of scrap paper placed next to their computer, without any further 
instructions as to its relevance.  
Finally, after answering our dependent measures, including demographic indicators 
such as age, gender, and study major, participants answered some funneled debriefing 
questions probing for hypothesis guessing. None had correctly guessed our hypothesis. 
We also randomly probed participants for suspicion regarding the reality of the virtual 
team environment. None of the probed participants indicated any suspicion. Finally 
participants were thoroughly debriefed, thanked for their participation and paid. 
Dependent measures. Our main dependent measure represented the number of 
points leaders self-awarded. Each compensation point counted as one lottery entry for 
several 50 euro prizes, meaning that the more points they self-awarded, the more lottery 
entries they had and the higher the chances of winning one of the prizes. All 
manipulation check measures were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). As a check of our power manipulation, participants 
responded to a 6-item scale (e.g., “I have significant power in administering negative 
consequences to my followers.”). These items were averaged into one power score 
(Cronbach’s ơ = .87). As a check of our accountability manipulation, participants 
answered four questions adapted from Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) (e.g., 
“When making the point distribution decision, I concentrated on the process of 
assigning points to my subordinates and myself.”; “I believed that I would have to 
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explain the process of distributing points to the researcher.” ). These items were 
combined into an average accountability score (Cronbach’s ơ = .79).  
 
Results 
In all analyses of variance (ANOVAs), power (high/low) and accountability 
(high/none) were factors in the design. 
Manipulation checks. A two-way analysis of variance on the average power score 
revealed only a significant main effect of power, F (1, 78) = 75.64, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .49, 
indicating that leaders in the high power condition (M = 5.73, SD = .73) felt more 
powerful than leaders in the low power condition (M = 4.47, SD = .57). A two-way 
analysis of variance on the average accountability score revealed only a significant main 
effect of accountability, F (1, 78) = 60.14, p < .001, Ƨ²p = .43, indicating that participants 
in the high accountability conditions (M = 5.17, SD = .78) felt more accountable than 
participants in the no accountability conditions (M = 3.89, SD = .73). Thus, we may 
conclude that our manipulations were successful.  
Leader allocation decision. A two-way ANOVA on the number of points leaders 
self-awarded revealed a main effect of accountability, F (1, 78) = 6.61, p = .01, Ƨ²p = .08. 
Non-accountable leaders claimed more points for themselves (M = 137.32, SD = 32.08) 
than accountable leaders (M = 122.63, SD = 19.88). As predicted, the main effect of 
accountability was qualified by a Power X Accountability interaction, F (1, 78) = 5.75, p 
=.02 Ƨ²p = .07 (see Figure 5.1). 
We had predicted that the effects of accountability would be stronger for high than 
for low power leaders. Specifically, we had predicted that accountable high power 
leaders would claim fewer resources for themselves than non-accountable high power 
leaders. A simple effects analysis indicated that high power accountable leaders (M = 
121.00, SD = 23.42) self-awarded less points than non-accountable high power leaders 
(M = 149.14, SD = 35.19), F (1, 78) = 11.77, p = .001, Ƨ²p = .13, CI (diff) = between -
44.47 and -11.81. No such differential accountability effects on leader self-allocations 
were found for low power leaders (MAcc = 123.91, SDAcc = 17.05 vs. MNon-Acc = 124.90, 
SDNon-Acc = 23.36). In addition, the simple effects analysis also revealed that non-
accountable high power leaders (M = 149.14, SD = 35.19) self-allocated more points 
than non-accountable low power leaders (M = 124.90, SD = 23.36), F (1, 78) = 9.23, p 
= .003, Ƨ²p = .10, CI (diff) = between 8.35 and 40.12.  
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Figure 5.1 Number of points self-allocated by leaders (out of 420 points) in Study 1 
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Study 2 
 
In Study 1 we had predicted that accountability should serve to constrain high power 
leaders’ self-serving behaviors in a resource allocation task. In line with our predictions, 
we found that high power leaders who were held accountable claimed less resources 
than high power leaders who were not held accountable. Additionally, and also in line 
with our predictions, the allocations of low power leaders were not contingent upon 
explicit accountability constraints.  
Study 2 was designed to further elucidate some potential questions that may have 
arisen from Study 1. In this study we measured leaders’ sense of power, perceived 
accountability, and self-serving leader behaviors in an organizational context. First, while 
the experimental study yielded causal evidence in support of our hypothesis, it does not 
speak to whether we can find support for our theoretical framework in a field context in 
a sample of organizational leaders. Second, whereas in the experiment we manipulated 
leaders’ relative power, in the cross-sectional survey we measured leaders’ perceived 
sense of power as a psychological state. Third, whereas in our experimental study, our 
accountability manipulation featured primarily elements typically associated with process 
accountability, in the current study, we employed a measure of perceived accountability 
that captures features of both outcome and process accountability. In line with previous 
research showing that the measure has a unidimensional factor structure (Hall et al., 
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2006; Hochwarter, Perrewé, Hall, & Ferris, 2005) we treated it as an overall measure of 
perceived accountability. Fourth, the dependent measure in Study 1 taps exclusively into 
the allocation of monetary resources, whereas leader self-serving behaviors may extend 
to other domains. In Study 2, we therefore expanded the scope of our dependent 
variable by scrutinizing a greater variety of leader self-serving behaviors which go 
beyond and above simple monetary allocations (e.g., time investment, credit allocated 
for jobs performed). Fifth, although we have no reason to believe that relying on Dutch 
samples in our experimental study poses a limitation to the generalizability of our 
conclusions, we nevertheless used the opportunity for a replication with a sample from a 
different country, namely the United Kingdom. To address these potential open 
questions we tested our hypothesis in a sample of organizational leaders.  
 
Method 
Procedure. The study was conducted online as a leadership survey. Respondents 
were recruited via a panel firm located in the United Kingdom. Emails with personalized 
survey links were sent to a panel of individuals in managerial or supervisory positions 
who had a minimum of 3 direct subordinates and a minimum of 5 years of work 
experience. 
The survey was conducted in line with recommendations given in the field 
(Birnbaum, 2004; Dillmann, 2007). By utilizing server-sided survey programming we 
avoided common technical selection biases, which generally exclude people who do not 
meet special browser requirements (e.g., Java Script). Moreover, prior to going live with 
the survey we pre-tested the layout on a number of different computers varying the 
browsers used as well as the screen resolutions to ensure that the survey would look the 
same on different systems. We also assigned each potential respondent a unique session 
ID, resulting in individualized survey links. This made it impossible for any respondent 
to participate in the survey more than once. To increase response rate respondents 
received a monetary incentive for their participation. On the first page of the survey we 
guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of individual surveys and emphasized that 
participation was voluntary. Respondents interested in our results were given the 
opportunity to provide their email addresses in a different database so that names and 
email addresses could not be linked to individual responses. These measures taken to 
prevent common pitfalls of online research lead us to be at least as confident about the 
quality of our data as we would have been had we conducted a traditional paper and 
pencil survey.  
Sample. One hundred and sixty six respondents meeting the study’s requirements 
completed the survey out of a total of 250 emails sent out to potential respondents (66 
140
Leader Power, Accountability, and Self-serving Behavior 
132 
% response rate). The sample’s mean age was 40 years, (SD = 9.63) and women made 
up 51.2 % of the sample. Respondents’ average fulltime work experience was 17.94 
years (SD = 10.73), their average tenure in a managerial or supervisory position was 9.30 
years (SD = 6.87), and their average tenure on the current job was 5.75 years (SD = 
4.75). All respondents worked in private organizations and had on average 9.43 
subordinates (SD = 9.42). Respondents with a higher education degree (i.e., Bachelor 
degree or higher) made up 75.4 % of the sample and the majority (87.12 %) held 
management or senior management positions.  
Measures. All responses were assessed on 5-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). Leaders’ sense of power was measured with the 8-item Anderson and 
Galinsky (2006) sense of power scale tailored to the respondents’ work environment 
(e.g., “In my relationships with my subordinates I can get them to listen to what I have 
to say.”). These 8 items were combined to form one average sense of power score. 
Leaders’ perceived accountability was measured with 4 items adapted from Hochwarter et 
al. (2005) (i.e., “I am held accountable for my actions at work.”; “I often have to explain 
why I do certain things at work.”; “Co-workers, subordinates, and bosses closely 
scrutinize my efforts at work.”; “I am held accountable for my decisions.”). The four 
items were combined to form one average accountability score.  
An 8-item scale, inspired by work by Choi and Mai-Dalton (1998) and van 
Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005) comprised our measure of leader self-serving 
behavior. Arguably, leaders can act self-servingly by securing higher monetary benefits for 
themselves, but they can also act self-servingly by making self-serving causal attributions 
such as taking unwarranted credit for group accomplishments or by denying 
responsibility for failure on group projects (cf. Weary Bradley, 1978). While in Study 1 
our dependent measure tapped into the allocation of monetary resources, in the survey 
we also measured the allocation of other resources, such as time and credit for jobs 
performed. Our self-serving behaviors measure in the survey is thus more encompassing 
than our measure in the experimental studies. For each of the 8 items of the scale, 
respondents had to indicate the number of times they had performed the described 
behavior during the past year (1 = never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = usually; 5 = always). 
The 8 items of our scale were the following: “ I have negotiated a bonus for myself that 
was substantially higher than the bonus my subordinates received.”; “I have used my 
leadership position to obtain benefits for myself.”; “I have pursued my personal 
interests, even if those interests were not serving my group’s interests.”; “I did not put 
my own position at risk, even when I thought that this could have helped promote my 
group’s goals.”; “Instead of giving credit to my subordinates for jobs requiring a lot of 
time and effort, I took the credit myself.”; “Although I was partly to be blamed, I did 
141
Leader Power, Accountability, and Self-serving Behavior 
133 
not take personal responsibility for my group’s failure to meet a goal.”; “I have shifted 
the blame for a mistake of mine onto one of my subordinates.”; “I did not work 
overtime, although this would have helped my group meet its goals.” 
 
Results 
We first performed a principal component analysis with OBLIMIN rotation of our 
predictor variable items (i.e., sense of power and accountability). This analysis yielded a 
two-factor solution with all items loading .69 or higher on the intended scale and all 
cross-loadings below |.14|. Then we performed a principal component analysis of the 
items comprising our dependent variable (i.e., leader self-serving behaviors). This 
analysis yielded a one-factor solution with item loadings of .75 or higher. Means, 
standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study variables are displayed in Table 
5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations for Study 2 
(1) Sense of Power
(2) Perceived accountability
M SD (1) (2) (3)
3.51 .63 (.81)
3.33 .78 .44** (.88)
(4) Leader self-serving behaviors 2.14 .86 .02 -.13 (.93)
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are displayed on the diagonal. All constructs were 
measured by Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5. N = 166 (listwise). * p < .05. ** 
p < .01.  
 
Leader self-serving behaviors. To test our hypothesis we conducted a hierarchical 
regression analysis in which leader self-serving behaviors were predicted by main effect 
terms (sense of power and perceived accountability) at Step 1 and the interaction term2 
at Step 2 (see Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2 Summary of Regression Analysis for Sense of Power and Perceived Accountability Predicting 
Leader Self-serving Behaviors in Study 2 
Step 1
Sense of power
Perceived accountability
b SE b ß t p
.13 .12 .09 1.09 .27
-.19 .09 -.17 -2.03 .04
Note. The explained variance of Step 1 was R2 = .03. Step 2 explained an
additional variance of R2 change = .05. N = 166 (listwise). 
Step 2
.12 .01 .16 .86
.09 -.13 -1.5 .13
Sense of power x Perceived 
accountability
-.27 .09 -.23 -2.8 .004
Variable
Sense of power
Perceived accountability
.02
-.14
 
 
Following Aiken and West (1991), leader sense of power and perceived 
accountability were centered by subtracting the mean from each score, and the 
interaction term as well as the main effects were based on the centered scores. Table 5.2 
shows the regression results: Step 1 explained a significant proportion of variance in 
leader self-serving behaviors and we found a negative relationship between perceived 
accountability and leader self-serving behaviors. More importantly, Step 2 explained a 
significant proportion of variance in leader self-serving behaviors and it revealed our 
predicted Sense of Power X Accountability interaction. To further analyze the 
interaction, we conducted simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) and determined 
the simple slopes for leaders with a high and low sense of power separately. As 
predicted, accountability yielded a negative relationship to leader self-serving behaviors 
for leaders with a high sense of power (1 SD above the mean; Ƣ = -.28, p = .002), but 
not for leaders with a low sense of power (1 SD below the mean; Ƣ = -.03, p = .77). 
Thus, in line with the findings of Study 1 we found that accountability moderates the 
effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors (See Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2 Leader self-ratings of self-serving actions in Study 2 
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In line with our theoretical framework, we replicated the results of Study 1 in a field 
setting, and showed that perceived leader accountability is indeed related to diminished 
leader self-serving behaviors for leaders with a high sense of power. The current study is 
thus not only an extension of our earlier findings to a field setting in a different country, 
but it also scrutinizes a greater variety of leader self-serving behaviors which go above 
and beyond simple monetary allocations.  
 
General Discussion  
 
Organizational leaders, who ostentatiously pursue the fulfillment of their own whims 
and desires at the cost of the collective, not only face the contempt and fury of the 
public and the body politic, but also the potential loss of status and wealth. Additionally, 
self-serving leader behaviors have been associated with negative consequences at the 
organizational level as well as decreases in subordinate motivation and performance 
(e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004). In this research, we predicted that 
accountability would moderate the effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors. 
Specifically, we proposed that powerful accountable leaders would exercise restraint and 
act less self-servingly (e.g., self-allocate a lower amount of resources) than non-
accountable high power leaders. This prediction rooted in insights from the power-
approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003), as well as from research on accountability (Lerner 
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& Tetlock, 1999) was tested in a laboratory experiment as well as in an organizational 
survey.  
Across both studies we found that leader power interacted with accountability in 
predicting leader behaviors. In Study 1 we showed that high power leaders who were 
held accountable self-allocated a lower amount of points than high power leaders who 
were not held accountable. In Study 2 we extended and replicated these findings in a 
cross-sectional survey of organizational leaders by demonstrating that powerful 
accountable leaders engaged in less self-serving behaviors than powerful leaders who did 
not feel accountable. Confidence in our results is bolstered because we replicated our 
findings across two studies, employing different methodologies (i.e., laboratory 
experiment, cross-sectional survey), and tapping into different samples from two 
different countries (i.e., Dutch students, managers and supervisors in the United 
Kingdom). Moreover, our findings held regardless of whether we manipulated power 
(Study 1) or measured supervisors’ subjective sense of power (Study 2), manipulated 
accountability (Study 1) or measured perceived accountability (Study 2), measured 
leaders’ allocation of resources (Study 1) or measured their engagement in a wider 
variety of self-serving behaviors, such as securing benefits for the self or taking undue 
credit for group efforts.  
Implications for the Study of Leader Self-serving Behaviors 
This research provides first empirical evidence that accountability moderates the 
effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors. Whereas accountability has previously 
been suggested to be a potential moderator of the more pernicious effects of power 
(Keltner et al., 2003; Magee et al., 2005), to our knowledge, this is the first empirical test 
of this contention. Our current findings are also congruent with some earlier research 
hinting at a possible interaction between power and accountability. For example, Tetlock 
(1981) showed that U.S. presidents exhibited greater integrative complexity in their 
thinking after they were elected and became accountable to a wide variety of 
constituents, than prior to election. Because they had to justify their decisions and 
policies to a wide array of different interest groups, the elected Presidents were more 
likely to consider the perspectives of these various groups, as well as to ponder on the 
consequences of their decisions. Similarly, Winter and Barenbaum (1985) found that 
individuals high in need for power typically engaged in self-serving profligate behaviors 
such as gambling. However, these high-need-for-power individuals acted in socially 
responsible ways when they faced certain life events that increased their accountability – 
having younger siblings and becoming parents.  
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The current research contributes to the study of leader allocation behaviors 
specifically and leader behaviors more generally in a number of important ways. First, it 
directly builds upon and extends work by Rus, van Knippenberg, and Wisse (2009) 
showing that procedural justice systems and leader perspective-taking mitigate the 
effects of power on leader self-serving behaviors. By showing that accountability, which 
has been linked to increases in perspective-taking (Tetlock et al., 1989), also moderates 
the effects of power on leader resource allocations, we have identified an additional 
strategy that could render powerful leaders more attentive to their subordinates’ 
interests. In doing so, we have taken another step toward integrating research on power 
and leadership whose study has historically not been very well integrated (Hollander & 
Offerman, 1990).  
Second, whereas we have argued and found that accountability moderates the effects 
of power on leader self-serving behaviors, we contend that accountability should not be 
seen as a panacea for all evils. First, in our research, we have treated accountability as a 
relatively unitary construct, having argued that the different accountability sub-types 
should have similar effects on leader self-serving behaviors. However, some caution 
should be exercised in generalizing our findings across types of accountability and across 
dependent variables. Specifically, we would argue that subjecting leaders to outcome 
accountability devoid of any process accountability could in fact entail negative effects for 
subordinates. We base this contention on research showing that pure outcome 
accountability can lead to a number of detrimental side effects, such as engagement in 
more politically motivated behaviors (Fandt & Ferris, 1990), a reduced ability to 
compromise and reach satisfactory agreements in negotiation contexts (Klimoski, 1972; 
Klimoski & Asch, 1974), and an increased likelihood to fall prey to the escalation of 
commitment bias (Simonson & Staw, 1992). It has been argued that the observed 
negative effects of outcome accountability stem from the fact that it focuses individuals 
disproportionately on the outcome to the detriment of the process of reaching the 
outcome, potentially leading them to take “shortcuts” in reaching their goals (e.g., Davis, 
Mero, & Goodman, 2007). Because outcome accountability seems to facilitate thinking 
and action predicated on a “means justify the ends” philosophy, holding high power 
individuals solely accountable for the final outcome of their actions, could exacerbate 
their tendency to treat others as means towards an end, and thereby fuel already existing 
predispositions to objectify others and ignore their internal experiences. For example, if 
high power individuals are solely accountable for the performance of their group, they 
may in fact institute draconian work policies that deny subordinates’ their human 
dignity. This, in turn, could have a negative impact on the overall performance of the 
group. Thus, outcome accountability may paradoxically lower exactly those outcomes its 
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implementation was intended to increase. On the other hand, because process 
accountability can lead to increased perspective-taking and more thorough information 
processing, a combination of process and outcome accountability appears to carry the 
most promise in terms of mitigating some of the negative effects of power.  
Third, it has frequently been argued that accountability increases felt responsibility 
(e.g., Hall et al., 2006). The notion that one could render those who are accountable to 
feel more responsible is very appealing from a leadership perspective, where leaders are 
expected to take responsibility for their group’s well-being. To date, there is no 
compelling evidence to suggest that responsibility is indeed part and parcel of felt 
accountability. However, we would speculate that accountability may lead to increased 
responsibility because it could render subordinates and their distinct interests more 
salient. This is of course an intriguing question that could be answered in future 
research.  
Caveats and Limitations 
Of course this research has its limitations that deserve comment. Both paradigms we 
employed suffer from certain drawbacks. First, our use of a student sample in the 
laboratory experiment could raise external validity concerns. Nonetheless, we 
purposefully chose for this experimental set-up high in internal validity (Mook, 1983) 
because our aim was to establish causality (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982) in the 
relationship between power, accountability and leader resource allocations. Additionally, 
previous research has shown that there is no reason to suspect that students behave 
differently than other populations (Brown & Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990). Moreover, 
experimental findings using similar paradigms have been replicated in survey-based 
organizational research (e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2004). More importantly 
we replicated our findings in an organizational survey in Study 2, which could serve as a 
counter-argument for the external validity criticism.  
Whereas our narrow focus on the allocation of monetary resources as a dependent 
measure can be considered a limitation of our experimental study, we extended the 
scope of our dependent variable in the survey by also measuring leaders’ time 
investment in group projects as well as their attributions of credit for jobs performed. 
Although we believe that the present results provide useful insights into leader self-
serving behaviors, the nature and scope of our dependent variable should be borne in 
mind when generalizing conclusions. Future investigations might benefit from extending 
the scope of our dependent variable to other domains such as the relational domain (i.e., 
leaders’ treatment of subordinates in terms of showing respect or allowing for voice 
behaviors).  
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Conversely, Study 2 could be criticized for being correlational in nature (i.e., 
rendering it mute in matters of causality) and for the measurement of undesirable 
behaviors via self-reports rather than via behavioral measures. Whereas we 
wholeheartedly endorse future tests of our hypotheses in field settings with more 
objective measures of self-serving behaviors, there is some evidence to suggest that in 
the assessment of undesirable behaviors, self-reports can be as accurate as more 
‘objective’ measures such as police reports or lie detector tests (Clark & Tifft, 1966; 
Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weiss, 1979). Previous findings also intimate that the use of self-
reports for undesirable behaviors is not as problematic as the use of self-reports for 
desirable behaviors, as they might be more prone to under- than to over-reporting 
(Aquino & Douglas, 2003). Another potential criticism of Study 2 could be that all 
variables were measured in a single questionnaire (i.e., making common source and 
common method variance a potential problem). This type of design could lead to an 
inflation of the relationships between variables, however, common source or method 
bias cannot account for statistical interactions. Because it may inflate the main effects it 
may lead to an underestimation of the effect sizes for interactions (Evans, 1985; 
McClelland & Judd, 1993). Therefore, common source or method bias does not pose a 
threat to the validity of our conclusions regarding the Power X Accountability 
interaction. The combination of the experimental design of Study 1 with the survey 
design of Study 2 leads us to see these concerns as less of a threat to the overall 
conclusions of this research, given that the strengths of the one methodology may 
compensate for the weaknesses of the other.  
Practical Implications 
Although inferences for practice should be seen as tentative and as requiring further 
inquiry and clarification, we see potential for our findings to be used in applied settings, 
i.e., in organizations trying to curb leader self-serving behaviors. First, there seems to be 
some value in instituting organizational systems of checks and balances in order to keep 
potential leader self-serving behaviors in check. Because it is often difficult to clearly 
disentangle outcome from process accountability in an organizational context, we would 
suggest that organizations may best be able to reap the benefits of the constraining 
power of accountability with systems of checks and balances that combine outcome and 
process accountability concerns. Second, if the context precludes the creation of formal 
accountability systems, organizations could try to create flatter hierarchies. By creating 
more democratic decision making systems, accountability implicitly becomes part and 
parcel of the decision making process, because each individual can expect to have to 
justify his/her position to the rest of the group.  
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To Conclude 
Leader self-serving behaviors carry the specter of negative consequences for 
subordinates’ well-being and motivation as well as for the organization at large. Given 
that such leader behaviors can have a wide variety of pernicious effects it is somewhat 
unfortunate that leadership research seems to have hardly concerned itself with 
understanding why leaders engage in such behaviors and how they could be mitigated. 
As such, the present research hopes to have opened an avenue for exploring these 
questions by pointing at the value of a power analysis. 
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Notes 
 
1In this research we treat accountability as an umbrella concept in line with our definition. Previous research 
has sometimes distinguished between process and outcome accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Siegel-
Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Whereas process accountability (PA) implies that the 
individual is evaluated based solely on the quality of the procedures used to reach a decision, under conditions 
of outcome accountability (OA) the individual is judged based exclusively on the quality of the outcome of the 
decision (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). However, we argue that in the context of 
leader resource allocations, differentiating between accountability types provides little extra added value for 
reasons to be set forth below. First, the complexities of organizational settings most likely preclude clear-cut 
distinctions between PA and OA, and instead probably blend aspects of both (see also Hochwarter, Perrewé, 
Hall, & Ferris, 2005; Seidenfeld, 2002). Second, although PA and OA may have different underlying 
mechanisms, we argue that both sub-types of accountability should serve to constrain high-power leaders’ self-
allocations because they merely emphasize different aspects of the more general process of being held 
accountable. 
2We did not control in our analyses for any covariates because rather often – especially with survey data – 
controls serve the purpose of getting something significant that was not significant before. Becker (2005) 
refers to this practice as problematic and cautions against potential Type II errors. Moreover, we hypothesized 
an interaction. Thus merely controlling for covariates would not be the best option if we want to exclude them 
as alternative explanations for our moderated findings. Including controls, however, does not change the 
significance or pattern of our interaction (i.e., with controls: age, gender, number of subordinates, years of 
fulltime work experience, overall tenure in leadership position, tenure in current leadership position). Because 
none of the control variables were related to our independent or dependent variables and we wanted to keep 
the survey study as similar as possible to our experimental study, we do not report regression results with 
covariates. 
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Chapter 6:General Discussion  
 
Organizations headed by leaders who hubristically plunder the company coffers to 
satisfy their own whims and desires face not only public scorn and anger, but also 
potential losses in wealth and standing. Whereas leader self-serving behaviors have been 
proposed, both in academic circles and within the forum of public opinion, to be a 
particularly destructive class of leader behaviors (e.g., Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1998; De 
Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004) with negative consequences for the 
organization, as well as for followers’ motivation and performance, leader group-serving 
behaviors have consistently been linked to increased leader effectiveness (e.g., Choi & 
Mai-Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & van 
Knippenberg, 2005; Yorges, Weiss, & Strickland, 1999). Despite the considerable 
downstream consequences associated with leader self versus group-serving behaviors, 
our understanding of when and why leaders engage in relatively self or group-serving 
actions has so far been limited. We argue that, furthering our understanding of why 
some leaders as opposed to others may be more likely to engage in behaviors that are 
harmful to the group’s interests represents a first step towards finding potential ways to 
mitigate the occurrence of such behaviors. This dissertation aimed to address these 
questions by pointing to the value of (1) a self-concept-based analysis, as well as (2) a 
power-based analysis of leader behaviors. In four empirical chapters we (1) have 
attempted to outline how self-definition processes intimately tied to the leader role as 
well as power-related processes influence leaders’ framing of allocation situations and 
their subsequent behaviors, and (2) we have identified potential ways to mitigate some 
of the negative tendencies associated with elevated leader power that could result in 
relatively self-serving behaviors. Below we will first summarize the main findings of our 
empirical chapters. Second, we will engage in a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for the study of leader behaviors in general, and leader self versus group-serving 
behaviors in particular, as well as outline some potentially fruitful directions for future 
research. Third, we will touch upon some of the strengths and limitations of this 
dissertation. Fourth, we will discuss potential practical implications of our research for 
organizations trying to curb leader self-serving behaviors before turning to a general 
conclusive statement.  
 
Summary of Main Findings  
In chapter two we hypothesized that self-definition as a leader would moderate the 
processing of social information in resource allocation contexts and that, contingent on 
the information used, leader self-allocations would be more or less self-serving. We 
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tested this more general prediction, derived from an integration of theorizing on leader 
self-definition (Kramer, 2003; Lord & Hall, 2005) and extensions of social comparison 
theory (Festinger, 1954), in a series of four laboratory and scenario experiments as well 
as in two organizational surveys. We consistently showed that leader self-definition 
interacts with normative social information, of both the descriptive (i.e., information 
about other leaders’ self-allocations) and the injunctive variety (i.e., effective leadership 
beliefs) in predicting leader self-serving allocations. The six studies showed that the 
effects of descriptive and injunctive social reference information on leader resource 
allocations were stronger for leaders who self-defined more strongly as leaders than for 
those who self-defined less strongly in terms of the leader category. When other leaders’ 
self-allocations were high, or when they endorsed self-serving ELBs, leaders self-
defining more strongly as leaders acted more self-servingly than when other leaders’ self-
allocations were low, or when they endorsed group-serving ELBs. These effects were far 
less pronounced for leaders who self-defined less strongly as leaders. In sum, we 
consistently found that self-serving leader behaviors are the result of an interaction 
between self-definition as a leader and social information processing. In other words, 
the present data suggest that leaders are more likely to use social reference information 
when their self-definition is deeply embedded in those references. This research 
contributes first and necessary evidence that leaders’ self-concept, more precisely 
leaders’ self-definition as a leader, has a significant impact on leader self-serving 
behaviors. As such, we hope to have put the study of determinants of leader self and 
group-serving behaviors on the research agenda and to have introduced self-definition 
as a leader as a concept to be reckoned with when studying leader behaviors.  
In chapter three we hypothesized that power would moderate leaders’ sensitivity to 
different cues that may inform leader behavior in resource allocation contexts. We 
proposed that higher leader power would not inevitably result in higher leader self-
servingness. Rather, we posited that the more power a leader holds, the more the 
leader’s actions would become contingent on internal belief states (e.g., effective 
leadership beliefs) and the less they would be contingent on situational, contextual cues 
(e.g., performance information). Whether this would result in more or less self-serving 
behaviors would depend on the nature of these belief states and contextual cues. We 
tested these predictions, derived from an integration of the power-approach theory 
(Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), equity theory (Adams, 1965), and leader 
categorization theory (Lord & Maher, 1993), in a series of four laboratory and scenario 
experiments as well as in an organizational survey. We consistently showed that leader 
power interacted with situational information (i.e., performance feedback) and internal 
belief states (i.e., effective leadership beliefs) in predicting leader self-serving allocations. 
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First, two experimental studies indicated that performance information impacted high 
power leaders’ self-allocations less than low power leaders’ self-allocations. Low power 
leaders relied more on performance information in making resource self-allocations than 
high power leaders. Moreover, low power leaders claimed more or less resources than 
high power leaders, contingent on their performance vis-à-vis followers. Second, data 
from two additional experiments showed that high power leaders’ self-allocations were 
more a reflection of their effective leadership beliefs than low power leaders’ self-
allocations. We found that high power leaders acted either more self or more group-
servingly than low power leaders, contingent on the content of their effective leadership 
beliefs. Finally, we replicated our experimental findings in a cross-sectional 
organizational survey. First, the research reported in this chapter provides compelling 
evidence that leader power has a significant impact on leader self-serving behaviors. 
However, contrary to popular opinion, we showed that high power leaders need not 
necessarily be corrupt. Importantly, high power leaders’ allocations seem to be 
contingent on the content of their beliefs regarding effective leadership. Those high 
power leaders who believe that being an effective leader implies serving the group’s 
interests, first and foremost, are more likely to engage in group-serving actions than 
those leaders who believe that being an effective leader entails favoring one’s own 
interests. Second, this research bridges recent developments in social psychological 
research on power and leadership research. Specifically, we have shown that different 
power levels, even within a role traditionally considered to be a high power role, lead to 
different decisions and behaviors. This suggests that, from a leadership perspective, it is 
important to consider not only the effects of power differences between leaders and 
subordinates, but also the effects of power differentials within the leadership role on 
decision making and behavior. 
In chapter four we predicted that the interplay between systemic procedural justice 
and leader perspective-taking would mitigate the myopic self-centered focus induced 
among leaders by the experience of elevated power. These predictions were derived 
from an integration of the power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003), procedural 
justice research (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; 
Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and insights from work on perspective-
taking (Davis, 1980, 1983; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005), and 
were tested in a series of two laboratory and scenario experiments as well as in an 
organizational survey. In our first experiment, we argued that systemic procedural justice 
would facilitate perspective-taking among high power leaders which should, in turn, 
directly translate into lower self-allocations as compared to conditions where procedural 
justice systems are absent. In line with our predictions, we found that high power 
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leaders self-allocated a lower amount of points when subordinates were afforded voice 
than when they were not. Moreover, we showed that these effects of procedural justice 
and power on leader self-allocations were mediated by leader perspective-taking. In the 
next two studies we further extended our reasoning by reformulating our mediation 
hypothesis as a moderation hypothesis. Therefore, in the second and third study, we 
tested the three-way interaction between power, procedural justice systems and 
perspective-taking on leader allocations, predicting that under conditions of no (or low) 
perspective-taking, high power leaders should allocate less resources when procedural 
justice systems are present than when they are absent. However, under conditions of 
high perspective-taking, this interaction between power and procedural justice systems 
should be weaker, and we expected high power leaders to exercise restraint in their self-
allocations across the board, regardless of the presence or absence of procedural justice 
systems. In line with our predictions, in Study 2 we showed that procedural justice 
systems and leader power interacted in their prediction of leader self-allocations in the 
no perspective-taking conditions, whereas in the perspective-taking conditions, high 
power leaders made other-oriented allocations across the board, independent of the 
presence or absence of procedural justice systems. In Study 3 we replicated and 
extended these findings to an organizational context, with a broader conceptualization 
of procedural justice systems, an individual difference measure of perspective-taking and 
a broader dependent variable as compared to our experimental studies. The research 
reported in this chapter provides first evidence that the interplay between procedural 
justice systems and leader perspective-taking can serve to mitigate some of the negative 
effects of power on leader resource allocations. 
In chapter five we hypothesized that accountability would moderate the effects of 
leader power on leader self-serving behaviors. Specifically we proposed that powerful 
accountable leaders would exercise restraint and act less self-servingly (e.g., self-allocate 
a lower amount of resources) than non-accountable high power leaders. This prediction 
rooted in insights from the power-approach theory (Keltner et al., 2003) as well as from 
research on accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) was tested in a laboratory 
experiment as well as in an organizational survey. In both studies we found that leader 
power interacted with accountability in predicting leader behaviors. In Study 1 we 
showed that high power leaders who were held accountable self-allocated a lower 
amount of points than high power leaders who were not held accountable. Moreover, 
low power leaders’ self-allocations were less contingent on accountability constraints 
than high power leaders’ allocations. In Study 2 we extended and replicated these 
findings in a cross-sectional survey of organizational leaders by demonstrating that 
powerful accountable leaders engaged in less self-serving behaviors than powerful 
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leaders who did not feel accountable. The research reported in this chapter is consistent 
with previous theorizing suggesting that holding powerful individuals accountable for 
their actions could harness some of the more pernicious effects associated with elevated 
power.  
A short explanatory note is due at this point regarding the three empirical chapters 
(chapters 3, 4, and 5) of this dissertation specifically focusing on the effects of power on 
leader self-serving behaviors. In chapter three, we showed, in line with previous research 
(Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Keltner et al., 2003, but see 
Guinote, 2008) that power alters the processing of information, such that elevated 
power will render individuals less sensitive to situational constraints and more sensitive 
to internal cues as compared to low power. In chapters four and five, we showed that 
organizational procedural justice systems and accountability constraints mitigated high 
power leaders’ tendency to allocate more resources to the self. At first blush, it may 
therefore seem that the findings of chapters four and five directly challenge our findings 
in chapter three, because procedural justice systems and accountability constraints are in 
fact exogenous to the leader. We argue that this apparent conflict is more superficial 
than substantive.  
First, we want to highlight that currently held goals are important moderators of 
high power individuals’ attention to situational contingencies (e.g., Bargh, Raymond, 
Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 
2008). One of the major goals that high power individuals may have is to maintain their 
status position. In the Galinsky, Magee et al., (2008) research as well as in the research 
reported in chapter three, contextual cues did not directly pertain to powerful 
individuals’ goal related to the preservation of their status position, whereas in chapters 
four and five, we contend that the focal contextual cues may have made powerful 
individuals’ goal to maintain their position in the hierarchy more salient. This, in turn, 
may have triggered the motivation to avoid engaging in actions that might result in the 
loss of power and status. Therefore, we contend that high power individuals will take 
situational cues (i.e., procedural justice systems and accountability demands) into 
account to the extent that they are deemed to be related to goal attainment. Second, and 
relatedly, powerful individuals have been shown to be more flexible in their focus of 
attention than low power individuals (e.g., Guinote, 2007b, Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & 
Galinsky, 2008). That is, they may or may not pay attention to situational cues 
depending on the extent to which these cues are deemed to be relevant. In chapter 3 we 
would argue that performance information relative to followers may be deemed as less 
relevant for high power leaders than for low power leaders, because their subordinates 
may simply not be the relevant comparison other. Third, an argument could be made 
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that procedural justice systems and organizational systems of checks serve to embed the 
leader in the larger organizational context. As such, these institutionalized systems 
provide leaders with the prevailing organizational norms, which in fact could become 
internalized. More specifically, the presence of procedural justice systems and 
accountability systems can lead to the internalization of norms of fairness and the need 
to justify one’s decisions. Thus, we argue that contextual cues may trigger cognitive 
intrapersonal processes leading to the development of internal attributes that may serve 
as cues in subsequent cognitive processing and behavior.  
 
Theoretical Implications and Directions for Future Research 
The research reported in this dissertation spans across a number of different theories 
that are either more closely or more distally related to leadership research. The common 
denominator across all our empirical chapters has been our attempt at explaining when 
and why leaders would engage in actions that are either relatively self or group-serving. 
Therefore, we would argue that our findings have a number of distinct implications for 
leadership research in general, as well as for the study of leader self-serving behavior in 
particular. For the sake of brevity, below we will highlight only those areas which we 
deem to have the highest potential in terms of informing future research.  
The role of a self-concept-based analysis of leader behaviors. This dissertation 
provides first evidence that leaders’ self-concept, more precisely leaders’ self-definition 
as a leader, has a significant impact on leader self-serving behaviors. First, the present 
work builds upon, and conceptually extends, the self-concept stream of leadership 
research (Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999; Gardner & Avolio, 1998; Shamir, House, & 
Arthur, 1993; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004) by taking 
the limelight off followers’ self-concept and by zooming in on leaders’ self-concept. 
Second, our self-concept analysis of leader self-serving behaviors also feeds into 
charismatic leadership research (e.g., De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002) as well as 
into work from a social identity theory of leadership perspective (e.g., Hogg & van 
Knippenberg, 2003). Whereas both aforementioned research streams have identified 
leader self-sacrificial or group-serving behaviors as being central precursors of leader 
effectiveness (e.g., Bass, 1990; Burns, 1978; Shamir et al., 1993; van Knippenberg & 
Hogg, 2003; Yukl, 2002), neither one of them has informed us on factors determining 
leader self versus group-serving behaviors. Our findings extend this work by 
highlighting factors that might influence the extent to which leaders engage in self or 
group-serving actions.  
Admittedly, the present evidence is still too modest to allow us to draw far-reaching 
conclusions about the effects of leader self-definition, but we believe that it alludes to 
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the concept’s potential to advance our understanding of leader behaviors in general, and 
leader self-serving behaviors more specifically. In this respect, we propose two 
directions for future research that seem particularly worthwhile. First, we have focused 
only on one specific aspect of the self-concept, namely leaders’ self-definition as leaders. 
Because the self-concept is a multidimensional construct consisting of a multitude of 
different identities (e.g., Lord et al., 1999; van Knippenberg et al., 2004), leaders could 
reasonably be expected to also possess self-definitions as members of their work groups 
or as members of their professional groups. Therefore, future research could extend our 
self-concept analysis of leader self vs. group-serving behaviors by investigating such 
alternative leader self-definitions as antecedents of leader actions. For example, from a 
social identity analysis of leadership perspective (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003), if 
leaders construed the self in terms of membership in their work group and identified 
strongly with this group, they should be more sensitive to group normative information 
when allocating resources. Thus, we propose that conceptually different self-definitions 
(e.g., as a leader, as a member of the professional group, as a group member) would 
affect leader behaviors differently by focusing their attention on the specific norms 
associated with the salient identity. 
Second, a self-concept-based analysis of leader behaviors inevitably raises a host of 
other intriguing questions. Two questions which we see as presenting especially 
promising avenues are (1) how are these various self-definitions interrelated, and (2) 
what factors influence the relative strengths of these identities? From a leader 
development perspective, self-definition as a leader represents a critical step in providing 
leaders with an understanding of their role, their goals, motivations and aspirations (e.g., 
Day & Harrison, 2007; Hall, 2004; Lord & Hall, 2005). Day and Harrison (2007) as well 
as Lord and Hall (2005) go further to propose that, over time and with more leadership 
experience, leaders’ individual-level identities would be first transcended by relational 
identities and subsequently by collective identities. The developmental view on leaders’ 
self-concept thus proposes a hierarchical relationship between self-definition as a leader, 
relational leader identities and collective leader identities. Moreover, this perspective also 
suggests that once these different self-definitions have been formed, leaders can switch 
between them contingent on the task at hand. This implies that various self-definitions 
can co-exist and that their relative strength in affecting behaviors would be determined 
by situational factors (e.g., task at hand, accountability, legitimacy, goals). We deem these 
to be interesting propositions that could be tested longitudinally. Whereas our work only 
allows us to draw conclusions as to the effects of self-definition as a leader on resource 
allocations, we can envision the explanatory potential afforded by a fuller model of 
leader self-definitions.  
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The role of power. Whether in the halls of academia or within the forum of public 
opinion, power has often been regarded as being the root cause of leader corruption and 
derailment. Contrary to popular opinion, and in line with more recent 
conceptualizations of power as having transformative effects that can be both functional 
as well as dysfunctional, depending on the person and the situation (Galinsky, Jordan, & 
Sivanathan, 2008; Keltner et al., 2003), in this dissertation, we show that power does not 
necessarily corrupt. As such, this dissertation also aimed to create a bridge between 
recent social-psychological research on power and leadership research, especially 
because, despite the historical and functional link between power and leadership (French 
& Snyder, 1959), their study has not been very well integrated (Hollander & Offerman, 
1990). First, our findings in chapter three are consistent with work by Galinsky and 
colleagues (2008) showing that power protects the individual from situational influences. 
This can of course have either functional or dysfunctional consequences depending on 
the nature of these situational influences as well as on the behaviors of the powerful that 
are under investigation. Second, our work in chapters four and five not only informs our 
understanding of how differential levels of power within the leader role affect leader 
behaviors, but also contributes to the power literature by identifying two moderators of 
the effects of power that need not necessarily be connected to a leadership context: 
perspective-taking and accountability. These findings directly build upon and extend 
previous theorizing on identifying ways to mitigate some of the more dysfunctional 
effects associated with high power (e.g., Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008; Keltner 
et al., 2003). Third, we would suggest that the greatest contribution of our work on the 
role of power in influencing leader behaviors lies in attempting to identify potential ways 
to harness its positive effects while mitigating its negative effects. Despite the 
considerable progress made in depicting power as both a generative and a destructive 
force, the question of how power can be transformed and used in the service of 
effective leadership has been largely side-stepped. Therefore, we would argue that 
addressing this question – of both theoretical and practical importance – remains an 
open challenge for leadership research.  
The role of procedural justice. This dissertation provides first evidence that 
procedural justice systems are potent moderators of the effects of power on leader 
resource allocations. First, we found that, at least in a context where leader self-serving 
behaviors occur at the expense of followers’ outcomes, systemic procedural justice can 
lead to higher subordinate outcome favorability. Typically, procedural justice research 
has studied the interactive effect of procedural justice and outcome favorability on 
employee fairness perceptions and attitudinal and behavioral reactions (see Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996, for a review). However, by studying systemic procedural justice as an 
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antecedent of leader allocation behaviors, we found that higher procedural justice at the 
system level can result in fairer resource distributions on the part of the leader. Of 
course this particular finding is bound by the specific context under investigation in our 
research, where the more the leader self-allocated the less was left over for followers. 
Whether these results can be generalized to different contexts remains an intriguing 
question to be answered by future research. Second, in this dissertation we treated 
procedural justice as an exogenous variable influencing leader behaviors. Typically, 
procedural justice research has studied procedural justice as an exogenous variable 
influencing employee perceptions and behaviors. Much less attention has been devoted 
to understanding when, why and how leaders might in fact act in accordance with 
procedural justice rules (see also Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007). By shifting the 
focus from the employee as the recipient of procedural justice to the leader as the enactor 
of procedural justice we opened a new research avenue that could provide us with 
valuable insights into how systems of procedural justice can influence leader behaviors. 
For example, one could envision systemic procedural justice having a positive effect on 
leader implementation of procedural justice as well as on leader expressions of 
interactional justice. From a theoretical standpoint, examining factors that influence 
leader expressions of justice can provide us with new directions for building 
organizational justice models. From a practical standpoint, understanding the conditions 
that would facilitate leader engagement in distributive justice as well as leader 
expressions of procedural and interactional justice, could aid organizations in preventing 
injustice.  
The role of perspective-taking. Perspective-taking has often been proclaimed to 
be a vital component for the smooth functioning of social relations (e.g., Mead, 1934; 
Piaget, 1932). In this dissertation we have shown that perspective-taking can be a potent 
mitigator of power-induced egocentric tendencies. This finding corroborates previous 
power research suggesting that the personalities of high power individuals are better 
predictors of their behaviors than the personalities of low power individuals (e.g., Bargh, 
Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008). 
For example, Chen and colleagues found that power-primed communally-oriented 
participants acted more selflessly and power-primed exchange-oriented participants 
acted more selfishly than participants exposed to neutral primes. Similarly, Bargh et al. 
(1995) showed that the activation of the concept of power in men who had a 
predisposition towards sexual harassment led to an automatic triggering of sex-related 
concepts and consequently to viewing female discussion partners as sexual objects. First, 
this suggests that future research trying to elucidate leader behaviors may benefit from 
considering other dispositional attributes that could attenuate some of the potentially 
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negative effects associated with high power. For example, justice orientation (Rupp, 
Byrne, & Wadlington, 2003), social value orientation (MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976), 
social relationship orientation (Mills & Clark, 1984) or moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 
2002) emerge as potential moderators of the effects of power. Second, we argue that 
perspective-taking can be a powerful moderator of the effects of power on a multitude 
of organizationally relevant variables, above and beyond leader resource allocations. In 
fact we would propose that perspective-taking is part and parcel of effective leadership 
(see also Galinsky, Jordan, & Sivanathan, 2008). Leaders are generally expected to 
motivate their subordinates toward the achievement of group goals (e.g., Hollander, 
1980). But leaders can only be effective motivators if they understand their audience, 
and we suggest that this understanding relies largely on leaders’ capacity to see the world 
from their subordinates’ perspective. Therefore, we argue that leader perspective-taking, 
especially when coupled with the action-orientation and optimism that comes with high 
leader power can be an important precursor of leader effectiveness. For example, 
previous research has found that employees who perceive that their leaders do not treat 
them with dignity and respect (i.e., interactional justice), are more likely to trust these 
leaders less (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), to exhibit worse performance (e.g., 
Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), and to engage in more retaliatory 
behaviors (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) than employees who perceive that their 
supervisors are treating them fairly. We argue that leader perspective-taking could serve 
to mitigate some of these negative effects by increasing the extent to which high power 
leaders engage in expressions of interactional justice.  
The role of accountability. Whereas accountability has previously been suggested 
to be a potential moderator of the more pernicious effects of power (Keltner et al., 
2003; Magee, Gruenfeld, Keltner, & Galinsky, 2005), to our knowledge, this is the first 
empirical test of this contention. Our current findings are also congruent with some 
earlier research hinting at a possible interaction between power and accountability. For 
example, Tetlock (1981) showed that U.S. presidents exhibited greater integrative 
complexity in their thinking after they were elected and became accountable to a wide 
variety of constituents, than prior to election. Because they had to justify their decisions 
and policies to a wide array of different interest groups, the elected Presidents were 
more likely to consider the perspectives of these various groups as well as to ponder on 
the consequences of their decisions. Accountability is however a complex, multi-
dimensional construct (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and in this dissertation we have only 
begun to scrape the surface of the interactive effects of accountability and power on 
leader behaviors. Future research may benefit from delving deeper into the potential 
effects of different types of accountability on leader behaviors. Whereas process 
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accountability has been related to better quality decisions by, for example, increasing 
judgmental accuracy (Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996) and the 
thoroughness of information processing (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock, 1983; 
Tetlock & Boettger, 1989), outcome accountability has been shown to also lead to a 
number of detrimental side effects, such as more wasteful resource distributions 
(Adelberg & Batson, 1978), more politically motivated behaviors (Fandt & Ferris, 1990), 
and less compromising in a negotiation context (Klimoski, 1972; Klimoski & Ash, 
1974). It has been argued that the observed negative effects of outcome accountability 
stem from the fact that it disproportionately focuses individuals on the outcome to the 
detriment of the process of reaching the outcome, potentially leading them to take 
“shortcuts” in reaching their goals (e.g., Davis, Mero, & Goodman, 2007). Because 
outcome accountability seems to facilitate thinking and action predicated on a “means 
justify the ends” philosophy, holding high power individuals solely accountable for the 
final outcome of their actions, could exacerbate their tendency to treat others as means 
towards an end, and thereby fuel already existing predispositions to objectify others and 
ignore their internal experiences. This question open to future empirical tests, does 
however suggest that in certain situations, outcome accountability - devoid of process 
accountability - could have pernicious effects on high power individuals’ behaviors.  
 
Caveats and Limitations 
This dissertation offers an analysis of how leaders come to engage in relatively self 
versus group-serving behaviors. Below I will discuss the limitations of the present 
research in terms of (1) the methods used, and (2) operationalization and measurement 
issues.  
Method. In this dissertation, I report a total of sixteen empirical studies, spread over 
four empirical chapters attempting to answer my central research question. Six of the 
studies are laboratory experiments, five are scenario experiments and five are cross-
sectional organizational surveys. Each of the employed methodologies suffers from its 
own drawbacks in terms of generalizability and validity. Whereas laboratory experiments 
have the advantage of experimental control and hence a relatively strong internal validity 
of results, they also have the disadvantage of being artificial in nature and somewhat 
disconnected from reality – which threatens the external validity of the findings. We did 
however choose for an experimental set-up because our aim was to establish causality in 
our predicted relationships (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). Moreover, to alleviate 
some of the concerns regarding the artificiality of the experimental set-up we 
complemented most of our laboratory experiments with scenario experiments, which 
usually score higher on levels of mundane realism. Additionally, previous research has 
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indicated that there is no reason to suspect that students behave differently than other 
populations (Brown & Lord, 1999; Dipboye, 1990) and experimental findings using 
similar paradigms have been replicated in survey-based organizational research (De 
Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). 
More important, in each chapter, we replicated the findings from our experimental 
studies in at least one organizational survey, for which external validity concerns should 
pose less of a problem. This is not to say that cross-sectional surveys do not suffer from 
their own drawbacks in terms of being correlational in nature (i.e., rendering them mute 
in matters of causality). All in all, we argue that, the employed combination of 
experimental designs with the survey designs leads us to see these concerns as less of a 
threat to the overall conclusions of the present research, given that the strengths of the 
one methodology may compensate for the weaknesses of the other. Confidence in our 
results is bolstered not only by replication across studies and methodologies but also 
across samples (i.e., Dutch students, managers and supervisors in the United Kingdom).  
Operationalizations and measurement. First, whereas, in chapter two we used 
multiple operationalizations of the self-definition concept as well as of the social 
information construct, one could argue that in chapters three, four and five, we used the 
same power manipulation in all of our experimental studies. This could of course raise 
questions as to whether our findings are limited to the manipulation we employed. We 
would argue that, because we also measured leader power either by measuring position 
power (chapters 3 and 4) or by measuring leaders’ subjective sense of power (chapter 5), 
and replicated the results of our experimental studies, our specific operationalization of 
leader power should constitute less of a concern. We do nonetheless acknowledge this 
potential limitation and endorse future studies with different power manipulations.  
Second, whereas our narrow focus on the allocation of monetary resources as a 
dependent measure can be considered a limitation of our experimental studies, we 
extended the scope of our dependent variable in the surveys by also measuring leaders’ 
time investment in group projects as well as their attributions of credit for jobs 
performed. Although we believe that the present results provide useful insights into 
leader self-serving behaviors, the nature and scope of our dependent variable should be 
borne in mind when generalizing conclusions. Future investigations might benefit from 
extending the scope of our dependent variable to other domains such as the relational 
domain (i.e., leaders’ treatment of subordinates in terms of showing respect or allowing 
for voice behaviors).  
Third, one could criticize our measurement of undesirable behaviors via self-reports 
rather than via behavioral measures. There is however evidence suggesting that, when 
measuring undesirable behaviors, self-reports are as accurate as more ‘objective’ 
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measures such as police reports or lie detector tests (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Hindelang, 
Hirschi, & Weiss, 1979). Nonetheless, we do not want to be presumptuous and assume 
that our self-reported measure of self-serving behaviors is necessarily accurate, just 
because similar research has found a correlation between self-reports of undesirable 
behaviors and their ‘objective’ measurement. Ultimately, this remains a question to be 
answered in future research and we wholeheartedly endorse future tests of our 
hypotheses in field settings with both follower and leader ratings of self-serving 
behaviors as well as more ‘objective’ measures.  
Fourth, a potential weakness of our survey studies could be that all variables were 
measured in a single questionnaire (i.e., making common source and common method 
variance a potential problem). We would argue that this does not necessarily threaten 
the validity of our conclusions for two reasons. First, we also replicated our survey 
findings in experimental studies. Second, because this type of design could lead to an 
inflation of the main effects, it may lead to an underestimation of the effect sizes for 
interactions (Evans, 1985; McClelland & Judd, 1993). As such, common source or 
method bias does not pose a threat to the validity of our conclusions regarding our 
proposed interactions.  
 
Practical Implications 
Although conclusions regarding practical implications are to be regarded as tentative 
and as requiring further inquiry and clarification, we see potential for our findings to be 
used in applied settings, i.e., in organizations trying to curb leader self-serving behaviors. 
First, in chapters two and three, we showed that leaders’ effective leadership beliefs 
substantially impacted their resource allocation behaviors. The leader development 
(London, 2002) and coaching literature (Smither & Reilly, 2001) suggests that 
interventions directed at improving leadership generally work because they aim at 
creating new self-schemas. Some value might therefore be drawn from promoting 
group-serving effective leadership beliefs as ideal leadership self-schemas. Moreover, if 
more leaders would endorse group-serving effective leadership beliefs this could lead to 
a more general downward compensation spiral. As we have shown in chapter two, 
leaders self-defining more strongly as leaders are more likely to use information about 
other leaders’ outcomes. Therefore, if a high number of leaders endorses group-serving 
effective leadership beliefs this could influence other leaders to claim lower outcomes 
for themselves. The promotion of group-serving effective leadership beliefs could be 
done via leadership training and executive seminars as well as via teaching in MBA 
programs, where future leaders are formed.  
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Second, based on our findings in chapters four and five, there seems to be some 
value in the institution of procedural justice systems as well as in the implementation of 
organizational systems of checks and balances. First, whereas procedural justice research 
has typically shown that procedural justice systems increase employee satisfaction, well-
being, and performance (for a review see Colquitt et al. 2001), our research suggest that 
the simple presence of procedural justice systems serves to temper leader resource self-
allocations. Thus, procedural justice systems can, under certain conditions (i.e., when 
leaders and subordinates share a common resource pool) beget more distributive justice. 
Second, we would suggest that organizations may best be able to reap the benefits of the 
constraining power of accountability on leader behaviors with systems of checks and 
balances that combine outcome and process accountability concerns. Additionally, if the 
context precludes the creation of formal accountability systems, organizations could try 
to create flatter hierarchies. By creating more democratic decision making systems, 
accountability implicitly becomes part and parcel of the decision making process, 
because each individual can expect to have to justify his/her position to the rest of the 
group. 
Third, in chapter four, we have shown that leader perspective-taking can also act as a 
damper on self-serving leader allocations. This finding has two different practical 
implications. First, because power increases the correspondence between traits and 
behavior (Bargh et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2001), the personalities of high power 
individuals are better predictors of their behaviors than the personalities of low power 
individuals. Consequently, organizations could select individuals into leadership roles 
who score high on perspective-taking measures. Second, because perspective-taking is a 
highly trainable ability (e.g., Parker & Axtell, 2001), organizations could invest in training 
programs that provide leaders with an appreciation of, as well as the skills necessary to 
engage in perspective-taking. The simple act of trying to see the world through their 
subordinates’ eyes could make leaders aware of their employees’ interests and act 
accordingly. This could be done via leadership training and executive seminars.  
 
Concluding Remark 
Leader self-serving actions are a particularly pernicious class of leader behaviors that 
carry the specter of negative consequences for subordinates’ motivation and 
performance, as well as for the organization at large. In contrast, leader group-serving 
behaviors have consistently been depicted as a positive force, linked to increased leader 
effectiveness. Despite the considerable dysfunctional downstream consequences 
associated with leader self-serving behaviors, our understanding of when and why leaders 
choose to serve their own interests or to benefit their groups has been limited. This 
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dissertation aimed to uncover some of the factors that would inform us when and why 
leaders may engage in self versus group-serving behaviors. First, we found that self-
definition as a leader and power influence the type of information used by leaders in 
resource allocation contexts. Contingent on the content of this information, more or 
less self-serving behaviors ensued. Importantly, power did not necessarily lead to 
increased leader self-servingness. Second, we identified systemic procedural justice, 
accountability, and perspective-taking as potential mitigators of some of the more 
negative tendencies associated with elevated leader power that could result in relatively 
self-serving leader behaviors. All in all, we hope to have opened a new avenue for 
exploring potential determinants of leader self versus group-serving actions by pointing 
to the value of a self-concept-based analysis, as well as at to the value of a power-based 
analysis of leader behaviors. 
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Organisaties die geleid worden door leiders die de fondsen van hun bedrijven 
plunderen om hun egocentrische belangen te behartigen lopen niet alleen het risico op 
minachting en woede van het publiek, maar ook op potentieel verlies van rijkdom en 
aanzien. Zelf-dienende gedragingen van leiders worden zowel in de wetenschap als in de 
publieke opinie aangedragen als een bijzonder destructieve categorie van 
leiderschapsgedragingen (Choi & Mai-Dalton, 1998; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 
2002, 2004) die negatieve consequenties heeft voor zowel de organisatie als de motivatie 
en prestatie van de medewerkers. Daarentegen wordt gedrag van leiders dat de groep 
dient consistent in verband gebracht met toegenomen leider effectiviteit (Choi & Mai-
Dalton, 1999; De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004; van Knippenberg & van 
Knippenberg, 2005; Yorges, Weiss, & Strickland, 1999). Ondanks de aanzienlijk 
negatieve consequenties die geassocieerd worden met leider zelf- dienende gedragingen, 
is ons begrip van wanneer en waarom leiders zich relatief zelf- of groep-dienend gedragen 
tot nog toe beperkt. Wij stellen dat begrip van waarom sommige leiders meer geneigd 
zijn om gedragingen ten toon te spreiden die de belangen van de groep schaden dan 
andere leiders, een eerste stap is om manieren te vinden om het voordoen van zulk 
gedrag te beperken. Deze dissertatie beoogde het begrip hieromtrent te vergroten door 
de waarde van (1) een op het zelf-concept gebaseerde analyse, evenals (2) een op macht 
gebaseerde analyse van leidergedragingen in kaart te brengen. In vier empirische 
hoofdstukken hebben we ten eerste getracht om uiteen te zetten hoe zelf-
definiëringsprocessen die nauw verbonden zijn met de rol van de leider en tevens 
gerelateerd zijn aan machtsprocessen, invloed hebben op de manier waarop de leider de 
allocatiesituatie waarneemt en op de gedragingen die daarop volgen. Ten tweede hebben 
we verschillende manieren om negatieve gevolgen van toegenomen macht van de leider, 
met name die gevolgen die zouden kunnen leiden tot relatief zelf-dienende 
leidergedragingen, geïdentificeerd. 
In hoofdstuk twee veronderstelden we dat het verwerken van sociale informatie in 
een allocatiecontext zou worden gemodereerd door de mate waarin een leider zichzelf 
definieert als leider, en dat afhankelijk van de aangeboden informatie de zelf-allocatie 
van de leider meer of minder zelf-dienend zou zijn. We testten deze meer algemene 
voorspelling, afgeleid van een integratie van theorieën op het gebied van leider zelf-
definitie (Kramer, 2003; Lord & Hall, 2005) en de sociale vergelijkingstheorie (Festinger, 
1954), in een serie van vier laboratorium- en scenario-experimenten en twee veldstudies. 
We toonden consistent aan dat leider-zelfdefiniëring samen met normatieve sociale 
informatie, van zowel descriptieve (bijv. informatie over de zelf-allocatie van andere 
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leiders) als injuctieve (bijv. effectieve leiderschapsovertuigingen, -hierna ELB’s 
genoemd-) aard, invloed heeft op leider-zelf-dienende allocaties. De zes studies lieten 
zien dat de effecten van descriptieve en injuctieve sociale informatie op de mate waarin 
leiders uitkomsten aan zichzelf toewezen sterker waren voor leiders die zich sterker als 
leiders definieerden dan diegenen die zich minder sterk als leider definieerden. Leiders 
die zich sterker als leider definieerden gedroegen zich meer zelf-dienend wanneer de 
zelf-allocaties van andere leiders hoog (vs. laag) waren, of als leiders zelf-dienende (vs. 
groeps-diendende) ELBs hadden. Deze effecten waren minder sterk voor leiders die 
zich zelf minder sterk definieerden als leiders. Samengevat vonden we consistent dat 
zelf-dienende leidergedragingen het resultaat zijn van een interactie tussen zelf-
definiering als een leider en sociale informatieverwerking. Met andere woorden, de 
huidige data suggereren dat leiders vooral sociale informatie die verankerd is met de 
manier waarop zij zichzelf definiëren zullen gebruiken. Dit onderzoek geeft het eerste en 
noodzakelijke bewijs dat het zelfconcept van leiders, om precies te zijn de zelfdefinitie 
van een leider als leider, een significant effect heeft op de zelf-dienende gedragingen van 
een leider. We hopen hiermee niet alleen het onderzoek naar de determinanten van 
leider zelf- en groep-dienende gedragingen op de onderzoeksagenda te hebben gezet, 
maar ook leider zelf-definitie geïntroduceerd te hebben als een concept waar rekening 
mee gehouden dient te worden bij onderzoek naar gedrag van leiders.  
In hoofdstuk drie stelden we dat de mate waarin een leider gevoelig is voor 
verschillende soorten signalen in allocatiecontexten beïnvloed wordt door macht. We 
veronderstelden dat veel macht van de leider niet onvermijdelijk zou resulteren in meer 
leider zelf-dienende gedragingen. Wel veronderstelden we dat hoe meer macht een leider 
heeft, des te meer de acties van deze leider afhankelijk worden van interne aannames en 
overtuigingen (bijv. effectieve leiderschapsaannames, ELBs), en des te minder 
afhankelijk ze worden van situationele, contextuele signalen (bijv. prestatiefeedback). Of 
dit zou leiden tot meer of minder zelf-dienende gedragingen zou afhangen van de aard 
van deze aannames en contextuele signalen. We hebben deze voorspellingen, die tot 
stand zijn gekomen op basis van een integratie van de power-approach theorie (Keltner 
et al., 2003), de equity theorie (Adams, 1965), en leider-categorisatie theorie (Lord & 
Mahler, 1993), getoetst in een serie van vier laboratorium- en scenario-experimenten en 
één veldstudie. We hebben consistent aangetoond dat de macht van een leider 
interacteerde met situationele informatie (prestatiefeedback) en interne overtuigingen 
(ELBs) in het voorspellen van leider zelf-dienende allocaties. Ten eerste gaven twee 
experimentele studies aan dat prestatiefeedback minder impact had op de zelf-allocaties 
van leiders met veel macht dan op de zelf-allocaties van leiders met weinig macht. 
Leiders met weinig macht claimden meer of juist minder middelen dan leiders met veel 
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macht, afhankelijk van hun prestatie ten opzichte van volgers. Ten tweede lieten de 
resultaten van twee additionele experimenten zien dat de zelf-allocaties van leiders met 
veel macht meer een reflectie waren van hun interne overtuigingen aangaande effectief 
leiderschap dan de zelf-allocatie van leiders met weinig macht. We vonden dat leiders 
met veel macht zich of meer zelf-dienend of meer groep-dienend gedroegen dan leiders 
met weinig macht, afhankelijk van de inhoud van hun ELBs. Tot slot hebben we onze 
experimentele bevindingen gerepliceerd in een cross-sectionele organisatie-survey. Ten 
eerste leveren deze studies overtuigend bewijs dat de macht van een leider een 
significante invloed heeft op zelf-dienende gedragingen. We toonden echter ook aan dat, 
in tegenstelling tot de populaire publieke opinie, leiders met veel macht niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs egocentrisch, zelfbevoordelend of corrupt hoeven te zijn. De 
allocaties van leiders met veel macht zijn echter afhankelijk zijn van hun overtuigingen 
aangaande effectief leiderschap. Machtige leiders die ervan uit gaan dat effectief 
leiderschap betekent dat de belangen van de groep gediend moeten worden, zullen 
eerder tot groep-dienende gedragingen over gaan dan leiders die denken dat een 
effectieve leider voornamelijk de eigen belangen dient. Ten tweede slaat dit onderzoek 
een brug naar recente ontwikkelingen in sociaal psychologisch onderzoek naar macht en 
leiderschap. We hebben aangetoond dat verschillende machtsniveaus, zelfs binnen een 
rol die traditioneel gezien wordt als een rol met veel macht, tot verschillende besluiten 
en gedragingen leidt. Dit suggereert dat voor inzicht in leiderschapsprocessen het niet 
alleen belangrijk is de effecten van machtsverschillen tussen leiders en volgers op 
besluitvorming en gedrag in ogenschouw te nemen, maar ook de effecten van 
verschillen in macht binnen de leiderschapsrol. 
In hoofdstuk vier voorspelden we dat de kortzichtige egoïstische focus van de meer 
machtige leider zou worden beperkt door enerzijds procedurele 
rechtvaardigheidssystemen en anderzijds het in psychologische zin innemen van de 
positie van de ander. We baseerden ons hierbij op een integratie van de power-approach 
theorie (Keltner et al., 2003), onderzoek naar procedurele rechtvaardigheid (Colquitt, 
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), en onderzoek 
naar perspectief nemen (Davis, 1980, 1983; Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky et al., 2005). 
De hypotheses werden getest in een laboratoriumexperiment, een scenario-experiment, 
en een veldstudie. In ons eerste experiment beredeneerden we dat procedurele 
rechtvaardigheidssystemen het perspectief innemen van de ander door leiders met veel 
macht zou faciliteren, wat zou moeten leiden tot minder zelf-allocaties in vergelijking 
met situaties waarin procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen afwezig zijn. In 
overeenstemming met onze voorspellingen vonden we dat vooral leiders met veel macht 
zichzelf minder punten toekenden wanneer ondergeschikten inspraak hadden dan 
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wanneer ondergeschikten dat niet hadden. We toonden aan dat deze effecten verklaard 
konden worden doordat deze leiders meer geneigd waren het perspectief van de ander in 
te nemen. In de volgende twee studies hebben we onze mediatiehypothese 
geherformuleerd als een moderatiehypothese. In deze studies hebben we daarom de 
drieweg-interactie tussen macht, procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen en het innemen 
van het perspectief van de ander op de zelf-allocaties van de leider onderzocht. Hierbij 
voorspelden we dat onder condities waarbij het perspectief van de ander nauwelijks of 
niet wordt ingenomen, leiders met veel macht zichzelf minder bevoordelen als 
procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen aanwezig zijn dan wanneer ze afwezig zijn. In 
condities waarbij het perspectief van de ander wel wordt ingenomen zal deze relatie 
minder sterk naar voren komen. Verder verwachtten we dat leiders met veel macht hun 
zelf-allocatie zouden beperken, onafhankelijk van de aanwezigheid of afwezigheid van 
procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen. In overeenstemming met onze voorspellingen, 
toonden we in studie 2 aan dat procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen en de macht van 
de leider interacteerden in het voorspellen van leider zelf-allocatie wanneer leiders het 
perspectief van de ander niet innamen. Wanneer leiders het perspectief van de ander wel 
innamen kenden leiders met veel macht relatief veel toe aan anderen, onafhankelijk van 
de aanwezigheid of afwezigheid van procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen. In studie 3 
repliceerden we deze bevindingen in een organisatiecontext. We gebruikten hiervoor een 
uitgebreidere conceptualisatie van procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen, een 
individuele verschilmaat van het innemen van het perspectief van de ander en een 
bredere afhankelijke variabele in vergelijking tot onze experimentele studies. Het 
onderzoek dat wordt beschreven in dit hoofdstuk levert het eerste bewijs dat het 
samenspel tussen procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen en het innemen van het 
perspectief van de ander het gedrag van leiders kan beïnvloeden. 
In hoofdstuk vijf stellen we dat aansprakelijkheid de effecten van de macht van een 
leider op zelf-dienende gedragingen zou modereren. Heel concreet stelden we dat 
machtige leiders die aansprakelijk gesteld kunnen worden zich zouden inhouden en zich 
minder zelf-dienend zouden gedragen dan leiders met veel macht die niet aansprakelijk 
gesteld kunnen worden. We baseerden ons hierbij op de power-approach theorie 
(Keltner et al., 2003) en op onderzoek naar de psychologische effecten van 
aansprakelijkheid (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). De hypothese werd getoetst met behulp van 
een laboratorium experiment en een veldstudie. In beide studies vonden we dat de 
macht van een leider interacteerde met aansprakelijkheid in het voorspellen van het 
gedrag van de leider. In studie 1 toonden we aan dat vooral als leiders weten dat zij 
aansprakelijk gesteld kunnen worden (vs. als zij niet aansprakelijk gesteld kunnen 
worden) leiders met veel macht zichzelf minder toebedeelden dan leiders met veel 
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macht. De zelf-allocaties van leiders met weinig macht waren minder afhankelijk van 
aansprakelijkheid dan de zelf-alloacties van leiders met veel macht. In studie 2 werden 
deze bevindingen gerepliceerd in een cross-sectionele veldstudie van leiders in 
organisaties. Hierbij werd aangetoond dat machtige leiders die zich aansprakelijk voelden 
zichzelf minder zelf-dienend gedroegen dan machtige leiders die zich niet aansprakelijk 
voelden. Dit onderzoek ondersteunt theoretische bespiegelingen waarin gesteld werd dat 
aansprakelijkheid van machtige personen schadelijke effecten van macht zou kunnen 
beperken. 
In hoofdstuk zes vatten we de bevindingen van de empirische hoofdstukken samen 
en bespraken we de theoretische en praktische implicaties voor leiderschapsonderzoek 
in het algemeen en voor onderzoek naar leider zelf-dienende gedragingen in het 
bijzonder. 
 
Conclusie 
Leider zelf-dienende gedragingen zijn een bijzonder schadelijke categorie van 
leiderschapsgedragingen die een scala van negatieve consequenties voor ondergeschikten 
en organisaties met zich meebrengt. Het is daarom enigszins verrassend dat 
leiderschapsonderzoek zich tot nu toe nauwelijks heeft bezig gehouden met factoren die 
zelf-dienend gedrag in de hand zouden kunnen werken. Deze dissertatie was erop 
gericht om enkele factoren aan het licht te brengen die ons konden informeren over 
wanneer en waarom leiders zich meer zelf-dienend of groep-dienend gedragen. Ten eerste 
vonden we dat leider zelf-definitie en leider macht het soort informatie dat leiders 
gebruiken in een allocatiecontext beïnvloedt. De mate waarin een leider zich zelf-
dienend gedroeg bleek afhankelijk van de inhoud van deze informatie. Belangrijk hierbij 
is dat macht niet noodzakelijkerwijs meer zelf-dienend gedrag van de leider tot gevolg 
had. Ten tweede hebben we procedurele rechtvaardigheidssystemen, aansprakelijkheid 
en het perspectief nemen door de leider als potentiële begrenzers van enkele van de 
meer negatieve consequenties van macht van de leider aangewezen. We hopen dat ons 
onderzoek aanleiding zal geven voor het verder exploreren van factoren die ertoe leiden 
dat leiders zich zelf-dienend gedragen, en dat de belangrijke rol van leider zelfconcept en 
leider macht hierbij in ogenschouw genomen zal worden. 
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l)THE DARK SIDE OF LEADERSHIP
EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADER SELF-SERVING BEHAVIOR
Leaders often have considerable control over the distribution of scarce resources within
their organizations or groups. In the quintessentially interdependent organizational
context these resources are typically needed to reach collective goals, and yet some
leaders choose to enrich themselves at the expense of the group. In academic circles as
well as in the forum of public opinion, leader self-serving behaviors have been proposed
to be particularly destructive, because they carry the specter of negative consequences for
the organization at large, as well as for individual followers’ motivation and performance.
In contrast, leader group-serving behaviors have consistently been depicted as a positive
force, linked to increased leader effectiveness. Despite the considerable dysfunctional
downstream consequences associated with leader self-serving behaviors, our under -
standing of when and why leaders choose to serve their own interests or to benefit their
groups has been limited. This dissertation aimed to uncover factors that influence leader
self versus group-serving behaviors by pointing to the value of (1) a self-concept-based
analysis, as well as (2) a power-based analysis of leader actions.
In a series of experimental and field studies, across four empirical chapters (1) I have
outlined how self-definition processes intimately tied to the leader role, as well as power-
related processes influence leaders’ framing of allocation situations and their subsequent
behaviors, and (2) I have identified potential ways to mitigate some of the negative
effects associated with elevated leader power. First, I found that self-definition as a leader
and power influence the type of information used by leaders in resource allocation
contexts. Contingent on the content of this information, more or less self-serving behaviors
ensued. Importantly, power did not necessarily lead to increased leader self-servingness.
Second, I identified systemic procedural justice, accountability, and perspective-taking as
potential mitigators of some of the more negative tendencies associated with elevated
leader power that could result in relatively self-serving leader behaviors.
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